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ABSTRACT 
Millions of users world-wide are sharing content using Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, such as 
Skype and Bit Torrent. While such new innovations undoubtedly bring benefits, there are 
nevertheless some associated threats. One of the main hazards is that P2P worms can penetrate 
the network, even from a single node and then spread rapidly. Understanding the propagation 
process of such worms has always been a challenge for researchers. Different techniques, such 
as simulations and analytical models, have been adopted in the literature. While simulations 
provide results for specific input parameter values, analytical models are rather more general 
and potentially cover the whole spectrum of given parameter values. Many attempts have been 
made to model the worm propagation process in P2P networks. However, the reported 
analytical models to-date have failed to cover the whole spectrum of all relevant parameters 
and have therefore resulted in high false-positives. This consequently affects the immunization 
and mitigation strategies that are adopted to cope with an outbreak of worms. 
The first key contribution of this thesis is the development of a susceptible, exposed, 
infectious, and Recovered (SEIR) analytical model for the worm propagation process in a P2P 
network, taking into account different factors such as the configuration diversity of nodes, user 
behaviour and the infection time-lag. These factors have not been considered in an integrated 
form previously and have been either ignored or partially addressed in state-of-the-art 
analytical models. Our proposed SEIR analytical model holistically integrates, for the first 
time, these key factors in order to capture a more realistic representation of the whole worm 
propagation process. 
The second key contribution is the extension of the proposed SEIR model to the mobile M-
SEIR model by investigating and incorporating the role of node mobility, the size of the worm 
and the bandwidth of wireless links in the worm propagation process in mobile P2P networks. 
The model was designed to be flexible and applicable to both wired and wireless nodes. 
The third contribution is the exploitation of a promising modelling paradigm, Agent-based 
Modelling (ABM), in the P2P worm modelling context. Specifically, to exploit the synergies 
between ABM and P2P, an integrated ABM-Based worm propagation model has been built 
and trialled in this research for the first time. The introduced model combines the 
implementation of common, complex P2P protocols, such as Gnutella and GIA, along with 
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the aforementioned analytical models. Moreover, a comparative evaluation between ABM and 
conventional modelling tools has been carried out, to demonstrate the key benefits of ease of 
real-time analysis and visualisation. 
As a fourth contribution, the research was further extended by utilizing the proposed SEIR 
model to examine and evaluate a real-world data set on one of the most recent worms, namely, 
the Conficker worm. Verification of the model was achieved using ABM and conventional 
tools and by then comparing the results on the same data set with those derived from developed 
benchmark models.   
Finally, the research concludes that the worm propagation process is to a great extent affected 
by different factors such as configuration diversity, user-behaviour, the infection time lag and 
the mobility of nodes. It was found that the infection propagation values derived from state-
of-the-art mathematical models are hypothetical and do not actually reflect real-world values. 
In summary, our comparative research study has shown that infection propagation can be 
reduced due to the natural immunity against worms that can be provided by a holistic 
exploitation of the range of factors proposed in this work.  
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NFS Network File System 
ODD Overview, Design Concepts, and Details 
P2P Peer-to-Peer 
PDA Personal Desktop Assistants 
PDF Probability Density Function 
PMP Pontryagin’ s Maximum Principle 
PQ Probabilistic Queuing 
RPC Remote Procedure Calls 
RW Random Walk 
RWP Random Way Point 
SEIDR Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Diagnosed, and Recovered 
SEIR Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Recovered 
SFN Scale Free Networks 
SIM Susceptible Infectious Mobile 
SIR Susceptible, Infected and Recovered 
SMS Short Message Service 
STAWP Stochastic Active Worm Propagation 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TTL Time to Live 
UB User Behaviour 
VD Virtual Degree Local search algorithm 
XSL Extensible Style sheet Language 
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  : INTRODUCTION 
1.1.   Background 
Over the past decade, the internet has grown dramatically. With this increase, several 
applications have emerged to solve the various issues of scalability and resilience [1]. One of 
these applications is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. In keeping with the wide range of uses for 
P2P networks, a multitude of definitions for Peer-to-Peer have been proposed. 
A P2P network has been defined as a distributed system comprising a set of interconnected 
nodes without the need for the intermediation or support of a centralized server [2]. Such a 
system is capable of adapting failure and accommodating scalability while also maintaining 
satisfactory connectivity and performance. This is done to share various resources such as 
content, storage and bandwidth. P2P networks are offered as overlay networks on the top of 
physical networks. The overlay network is responsible for location and storing services while 
the physical network is responsible for physically forwarding data.  
P2P network paradigms have gained significant popularity due to their independence from the 
central server management. Since P2P networks are implemented as overlay networks, they 
allow a higher level of communication and data-sharing among participating peers. The 
connections that are established between peers are logical and independent from the physical 
layer [3]. A P2P network can be categorized in one of the two main categories which are 
structured and unstructured overlays. 
The popularity of P2P networks has led to serious security implications and vulnerabilities 
[4]. Common threats to P2P networks are sabotaging  the network through internet worms, 
which can disable a large portion of  a network [5][6][7], and compromise privacy and identity, 
resulting in the disclosure of users’ private information [8], fairness in sharing [9], and the 
distributed denial of service attack, making the servers unavailable to requesting clients [10], 
[11], free riders [12], and even the blocking of P2P traffic. 
Among all the security-related challenges, P2P worm remains one of the major vulnerabilities. 
A P2P worm is a kind of malicious code that spreads by means of P2P networks [13]. The 
network worm is a self-reproducing program that, unlike a virus, does not infect other 
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programs. Instead, a worm creates copies of itself which then further creates even more copies 
[14].  
Worms target multi-processing operating system, create copies of itself and spread to other 
connected neighbours on network. There are many reasons that make P2P networks vulnerable 
to worms. One of the reasons is that many P2P networks, such as Kaaza [15], Gnutella [16] 
and GIA [16], are able to share an executable file. Another reason is that an enormous number 
of common users are connected to P2P network at any given time. These users are normally 
not aware of the security concerns related to P2P networks that can potentially make the 
network vulnerable to a potential attack [17].  
1.2.   Issue and Challenges  
The focus of this thesis is worm propagation modelling in unstructured P2P networks. There 
are several primary reasons why these particular issues have been addressed. Primarily, worm 
propagation modelling is achieved by developing analytical models that take different sets of 
parameters into consideration. One of the common concerns of some of these models is when 
only a subset of parameters is considered while assuming constant values for major factors, 
which may act as a hard-constraint for the analytical models. Moreover, the worm propagation 
process is a complex process and the simulations generated using conventional tools raise 
questions concerning the validity of the results obtained. Another important consideration is 
the separate handling of P2P protocols and worm propagation models. Since some P2P worms 
are designed for a particular P2P protocol, an integrated solution reflecting more accurate 
behaviour is required. 
The issues and challenges addressed in this research are as follows: 
1.2.1. Realistic Worm Propagation Models  
A number of analytical models were developed to show the worm propagation process. These 
models were based on different factors such as configuration diversity, mobility, the join-and-
leave behaviour of nodes and the infection time-lag. Most of the models follow a deterministic 
approach [6] while a few are modelled as stochastic [7]. The issue with these particular models 
is that these were developed using a subset of causative factors instead of integrating all the 
relevant factors and therefore, as a result, they fail to portray a more realistic worm 
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propagation process. Consequently, the immunization strategies developed using these models 
suffer from a high false-positive rate for the detection of worms. 
1.2.2. Mobility of Nodes 
In presence of diverse sets of devices, such as hand-held personal desktop assistants (PDA), 
smart phones, laptop computers and desktop machines that are connected through a P2P 
network, it is essential to consider the impact of the mobility of the node on not only on query 
propagation but also on worm propagation [18]. Relatively less attention has been paid in the 
literature to consider the mobility factor in analytical models. 
1.2.3. User Behaviour Modelling 
 This is a broad term which includes the online/offline behaviour, the setting-up 
upload/download limit, the free-rider issue and many more behavioural issues. During the 
worm propagation process, different P2P clients log on and off frequently, set up upload and 
download limits randomly and utilize the network as free-riders. Therefore, determining the 
impact of these factors on worm propagation is an important issue. These factors need to be 
addressed in the development of more realistic analytical models. 
1.2.4. Real-World Dataset Availability  
The availability of a real-world dataset showing the infectious node and the propagation 
behaviour is a real challenge in understanding the worm process. Many of the existing research 
is based on hypothetical assumptions and associated worm propagation models [19] and relies 
on simulations to model the behaviour, and, therefore, has not been validated through data 
generated by real networks. 
1.2.5. Requirement for an Appropriate Modelling Tool  
Considering the complexity and adaptive nature of the worm propagation process, the 
conventional network modelling tools are limited when it comes to modelling an exact 
reflection of the process. To address this issue, a promising modelling paradigm, Agent-based 
Modelling (ABM), in P2P worm modelling context has been used. Specifically, to exploit the 
synergies between ABM and P2P, an integrated ABM-Based worm propagation model has 
been built and trialled in this research for the first time. 
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1.3.   Thesis Statement 
P2P networks suffer from many security issues, one of them being worm propagation in a 
highly connected network where all peers are sharing their data. This thesis investigates the 
propagation process of worms affected by different factors such as configuration diversity, 
infection time lag and user-behaviour. In this thesis, an integrated analytical model is 
developed to demonstrate the influence of these factors, holistically,  using a P2P protocol. 
The propagation of active P2P worms is also simulated on P2P protocols (Gnutella and GIA), 
using an analytical model with different parameter values.  
Furthermore, the mobility of nodes is addressed within the context of P2P networks and the 
mobility factor is computed using existing mobility models and wireless-network-specific 
parameters. Moreover, using conventional and ABM tools, extensive simulations are 
comparatively evaluated, and these not only reflect the effectiveness of the analytical model 
itself but also investigate the feasibility of ABM tools in the domain of worm propagation 
modelling. Moreover, the proposed analytical model is further evaluated using a real world 
data set of Conficker worms by considering other benchmark models that have been inspired 
and developed, based on the same data set. 
1.4.   Aims and Objectives 
The key objective of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive analytical model for the 
propagation of worms. The aim is to discover the impact of different factors on the worm 
propagation process and to understand the more realistic foot-prints of worms in an 
unstructured P2P network. This understanding will contribute to the adoption of counter-
measurement strategies against the worms and to a reduction in the false-positive detection 
ratio exhibited by the current detection models. The objectives of this thesis are the following: 
•   To investigate different P2P networks, conventional network modelling tools and the 
feasibility of agent-based modelling tools in simulating the worms in P2P networks, 
as well as to analyse comparatively both types of tools, considering different metrics 
such as query-delay and hop-count. 
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•   To investigate existing worm propagation models in P2P networks, and classify 
models according to the worm propagation mode that has been addressed. Also, to 
investigate the parameters affecting the worm propagation process. 
•   To represent a more realistic picture of worm propagation by developing an analytical 
model for worm propagation that holistically integrates the important factors. 
Moreover, to evaluate the worm propagation using the proposed model and 
considering infection density as the major metric. The evaluation will make use of both 
types of modelling tools (Conventional and ABM). 
•   To evaluate the proposed model with a real-world worm dataset along with benchmark 
models developed on top of the same dataset. Also, to discuss the role of different 
network-related parameters, such as the Network Address Translation (NAT) protocol, 
on infection density. 
•   To investigate the role of node mobility on the process of worm propagation. This is 
achieved by developing the mobility factor for mobile nodes using mobility models. 
This is followed by the integration of the mobility factor with the existing analytical 
model for worm propagation. To evaluate the proposed analytical model using the 
various tools and to demonstrate the node importance of node mobility on the worm 
propagation process. 
1.5.   Contributions 
In this thesis, a number of issues related to P2P worms has been investigated and addressed. 
These include: (1) the development of a more realistic worm propagation model in 
unstructured P2P networks, combining different factors; (2) the impact of mobility on the 
worm propagation process; (3) the evaluation of the proposed model considering a real-world 
dataset of Conficker worm; (4) worm propagation modelling issues in conventional network 
modelling tools; and (5) the exploitation of Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) in a P2P domain 
with the secondary objective of implementing an integrated model of P2P protocol (Gnutella 
or GIA) with the worm propagation process. 
The expected contributions of this thesis are the following: 
•   The development of an analytical model for the worm propagation process in a P2P 
network, considering different factors such as the configuration diversity of nodes, user 
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behaviour and infection time lag. The factors are generally not, or at least only, 
partially considered in most of the analytical models. In the proposed SEIR model, 
they will be integrated holistically in order to provide a more realistic representation 
of the actual effects of the worm propagation behaviour. 
•   An investigation into the effect of the mobility of nodes, the size of worm and the 
bandwidth of wireless links on the worm propagation process in mobile P2P networks. 
The model is designed to be flexible as both wired and wireless nodes are considered. 
There is also the flexibility to calculate the mobility factor for each individual node at 
any given times provided instead of computing for the whole network. 
•   As a secondary objective, a new and promising modelling paradigm, namely, Agent-
based Modelling (ABM), is explored. This is found to be an effective and powerful 
tool across a wide range of domains. In this thesis, the capability of such an ABM 
modelling approach in simulating P2P network and P2P worm propagation has been 
demonstrated. Consequently, for the first time, an integrated model, implementing the 
unstructured P2P protocols (Gnutella and GIA) along with the aforementioned 
analytical models, has been carried out. Moreover, a comparative study of ABM versus 
conventional network modelling tools is also undertaken. 
•   An exhaustive and comparative evaluation of the worm propagation process, using the 
proposed model with conventional and ABM tools. A discussion of the associated 
issues and challenges encountered during the simulations.  In addition, a discussion on 
various artefacts which are produced as a result of these simulations. 
•   An evaluation of the proposed model considering the data set of one of the most recent 
worms (Conficker). The verification of this model is achieved using ABM and 
conventional tools compared with benchmark models developed and based on the 
same data set. 
1.6.   Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, a synopsis of which is given below.   
•   Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the thesis. It presents the thesis statement, the 
challenges, the objectives and the contributions of the research. 
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•   Chapter 2 introduces P2P networks, their characteristics and types, namely, 
unstructured and structured P2P systems. It provides further details concerning P2P 
protocols such as GIA and Gnutella, the issues and challenges associated with P2P 
networks and conventional modelling tools. Moreover, Agent-Based Modelling in P2P 
networks is introduced and this is followed by a comparative discussion between ABM 
and conventional simulators. A performance evaluation of GIA using a conventional 
simulator (Oversim) and an ABM tool (Netlogo) is carried out. This chapter lays the 
foundation for integrating the implementation of P2P protocols along with the 
analytical models of worm propagation, using ABM tools. 
•   Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive review of P2P worms and their classification, 
their propagation behaviour, and their destruction strength and of existing analytical 
models by presenting the current state-of-the-art of the existing worm propagation 
models. Following this, gaps in the existing research are highlighted and parameters, 
such as the infection time-lag, configuration diversity and user behaviour are 
considered as important parameters in the worm propagation process. More 
importantly, an entirely new SEIR model is presented, one that holistically takes all of 
these important parameters into account. 
•   Chapter 4 gives exhaustive results for SEIR model, which unveiled in Chapter 3. The 
results were generated using both ABM and conventional tools. A detailed and 
comparative analysis for worm propagation behaviour according to the different values 
of the factors is generated. In addition, an integrated solution for the proposed model 
and P2P protocols (Gnutella and GIA) is implemented. The impact of different tools 
(ABM and Conventional) is evaluated from the perspective of the worm propagation 
process. 
•   Chapter 5 evaluates the proposed SEIR model with a real data set from one of the 
most recent worms (Conficker). The results were obtained using conventional and 
ABM tools and then compared with the real data in the presence of selected benchmark 
models. 
•   Chapter 6 extends SEIR model to M-SEIR model by investigating the role of node 
mobility, the bandwidth of wireless links and the worm data size as important factors 
and then computes the node mobility factor, based on the Gauss-Markov mobility 
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model. The throughput of wireless links is also analytically computed. The additional 
factors related to mobility of nodes are integrated with SEIR analytical model. Without 
losing generality of the network, M-SEIR model can be applied on wired, wireless or 
heterogeneous networks. The salient features of this model are that it can maintain the 
spatial-temporal behaviour of nodes, the node-level mobility-factor control, the 
randomness control for individual nodes, and the throughput offered by the network 
and the worm size. 
•   Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It provides an overall summary of the whole thesis, 
revisits the thesis objectives and discusses how these have been addressed. Finally, the 
limitations of this study are discussed and potential directions for future research are 
suggested.  
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  : REVIEW OF P2P 
NETWORKS 
2.1.   Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of P2P networks, their characteristics and taxonomy. It 
further describes important P2P protocols and their functions. Existing issues and challenges 
in P2P networks are then briefly discussed. Following this, an overview of conventional 
network modelling tools is provided. Moreover, the utility of Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) 
tools is also introduced within the domain of P2P networks by considering a case study 
implementation. Moreover, comparative evaluation between ABM and conventional network 
modelling tools is given by implementing GIA protocol using OverSim and Netlogo 
simulators. The obtained results of this implementation indicate certain benefits from ABM 
tools such as ease of implementation, real-time analysis support being an aid to visualization. 
2.2.   Distributed Systems 
The distributed systems are basically designed to share data with each other and form the basis 
of many distributed applications [20]. Also, it allow multiple processes to share data over long 
periods in a secure and reliable way. These processes serve as a basic layer for distributed 
systems and applications. Additionally, different types of architectures followed in distributed 
file system, and a brief description of these architectures is provided as follows: 
1-   Client-Server Architecture: The basic theme of client-server architecture is to share 
data among different clients in standardized format. To achieve this objective, Network 
File System (NFS) was proposed which represents file independent of the files system 
on local clients. NFS is a standard which can be utilized for sharing files by any 
application program without relying on local file system and provide remote access to 
files by the application [21]. 
2-   Cluster-Based Distributed File Systems: Parallel applications that require parallel 
computing are mainly hosted on multiple cluster servers. The associated file systems 
of the cluster will be adjusted accordingly. A file to be stored on distributed servers is 
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divided into multiple parts and these parts are stored on the different servers thus 
making parallel processing possible [22]. 
3-   Symmetric Architectures: The typical examples of full symmetric organizations are 
based on P2P technology like Chord DHT-based system. These architectures are 
centralized which are based on distributed hash tables (DHTs) [23] and decentralized 
such as given in [24].  
 In following sections, the distributed systems will be discussed in detail in the context of P2P 
networks. 
2.3.   Peer-to-Peer Networks 
2.3.1.  Introduction to P2P 
The internet has recently grown dramatically. With this increase, several applications have 
emerged to solve various issues of scalability and resilience. One of these applications is P2P. 
In accordance with the wide range of use for P2P, many definitions for Peer-to-Peer systems 
have been proposed. P2P system is decentralized system of connected nodes without any 
central mechanism of mediation [2]. This system is capable of adapting failure and 
accommodating scalability while maintaining satisfactory connectivity and performance. This 
is done to share various resources such as content, storage and bandwidth. P2P systems can 
mainly be divided into three different architectures, namely, centralized, decentralized 
structured and decentralized unstructured [2]. In a centralized approach, central servers are 
dedicated to manage the operations of P2P network. In contrast, decentralized P2P architecture 
eliminates the need for such servers. This in turn provides flexibility among peers to exchange 
information between each other. In decentralized structured systems, nodes are distributed 
according to the distributed hash table (DHT), which shapes the whole topology into a specific 
structure as, for example, in Pastry, Kadamelia, and Chord. In a decentralized unstructured 
system, there is neither a dedicated server nor any distributed hash function. The most popular 
examples are Gnutella [16] and KaZaA [25]. There is a further common distinction in that P2P 
can be classified as structured, unstructured overlays. 
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2.3.2.  Characteristics of P2P 
Some of the significant characteristics are considered as principles for Peer-to-Peer system 
paradigm and make it useful in today’s technology can be summarized as follows: 
•   Resource-sharing: To support the operation of Peer-to-Peer system, each peer 
contributes some resources such as network bandwidth, disk storage and compute 
cycles.  
•   Decentralization and Symmetry: In P2P system, there are no dedicated servers. 
Moreover, every node has a similar role and responsibility in the overlay and the 
collection of their behaviour shapes the overlay. However, some P2P algorithms give 
some special peers special roles such as super peers and relay peers. 
•   Self-Organization: The overlay is not controlled and dominated by a specific peer. 
The overlay organization is based on the local state and information at each peer. All 
peers cooperate in the overlay maintenance and formation. The network also tends to 
improve its state throughout the run of the network. 
•   Networked: All the peers can reach each other in the same overlay. Since all peers are 
interconnected with each other in one graph, the peers in the network will participate 
in forwarding and propagating messages in the network. 
•   Stability: Even with a high churn rate (the rate of peers joining and leaving the 
network, P2P system is designed to be stable and maintain connectivity throughout the 
graph by recovering from failure and reshaping the graph, based on changes in the 
topology, as can be seen in Fault-Tolerance. 
•   Autonomy: In P2P system, the capability of each peer is determined according to its 
own resources.  Each peer is also able to independently determine whether to join or 
leave the overlay and what request it should send to the overlay.  
•   Scalability: Due to the autonomy factor, Peer-to-Peer systems need to be highly 
scalable. This is critical as the number of peers can change dramatically and 
unpredictably. Currently, several P2P applications are operating with a significant 
number of peers. 
•   Fault-Tolerance: Since the behaviour of the peers is not predictable, P2P systems are 
designed to be tolerant. In case, a peer goes offline or is disconnected from the overlay, 
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its resources will be reallocated. This is possible since some degree of redundancy is 
built into the system.  
2.3.3.  Types and Classifications of P2P Systems 
The numerous designs for P2P networks have led to many proposals for classification [2]. One 
of the common distinctions is to categorize P2P overlays into structured and unstructured 
overlays. Structured overlays are distinguished by a variety of dimensions such as the 
maximum number of hops, the routing algorithm, or the size of overlay with node degree and 
lookup type. Moreover, structured overlays use key-based routing to facilitate object 
placement, where the nodes maintain a routing table about how to reach the entire overlay 
nodes. Furthermore, unlike unstructured overlays, they limit the number of messages needed 
to discover any specific object in the overlay. Examples of structured overlays are Chord, 
Kademlia and Pastry. Contrasting with structured overlays, unstructured overlays are usually 
further distinguished by how search requests propagate, by the distribution of node degree in 
the peer population, and by differences in link creation with neighbouring nodes. Nodes in 
unstructured overlays depend only on their adjacent nodes for propagating messages and do 
not impose any particular network structure. Most commonly, message propagation strategies 
use to some extent flooding and random walk approaches [26]. Most deployed P2P 
applications employ unstructured search techniques [27]. More recently, research has focused 
on the design of efficient search algorithms, including query propagation and query 
processing.  
Various proposals for the classification of P2P systems are based on the different design of 
P2P networks. One design involves completely decentralized architecture while other design 
combined servers with P2P routing. 
The classification of P2P overlays is shown in Figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1: Classification of P2P Overlays [2] 
2.3.3.1.   Structured Overlay 
A structured P2P network is a network in which nodes maintains routing information about 
reaching all other nodes in the network cooperatively [28]. Structured overlays set a limit on 
the number of message that can be used to propagate a query in the network [29]. As compared 
with unstructured overlays that do not provide any limit on query propagation in the network. 
This becomes important particularly while searching low priority queries [16].  
Local routing information is maintained by each node which is used by the forwarding 
algorithm. A specific bootstrap procedure is utilized to initialize the routing table when a peer 
joins or leave the overlay. The routing table information is periodically exchanged by the peers 
as part of overlay maintenance. 
The structured P2P overlay can use key-based routing in which each address is associated with 
a set of keys in the address space so that the nearest peer to an address stores the values of the 
associated keys. Since address space is virtualized and the addresses of peers are randomly 
assigned, the topological neighbours of the peer are distant in the underlying overlay network. 
Although it provides fault tolerance, it nevertheless has a significant performance overhead. 
As a result, the topology-aware overlays used measurement of proximity of peers in the 
underlying network to create neighbour peer in the network [30]. 
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2.3.3.2.   Unstructured Overlay 
In contrast to structured overlays, unstructured overlays do not impose any specific structure 
on the overlay itself. Unstructured overlays are usually classified by how the search requests 
propagate, by the distribution of node degree in the peer population, and by the differences in 
link creation with neighbouring nodes. Nodes in unstructured overlays depend only on their 
adjacent nodes for the propagating of messages [27]. The lack of structure poses many 
challenges especially when searching the network. To solve this issue, many search 
approaches [31] have been introduced and can be classified as follows: 
•   Blind Search Methods: Is used in overlays in which the peers do not maintain any 
information about the location of resources.  
•   Informed Search Methods: In contrast to the blind search technique, informed search 
methods require peers to maintain further routing information about other peers in the 
network in order to forward queries to the appropriate peer.  
The search is the most fundamental function of most deployed P2P overlays, and most of the 
studies of unstructured P2P tend to enhance the search process and design it more efficiently.  
An unstructured network is a network in which a peer relies on its neighbouring peer for the 
delivery of message to any other peer in the network. Example of message propagation 
strategies are Flooding (broadcasting the search query to its immediate neighbours) [1] and 
Random walk (forwarding the query to a randomly selected neighbor at each step until the 
query is satisfied with sufficient responses) [31]. A description of the message propagation 
strategies is provided in Section 2.3.1 in the context of Gnutella protocol. 
The unstructured network graph can be compared with power-law or scale free random graphs 
[32] where random graphs are the graphs showing small world phenomena and social 
networks. The most common P2P overlay network designs are listed in Table 2.1: 
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Table 2.1: Unstructured P2P Overlays 
Type Design Features References 
Hill 
climbing 
backtracking 
Freenet Routing and security can be provided using hill climbing with backing 
[33] 
Hill 
climbing 
backtracking 
Fast Freenet Each peer creates its own summary and share it with other peers in Fast Freenet. 
[33] 
Hill 
climbing 
backtracking 
Small 
World 
Freenet 
Free net considering a small network [34] 
Random 
Walk 
GIA 
Based on four amendments and techniques such as active 
flow control, dynamic topology adaptation, biased 
random walk and one-hop index replication to improve 
performance 
[16] 
Random 
Walk 
LMS Consistent hashing of object identifier to place objects near a close node identifier 
[35] 
Flooding Gnutella 
Flooding of requests by super peers on behalf of regular 
peers 
[36] 
Flooding FastTrack 
Connection shuffling with super peer architecture being 
a proprietary protocol 
[37] 
2.3.3.3. Hybrid Overlays 
Hybrid overlays refer to a mixture of purely decentralized such as Gnutella protocol and 
centralized such as Kaaza protocol. A hybrid approach is followed by Gnutella protocol 0.6 
[38] by combining centralized and decentralized models. The nodes of overlay are categorized 
as leaves and ultra-peers. An ultra-peer keeps connection to fewer leave nodes and connected 
to other ultra-peers. These peers work as proxy for query directing to leave nodes with the 
believe that the leave nodes will response the query. 
2.3.3.4. Hierarchical Overlays 
Hierarchical overlay networks can be represented structured P2P networks look up service 
[39]. The service is based on distributed hash table (DHT) functionality. The data is search 
based on keys which are distributed on multiple serving nodes. In contrast hierarchical DHTs, 
in which peers are organized into groups, and each group has its autonomous intra-group 
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overlay network and lookup service. The top level peer in each group takes the responsibility 
for a key and determines the specific peer which is responsible for the key.  
2.4.   P2P Protocols 
P2P protocol works at the application layer of P2P networks. The major responsibility of these 
protocols is to form and maintain the overlay network and the participating nodes. It provides 
a node with the mechanism of searching for contents, joining the network, leaving the network 
and publishing it contents. Starting from 1999, there is a long list of P2P protocols. A few of 
them are Ares, Bitcoin [40], BitTorrent[41], FastTrack [42], eDonkey [42], Gnutella and GIA. 
In the next section, popular P2P protocols will be discussed in more detail. 
2.4.1.  Gnutella 
The idea of P2P file sharing system was devised by Napster while supporting centralized 
servers for file sharing. Soon after that, the idea of decentralized file sharing and search 
algorithm was proposed in the form of Gnutella which is an open, decentralized and search 
protocol, mainly used for file sharing. The term ‘Gnutella’ refers to the overlay network of 
Gnutella-speaking applications connected via the internet and a number of smaller and often 
private disconnected networks. Gnutella gained popularity after Napster was closed down and 
it has turned out to be one of the most popular systems to date [43].  
Primarily, using Gnutella protocol, when a new peer joins the system, it executes a 
bootstrapping process to find and connect to potential peers. Once a new peer has connected 
to the overlay, it sends a ping message to all connected peers to announce its presence. The 
receiving peer sends back a pong message which in turn comprises its port number and IP 
address. 
Query propagation in Gnutella is based on a flooding mechanism, for example the search 
query propagates from the original requesting peer to all connected neighbours. The query is 
further flooded until it finds the contents or time-to-live expires. Moreover, the intermediate 
nodes are in charge of checking their repository as to whether they have the desired file, and 
of replicating and forwarding the query to all reachable neighbours in the overlay. The query-
hit message or query response is also returned along the reverse path in the direction of the 
requesting peer. Gnutella protocol follows random walk procedure in which the peer which 
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have to forward query to its immediate neighbours selects its neighbour randomly without any 
criteria. 
To reduce the potentially enormous number of messages in the network, queries are restricted 
by a time-to-live (TTL) value, which signifies the number of hops a message can travel before 
it is discarded. TTL is decreased by one with each hop, until the message is discarded when it 
reaches zero. Broadcasting the query to all reachable peer nodes in the overlay within the TTL 
value limitation is called a Breadth-First Search (BFS) mechanism [44]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Gnutella Search Algorithm 
Figure 2.2 shows the search process of Gnutella. Assume that peer ‘A’ needs to find a 
particular file. Initially, it generates its search query which is forwarded to all its connected 
neighbours, peers B, C, and E. When those neighbours receive the query message, they will 
check whether their repository has the required file. Otherwise, they forward the query on to 
their neighbours. Suppose that peer D holds the required file. Peer D will send a response 
along the reverse path to the peer that sent the query, which was peer C. After that, peer C 
continues forwarding the response to the query originator, peer A. Eventually, peer ‘A’ 
contacts peer D directly to download the required file. 
The design goals of Gnutella are as follows: 
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•   The Ability to Operate in a Dynamic Environment: Gnutella based application 
operates in an environment where the nodes join and leave the networks very quickly. 
In order to provide the flexibility for smooth operations, transparent resource handling 
is required. 
•   Performance and Scalability: P2P network can only be beneficial for large-scale 
networks where the limitations of client-server paradigm become evident. The 
scalability refers to the capability of a network to handle a large number of the 
participants. 
•   Reliability: The network attacks should not significantly degrade the performance of 
network significantly. 
•   Anonymity: It is about how to protect the privacy of users seeking or providing 
unpopular information. 
2.4.2.  GIA 
One of the influential unstructured P2P approaches is GIA [16], which derives its name from 
GIAnduia, and is based on the common P2P Gnutella algorithm. By 2007, Gnutella, which 
GIA is improving, was the most popular file-sharing protocol with an estimated market share 
of more than 40%. As Gnutella adopted a decentralized search algorithm, it had one 
fundamental problem, namely, that the nodes became overloaded quickly due to the effect of 
the high aggregation query rate [16]. Therefore, as the resource placement performance is 
significantly affected by the overlay topology, GIA suggested several modifications to 
Gnutella design, to deal with the high aggregation query rate. These can be summarized as the 
following four components: 
•   An Active Flow Control: To ensure that the nodes are not overloaded with high 
queries, each sender node can direct the query only to a neighbour that has informed 
the sender by means of a flow-control token. Each token represents a one-query 
message that the neighbour is ready to accept.  
•   One-hop Replication: Each node keeps an index for its connected neighbour’s 
content. So, when a node receives a query message, it responds with the matching 
contents, and it will also include a list of contents of its connected neighbours. 
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•   A Biased Random Walk (BRW) Search Protocol: Instead of using flooding or 
random-walk search methods, the search process in GIA makes sure that all search 
queries are directed to the high-capacity nodes rather than to randomly chosen nodes 
as in random walkers. The algorithm for the BRW is shown below in Figure 2.3. 
•   A Dynamic Topology Adaptation: The most important component in GIA ensures 
that all nodes in the overlay are connected to the high-capacity nodes, based on the 
pseudo-code in Figure 2.3. To achieve the main goal of topology adaptation, each node 
in GIA calculates a value from 0 to 1. This value is presented by Level of Satisfaction 
(S), in order to measure how the node is satisfied with its connected neighbours. The 
value of 0 means that the node is completely unsatisfied whereas 1 refers to that the 
node being totally satisfied. 
 
Figure 2.3: GIA Pseudo-Code [16] 
 Where: 
o   Num_nbrs: Number of neighbours of a peer. 
o   Max_nbrs: Maximum number of neighbours that a node can have. 
o   Ci: Capacity of a node to handle requests. 
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With the aim of improving the consistency of GIA overlay networks in mobile networks, the 
study in [45] presented a new technique based on GIA. The main concept introduced by M-
GIA is the physical distance between two nodes. The information about a node’s location will 
therefore be considered as an additional parameter to GIA protocol. Indeed, the distance 
between nodes does not comply with the mobility of nodes. Thus, this in turn will burden the 
network, thus increasing the need to calculate the distance with each movement. Furthermore, 
some studies such as GES [46] have inspired the idea of topology adaptation in GIA to 
improve their look-up performance, with the difference bring that the topology adaptation in 
GES is mainly used to organize the semantically relevant nodes into similar semantic groups. 
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Figure 2.4: Flowchart of GIA 
2.5.   Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks 
Most recently, the way people interact and share content with others and connect to their 
environment has been affected by the significant growth in communication and wireless 
technologies, particularly with mobile phones. 
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In general, mobile phones are characterized by four features, which make a distinction 
between P2P and other conventional wired devices and which affect the interaction with the 
overlay. The four features are as follows: 
•   Roaming: Where mobile devices may move from one mobile network to another 
mobile network and, in turn, their IP addresses could be consequently changed. 
•   Node Heterogeneity: The network capacity is not equally distributed among all nodes. 
Due to the physical position of nodes, one node can have more capacity compared with 
another node; hence it can work as a super peer node while the other node still works 
as an ordinary node. 
•   Energy Limitation: Power consumption for all mobile devices is a critical issue, 
which must be taken into account. Different mobile hardware manufacturers are now 
providing power-saving modes to save the limited energy of their devices. 
•   Multi-Homed: Nodes are capable of establishing connections with different networks 
at the same time. 
Recently, wireless nodes represented significant percentage of all overlay nodes in the form 
of smart phones, PDA and other wireless devices. These wireless devices are themselves well-
integrated into our modern way of life. 
The suitability of mobile phones for applications that depend on unstructured P2P for 
information exchange nevertheless presents a number of challenges. Utilizing existing mobile 
applications, mobile nodes not only support content delivery but also act as a data provider. 
Some of the challenges of deploying P2P over mobile networks are listed below: 
•   Energy Constraints: Unfortunately, battery capacity is not keeping pace with the 
huge advances in mobile phone and wireless technology. This must be taken into 
account for any future developments. 
•   Query Propagation: Considered one of the critical issues for data-sharing in P2P 
overlays, the plain flooding mechanism is quite a simple solution for this issue in wired 
networks. It nevertheless seems challenging to guarantee it in bandwidth-limited 
networks. Further refined schemes will undoubtedly be required. 
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•   NAT and Firewall Traversal: This was created by mobile operators in order to allow 
only outbound connection. Semi-centralized servers or proxies are proposed as a 
solution to the aforementioned problem [47]. 
•   Bandwidth Constraints: P2P was introduced for adoption on wired networks that 
depend on IP infrastructure and feature bandwidth availability. Moreover, wireless 
connections remain limited in bandwidth. 
•   Security: The popularity of P2P networks has led to security implications and 
vulnerabilities [33]. Common threats to P2P networks, such as worms, privacy and 
identity, fairness in sharing, the distributed denial of service attack, and the blocking 
of P2P traffic, can all sabotage the network. 
2.6.   Issues and Challenges of P2P Networks 
2.6.1.  Scalability Issue 
Scalability of a system refers to the capability of a system to operate under varying loads 
without significant drop in the performance [48]. The access upload bandwidth is probably 
the main limitation of P2P content distribution because most of the links have asymmetric and 
low upload capacity [48]. As a result, most of P2P protocols have to set a relatively low access 
bandwidth which results in performance bottleneck. The example of protocols suffering from 
the scalability issue is given in Gnutella, Tapestry, Pastry and Chord.  
2.6.2.  Free Rider Issue 
 P2P networks work on the resource-sharing principle of resource, where each node 
contributes to the system by offering its own resources and, in return, expect some other nodes 
to provide it with the required resources. The nodes that take the required resources from other 
nodes but are reluctant to share their own resources are called ‘free riders’ [49]. As a result, 
no node is willing to offer its contents and expects other nodes to bear the cost instead. 
Ultimately, this results in resource congestion and unavailability. 
2.6.3.  Node Mobility 
With growing advancements in wireless technologies, more and more users are shifting to 
mobile devices [50]. For a P2P network that consists of wired and wireless nodes, it is vital to 
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devote significant research efforts to model query propagation behaviour in wireless networks, 
particularly when the impact of node mobility on the overall process is considered. 
2.6.4.  Social Networking  
The social media apps are taking over the business and majority of community is using these 
apps [51]. In the paradigm of P2P networks, as these apps are increasing communication, it is 
important that research is done on the behaviour of users during usage of these applications. 
2.6.5.  Conventional Modelling Tools 
The behaviour of P2P networks is simulated using existing conventional tools. However, the 
query or worm propagation process in P2P network is a complex process that requires 
modelling support from tools to handle the behaviour effectively. Moreover, particular aspects 
of P2P simulations such as visualization of the propagation process and the die-out behaviour 
of simulations are not considered by the existing modelling tools. 
2.6.6.  Security and Threats of Worms 
A P2P worm is a software program with a malicious code that treats the network as a medium 
of spreading. There are many reasons that make P2P networks vulnerable from worms. One 
major reason is that many P2P networks, such as Kaaza, Fastrack and eDonkey, are able to 
share an executable file. The second reason is that at any given time a huge number of common 
users are connected to P2P network. These users are normally unaware of the security 
concerns related to P2P networks. 
Since P2P worms cause significant damage in terms of financial losses, a detailed study about 
worm types, propagation modes, the efforts towards understanding the behaviour of worms, 
and immunization strategies is provided in Chapter 3. The impact of different factors on the 
propagation process and the integration of these factors into one analytical model has been 
achieved. 
2.7.   Modelling Tools in P2P Networks 
Network modelling has been done using a variety of tools provided by open-source 
community and proprietary vendors. While all of these tools have advantages and 
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disadvantages, certain tools nevertheless fail to model protocol-specific behaviour. In this 
context, P2P networks have complex query propagation and protocol specific challenges. A 
list of conventional tools handling these challenges, along with brief description is provided 
in following sections. 
2.7.1.  Conventional Network-Modelling Tools 
Different modelling tools are used in networks to model a variety of behaviours. An overview 
of the current tools and frameworks used for the existing P2P networks is given in Table 2.2, 
where the main advantages and drawbacks of using each of them are also noted.  
2.7.2.  Oversim Simulator 
OverSim [52] is an overlay network simulation framework, developed in C++ at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology (KIT) and based upon OMNeT++, in order to handle the underlay 
network. OverSim includes a number of P2P models for structured ones such as Kademila, 
Chord, and Pastry, and unstructured ones such as GIA. It has been designed to be modular 
comprising three levels, as shown in Figure 2.5: 
•   Application: Where the tested applications are defined, such as the look-up method 
key-based routing (KBR), and direct hash table (DHT). 
•   Overlay: This comprises a number of structured and unstructured models. 
•   Underlay: Different kinds of exchangeable models underlying a network, which 
comprises three network models, namely, Simple, SingleHost and INET. These help 
to simulate the heterogeneous and large-scale networks. 
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Table 2.2: Conventional Modelling Tools 
Tool Description 
Program
ming 
language 
Advantages Disadvantages 
OMNeT++ 
[53] 
Highly modular 
discrete event 
simulator to 
evaluate 
networking 
systems 
C++ 
-Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) and high-level 
description language (NED). 
-Run distributed simulations 
through multi- machines. 
-The number of 
available protocols is 
not as high as alternative 
simulators. 
-Requires high 
programming skills to 
do modification. 
NS-2 
[54] 
Discrete-event 
simulator targeting 
network protocols 
with packet-level 
accuracy. 
C++, 
OTcl Large community of users 
Little work reported in 
P2P overlay. 
OverSim 
[52] 
Framework for 
simulating P2P 
overlays, built 
upon OMNeT++ 
C++ 
Easy to: 
Evaluate the robustness 
and resilience of structured 
P2P overlays under realistic 
different churns. 
Validate structured P2P that 
implements DHT. 
Not supported for 
unstructured P2P 
overlays. 
PeerSim 
[55] 
Focuses on P2P 
protocols, supports 
two simulation 
models, cycle- and 
event-based 
Java Simulate very large number of cycle-based nodes 
Avoid the details of 
underlying network 
- Low accuracy 
P2PSim 
Multi-threaded 
discrete event 
simulator for 
structured overlays 
C++ Support structured P2P with churn behaviour 
No GUI and 
visualization tool for the 
simulation. 
Little support for 
extending P2P protocols 
Overlay 
Weaver  
[56] 
Toolkit for 
simulating P2P 
network, focuses 
only on 
structured overlays 
Java Easy to use to test new protocols 
Real-time execution, 
and thus it is difficult to 
replicate results or 
control parameters 
during experiments. 
Limited use and barely 
documented 
PlanetSim 
The architecture 
comprises 3 layers: 
network, overlay, 
and application 
Java 
High scalability with a large 
scale and a big number of 
nodes. 
Implements just basic 
underlay models. 
Does not provide a 
visualization during 
simulation or GUI. 
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Figure 2.5: Modular Architecture of OverSim [52] 
OverSim users need to define their scenario parameters in the omnetpp.ini script. While the 
default script default.ini contains the default values and parameters of each P2P overlay, there 
is no need to define any parameters in the onmetpp.ini file if the user is going to use the default 
values. 
While observing OverSim simulator, it has been found that OverSim provide controls over 
simulation rather at abstract level by setting up configuration parameters. Also, there is a 
minimal control on P2P protocols related parameters. Moreover, defining the behaviour of 
query propagation through analytical models is hard to do and evaluate. 
2.8.   Agent-Based Modelling 
Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) is a type of computational modelling. This model is for 
simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents [57]. These agents can be either 
individual or collective entities such as organizations or groups. In this section, an introduction 
to Agent-Based Modelling will be provided. Also, the differences between ABM approaches 
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and classical approaches will be discovered and discussed. ABM can be used to develop agents 
which are proactive, autonomous and intelligent. The pro-activeness refers to agents’ 
capability of taking the initiative, enabling them to communicate with other agents and make 
decisions on their own  [57]. 
Most of the classical simulators are not designed to deal with a model in which the number of 
events can exponentially increase, which makes the model inefficient and hard to be analysed 
[58]. Agent-based modelling provides a description for the complex systems in P2P paradigm 
with a higher level of abstraction [59]. This can provide a better understanding of P2P 
paradigm and can be used for further improvements. 
While there is no unified definition of what an agent is, there are nevertheless three common 
characteristics for the agents: 
•   Autonomy: Agents can function without any kind of incorporation or intervention by 
other programs or users. 
•   Reactivity: Agents can react to the changes in the environment according to their goal. 
•   Social Ability: Agents in the system will interact with each other and possibly with 
the users. These interactions are done with the intention of enhancing cooperation and 
competition.  
Depending on the field of study, some characteristics have been presented in the literature 
[60], these are as follows: 
•   Pro-Activity:  Agents are capable of initiating actions as well as reacting to changes 
in the environment. These actions are done in order to achieve a particular goal. 
•   Adaptation/Learning: Agents in the system can improve by learning and adapting to 
its environment.  
•   Mobility: Agents are able to move between nodes in a network. 
As mentioned earlier, a peer could autonomously decide when to join or leave the overlay. 
Reactivity is noticeable in P2P paradigm where peers are expected to react to their 
environment. By reacting to their environment, peers try to make the network converge to an 
optimal state. The peers in the network are proactive. They will therefore take advantage of 
opportunities to improve their situation within the network. Moreover, adaptation and mobility 
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will allow nodes to learn and improve their performance as they traverse through the network, 
discovering links and resources. 
2.8.1.  ABM in P2P Networks 
With the intention of improving search efficiency in P2P network, a number of studies have 
suggested different search methods to resolve this issue. Moreover, many agent-based 
technologies have been proposed to improve the search efficiency in unstructured P2P. For 
example, a study by [61] proposed the Least Common Neighbours’ local search approach 
(LCN). LCN has been compared with the Virtual Degree Local search algorithm VD, which 
is based on selecting nodes with a high virtual degree to transmit the queries (the number of 
the node’s neighbours that have not received queries). One of the goals of LCN approach is to 
expand the scope of the search within the network, by propagating the queries from the node 
that is already occupied by the agent to a node that has the least common neighbours. LCN 
approach also attempts to decrease the possibility of repeatedly forwarding and receiving 
query messages. However, these two approaches will in fact produce too much redundancy. 
In [62], the authors consider merging two paradigms, P2P and ABM. This paper also dealt 
with how to improve the existing P2P ideas and concepts by using ABM. After reviewing the 
two paradigms, a new prototype system was suggested called ‘BestPeer’. The architecture of 
BestPeer comprises three layers: an agent layer at the top of the hierarchy and an underlay P2P 
layer, to support low-level communication, file-sharing and network configuration. This 
system assumes that the whole system is not known by any peer. However, the system will 
use resource-sharing and discovery concepts in P2P to apply it in ABM. ABM is applied on a 
P2P grid computing paradigm in [63] in a  discussion about how the tasks in grid computing 
are handled and distributed using an agent-based model. 
In [64], the paper discusses the use of an ant-based approach to route queries in peer-to-peer 
systems. This paper also discusses the parameters that affect the performance of the system. 
One parameter, in particular, is the ratio of agents or ants that are exploiting the current best 
path over the agents that are exploring and searching for a better path.  
Ecological mechanisms have inspired some researchers to develop ideas to solve P2P 
problems. For example, in studies in [65][66], searchers peer-selected a random number of 
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neighbouring peers to send queries to, and a set of micro-scale rules controlled the search 
mechanism. The agents had to consume the associated energy with peers in order to survive. 
A study by [67] discussed the major threat of the propagation of a P2P worm in the internet, 
how it poses a serious challenge to the network security, and how it  becomes increasingly 
complex. It worth mentioning that most of the existing studies resolve this problem by 
focusing only on the topology of the network as the main parameter affecting the worm 
propagation function. This study, however, introduces an additional effect, namely, the time 
taken by the worm to affect the peer. The results of this study were collected by simulating 
this proposal and developing new agent-based and analytical models. 
All of these studies show the applicability of ABM to the domain of P2P networks. In 
subsequent sections, different ABM tools will be discussed in order to model the complex 
propagation behaviours in P2P networks. 
2.8.2.  Agent Based Modelling Tools 
Over the last few years, several agent-based simulators have appeared and been discussed in 
general in many subjects, such as biology, physics and social studies. Recently, these studies 
have also covered some P2P aspects. This section reviews a number of the existing tools for 
network simulation that are focused on either conventional protocols or on some agent-based 
and biologically inspired protocols. 
Several agent-based simulators have been dedicated to the explicit discussion of some aspects 
of P2P, such as biologically inspired simulators. Examples of these simulators and frameworks 
are Anthill [68], LUNES [69], OverSwarm [70] and Netlogo [71]. 
Anthill framework was introduced specially to support the design of ant-based algorithms in 
P2P and the implementation and evaluation of these algorithms. Moreover, the execution of 
algorithms in Anthill could be cycle-based, enabling large-scale simulations with a large 
number of nodes, or based on a real-world set-up. The focus of Anthill development was on 
the framework rather than on the actual algorithm. 
Gabriela [69] presented an agent-based Large Unstructured Network Simulator (LUNES) to 
simulate the large number of nodes in complex networks. LUNES was introduced as a modular 
approach, establishing the three separate stages of network creation, protocol simulation and 
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result evaluation. The reason underlying the notion of this approach was to facilitate the 
integration and the reuse of some existing software tools. This module also allows analysis of 
a result with the use of integrated tools based on a simple template file. 
Another promising platform, called OverSwarm, was proposed by [70] to facilitate the 
evaluation and implementation of P2P protocols, based on bio-inspired paradigms. The main 
feature of the OverSwarm platform is its integration with the popular P2P simulator 
(OverSim). 
A few popular ABM tools have been discussed in the following sections from the perspective 
of their utilization in P2P domain. 
2.8.2.1.   NetLogo 
NetLogo is an agent-based framework based on the Logo language and it is principally more 
suitable for modelling complex systems that have evolved over a period of time [59]. The 
NetLogo model has been used in several domains such as the social, biological, economic, 
chemical and psychological sciences as well as in numerous other natural sciences  [57]. This 
has inspired some researchers to simulate and analyse distributed systems such as mobile ad 
hoc networks [58] and modern wireless networks [72]. 
A NetLogo package comes with an integrated code library containing numerous numbers of 
examples, and with a well-documented code to help the user easily modify and build their 
simulation. There is such a variety of examples covering so many subjects that most of the 
time it is easy to find a similar example to what the user is seeking to solve.  
The layout of the NetLogo interface, as shown in Figure 2.6, contains several components: 
•   A Virtual World Screen made up from patches and where the turtles and links are set. 
•   A collection of sliders, buttons, inputs and monitors to control the creation and 
interaction of turtles. 
•   Turtles: the important component in the Logo world, which is interacting with the 
patches in the Virtual World. 
•   Patch: represented by a single place where the turtle exists. 
•   Observer: to observe everything throughout the virtual world and ask the turtles to 
distribute and interact over the patches. 
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These turtles are defined with specific variables such as direction or position. The user is also 
able to locate turtles in a Virtual World interface at any position and initiate interaction 
between these turtles according to the code implementation that defines their behaviour. After 
that, the outcome of this interaction between turtles can be collected and presented in real-
time with monitors and charts in the NetLogo graphic interface (See Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure 2.6: NetLogo Main Interface 
As it can be seen in Figure 2.6 above, the layout of NetLogo is formed by the virtual world 
graphical window where the nodes are interacting together, with different sizes according to 
its capacity. The sliders in the upper-left are also used to define the number of nodes as well 
as the minimum and maximum number of links. On the right side of Figure 2.6, there are three 
monitors for the hop-count. Moreover, there are also some buttons for creating the searchers, 
changing the layout and running the simulation. A few of the important features of Netlogo 
are given below [71]: 
•   A simple language structure, based on the logo language. 
•   A huge number of agents and variables. 
•   A comprehensive dictionary for all NetLogo language primitives. 
•   An extensive Models Library with numerous documented code examples. 
•   A friendly and multi-purpose Interface. 
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•   A collection of monitors and sliders to inspect and control the interaction between 
agents. 
2.8.2.2.   StarLogo 
Start Logo was developed by MIT and adopted by academia in countries world-wide. The 
objective of Star Logo is to provide a playful, cooperative environment while also ensuring an 
adequate structure for learning of how to build models. The graphical user interface of Star 
Logo is shown below in Figure 2.7: 
 
Figure 2.7: Starlogo User Interface 
2.8.2.3.   Repast Symphony  
Repast is an abbreviation of REcursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit and was developed 
as a pure java implementation; it is now used widely for agent-based modelling and 
simulations. The features of Repast S are a visual aid for ABM design, a behaviour 
specification of agents, multiple executions of the model and the ability to carry out a 
comprehensive examination. The basic objective for the development of Repast S was to 
visually specify the properties of models. Since the framework is embedded with an Eclipse 
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Integrated Development Environment (IDE1), there is no separate installation package 
required for this tool. 
 
Figure 2.8: Repast Symphony User Interface2 
2.9.   Comparison between ABM and Conventional Modelling Approaches 
The main difference between agent-based modelling and a conventional network modelling is 
the nature of the agents, which could be autonomous, proactive and intelligent. As was 
mentioned earlier, ABM agents are able to take the initiative by contacting other agents and 
making decisions on their own, whereas the objects (Classes) in conventional tools are simple 
and reactive and have a limited capability. Furthermore, the ABM can be distinguished from 
                                                
 
1 http://www.eclipse.org/ 
2 https://repast.github.io/images/relogo_execution.png 
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the conventional network simulators by its simplicity, flexibility and efficiency in its various 
types of modelling systems [72].   
Moreover, one of the main factors that attracted the attention of users and increased the 
popularity of using ABM is the capability to visualize and animate the dynamic interaction 
between agents, which is also considered to be a powerful means of verifying, validating and 
understanding such models. Over time, the reputation of ABM has increased as it is capable 
of managing the increase in complexity of real-world systems, consisting of an enormous 
number of interacting agents that are autonomous and adaptive.  
2.10.   Evaluation of Unstructured P2P Networks using Conventional 
Simulation Approach 
In this section, the performance of an important unstructured P2P protocol, Gnutella-like 
(GIA), is evaluated using an OverSim simulator. The value of different metrics such as latency 
and hop count are measured and evaluated. The simulation is done on a Windows platform. 
2.10.1.   Simulation Set-up 
Before initiating this experiment in OverSim, users need to define their scenario parameters 
in the omnetpp.ini script. While the default script default.ini comprises the default values and 
parameters of each P2P overlay, there is no need to define any parameters in the onmetpp.ini 
file if the user is going to use the default values. OverSim is based upon the OMNeT++ 
framework, in order to handle the underlay network, whereas the results are processed by 
OverSim. This experiment was carried out by varying the number of network sizes i.e. 500, 
1000, 1500, 2000, 2500 and 3000 nodes; the underlying reason behind limiting the size of 
nodes and the ability to simulate a larger network was the current limitation of computer 
power. The results of the simulation are stored in the results file, produced by OverSim and 
processed in Microsoft Excel. 
2.10.2.   Performance Metrics 
The following performance metrics were evaluated from the conducted simulation: 
•   Hop Count: The mean number of hops between the source node that initiates the query 
and the requested node that has the desired file. 
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•   Latency: Measures the duration of the time, in seconds, needed for the stabilization 
process after facing churn, as well as the duration of time needed for resolving a search 
query from creating until responding. 
Table 2.3: GIA Default Values from (default.ini)  
Parameter Value 
The maximum number of neighbours (maxNeighbors) 50 
The minimum number of neighbours (minNeighbors) 10 
Topology adaptation interval (maxTopAdaptionInterval) 120 seconds 
The delay between two update messages (updateDelay) 60 seconds 
The time before message regarded to be lost 
(messageTimeout) 
180 seconds 
Th  tim  before neighbour regarded to be lost 
(neighborTimeout) 
250 seconds 
I terval of ssuing tokens (tokenWaitTime) 5 seconds 
The time to send new key list to neighbours (keyListDelay) 100 seconds 
2.10.3.   Simulation Results 
In Figure 2.9, the latency is computed by increasing the number of nodes in the network. Each 
of the nodes is generating queries at an instant of time. The capacity of the node is considered 
independent of the query generation rate. It can be observed that the delay starts increasing 
with the increase in number of nodes.  
 
Figure 2.9: Latency in GIA 
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In Figure 2.10, the hop count is observed by increasing the size of the network from 500 to 
3000 nodes. It can be seen that the hop count increases as the number of nodes in the network 
increases. This increase in hop count is due to the increase in the number of queries per node, 
which causes additional delay as well as hop count. 
 
Figure 2.10: Average Hop Count in GIA 
Different performance evaluations have been carried out for small and large networks ranging 
from 500 to 3000 nodes respectively. The evaluations have been carried out with the life-time 
of a node considered to be 300 seconds. This is done to measure how GIA would behave under 
a node’s churn. The scalability of GIA has been tested by measuring the hop-count against the 
increase in network size. It was observed that the value increases significantly as the size 
increases. This was also predicted by [16]. It was also noticed that the latency increases as the 
number of nodes and hence the number of queries increase with time. The latency increases 
as the query rate increases from individual nodes; this means that if the network size increases, 
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The results verify the work done in the benchmark paper [16] for latency and hop count. The 
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2.11.   Evaluation of Unstructured P2P Networks using ABM Approach 
In this section, a Gnutella-like (GIA) protocol is implemented using Netlogo (an ABM tool). 
The metrics to be studied are one-hop replication, delay in query propagation and bandwidth 
allocation. The simulation is verified from the ODD (Overview, Design Concepts, and Details) 
standard, as described below. 
2.11.1.   Model Description 
ABM tools have been widely accepted in many domains. However, unlike mathematical 
models which are easier to read and understand, there is no standard method for describing 
the simulation models, which are difficult to reproduce and to understand. ODD is a protocol 
to describe different aspects of the simulation model [73]. The protocol consists of three 
components (Overview, Design Concepts, and Details) and is further divided into seven 
elements. These elements are Purpose, State Variables and Scales, Process Overview and 
Scheduling, Design Concepts, Initialization, Input and Sub-Models. A division different 
blocks is shown below in Table 2.4: 
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Table 2.4: Division of Different Blocks of ODD Protocol 
 
Elements of Original ODD Protocol 
[74] 
Elements of Updated ODD Protocol  
[75] 
Overview 
1.   Purpose 
2.   State variables and scales 
3.   Process overview and 
scheduling 
1.   Purpose 
2.   State variables and scales 
3.   Process overview and scheduling 
Design 
Concepts 
4.   Design concepts 
•   Emergence 
•   Adaptation 
•   Fitness 
•   Prediction 
•   Sensing 
•   Interaction 
•   Stochasticity 
•   Collectives 
•   Observation 
4.   Design concepts 
•   Basic principles 
•   Emergence 
•   Adaptation 
•   Fitness 
•   Learning 
•   Prediction 
•   Sensing 
•   Interaction 
•   Stochasticity 
•   Collectives 
•   Observation 
Details 
5.   Initialization 
6.   Input 
7.   Sub-models 
5.   Initialization 
6.   Input 
7.   Sub-models 
For Netlogo simulation and result generation, ODD protocol is followed. A description of the 
proposed simulation model according to ODD protocol is provided as follows: 
2.11.1.1.   Purpose 
The object of the query propagation model is to study different matrices in a defined interval 
of time. The matrices to be studied are the latency, the success rate and the hop-count for GIA 
protocol under different query loads.  
2.11.1.2.   State Variables and Scales 
The model consists of three levels: individual, network and environment. Individuals are 
nodes that are operated by a user and set with different factors such as capacity, minimum 
neighbours, maximum neighbours, replication rate, and token for flow control. The values of 
these factors are set via the GUI of the model. 
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At the network level, the degree distribution, the number of links, the network being with or 
without super-peers and being a scale-free network (SFN) are the properties of the network. 
The environment refers to the setting of the variables related to visual display and processes. 
The variables in the model are network-type, layout-type, search behaviour and start-node-
number. 
2.11.1.3.   Process Overview and Scheduling 
The model proceeds in discrete time-steps. With each time-step, the query propagates and 
searches the contents. The query-originator searches for the most connected immediate 
neighbour and requests for a token to send the request. If the super-peer node is not occupied, 
it sends a token to serve the request. If the super-peer node is occupied and does not have the 
capacity to serve, the originator node has to wait until the node becomes free. If the super-peer 
has the contents, it responds to the originator node with a pointer to the contents or else it 
forwards the request to its most connected neighbour. The flow control of GIA model is 
explained in Figure 2.3. 
2.11.1.4.   Design Concepts 
•   Emergence: The query is initiated by a single node but the propagation is dependent 
on many factors. These factors are protocol-dependent.  
•   Adaptation:  The nodes request the super-peer for contents and if the super-peer has 
the capacity to serve, it provides a token and the requester moves forward. If the 
searcher node finds the contents of the query, it is a successful search or else it is a 
failed search. 
•   Fitness: The nodes should be connected in the network. If any node gets disconnected 
due to any reason, it no longer participates in the query propagation process. 
•   Prediction: The probability of selection of the most suitable neighbour for the query 
propagation. This probability is dependent on GIA protocol-related factors. 
•   Sensing: The node must receive the query request in order to transfer the request to its 
immediate neighbours. The process is defined by using GIA protocol. 
•   Interaction: Nodes communicate with each other using GIA protocol. 
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•   Stochasticity: There is no stochastic behaviour involved in the query propagation. The 
query’s propagation is based on the determined process of the protocol. 
•   Collectives: There is no grouping of individual agents. All nodes are spatially 
independent and purely distributed and connected using P2P-scale-free networks. 
•   Observation: To observe the query propagation, two methods of search take place, 
breadth-first and depth-first are observed. It is important to know that GIA follows 
breadth in its first search. 
2.11.1.5.   Initialization 
The model can be initialized for one searcher node. The node could be any node selected from 
a randomly distributed network of nodes. The number of nodes can be specified from the GUI 
of the model. 
2.11.1.6.   Input 
In general, the total number of nodes in the network, the minimum number of neighbours of a 
node, the maximum number of neighbours of a node, the search type, the node capacity and 
the starter node are provided as input to generate the scale-free network of nodes.  
2.11.1.7.   Sub-Models 
The sub-models utilized by ABM in order to make the main model work perfectly. 
2.11.2.   Simulation Set-up 
In this section, the implementation of GIA protocol using a NetLogo simulator is discussed. 
Different parameters were observed and a comparison was made based on the benchmark 
work done by [16]. 
The parameters used to model GIA protocol are described below: 
•   Size of The Network: Due to the limited processing capability of the machine 
available, it was decided to model a network of 100 and 1000 nodes. 
•   Query Rate: This is the rate at which searches are initiated. Different query rates are 
taken under different network sizes and other parameter values. 
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•   Replication Rate: This value represents the percentage of nodes that can satisfy the 
request. The range is from 0 to 1 where zero represents no replication and one 
represents 100% of the nodes having their replicated nodes. 
•   Minimum Number of Links: This is the minimum number of neighbours that a node 
can have.  
•   Maximum Number of Links: This is the maximum number of neighbours that a node 
can have. 
•   Time-to-Live (TTL): This is the time a node experiences for getting a response 
Netlogo provides a good level of understanding of P2P model. The current implementation of 
GIA protocol in Netlogo has produced and demonstrated it to be a useful educational tool. It 
is suitable for learners, being able to show them how a query is propagated through the nodes 
in the overlay, according to the predefined behaviour for the search method. The model also 
includes a real-time analysis, providing a good understanding of the communication between 
nodes. Moreover, the model visually represents the effect of the capacity on the nodes; the 
visual size of the nodes in this model represents its capacity; for example, bigger nodes have 
more capacity and vice-versa (Figure 2.10 below).  
 
Figure 2.81: GIA Model in NetLogo 
In (Figure 2.11), 1000 nodes are simulated in the virtual world; each node in the model has a 
different size representing its capacity. Each node is also connected to a number of neighbours, 
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based on the topology adaptation feature of GIA [16]. The red node can be clearly seen; it 
represents the target node of the searchers. With the input button, any number of researches 
can be created, with a single search being initiated each time the button is pressed. Based on 
the flow-control specification on GIA, the interaction between nodes will not begin until 
tokens are available for its connected neighbours, informing them that they are willing to 
accept their query. The upper-left button, named the ‘setup-network’, is used to create a 
network with predefined number of nodes. 
The graph in Figure 2.10 illustrates the interaction for 1000 nodes with a Time-to-Live (TTL) 
of 50, and it can be seen that the monitors on the right side illustrate the average hop-count 
and the success/fail ratios. Other monitors on the left side show the number of success and fail 
searches. This explanation of GIA model, implemented in NetLogo, shows that it is indeed a 
tool well-suited for the purpose of demonstrating search methods and their effectiveness on 
the network.  
2.11.3.   Performance Metrics 
The following metrics were collected as a result of the simulation: 
•   Average Hop Count: The average number of hops between the source node that 
initiates the query and the requested node that has the desired file. 
•   Average Delay: The duration time or query from start to finish. 
•   Success Ratio: The number of queries that successfully found the desired source. 
From Figure 2.12, it can be seen that the average hop count was small for the small network 
size but it increased significantly as the network size increased. The average hop count for a 
network of 100 nodes was 3 hops, while the hop count for a network of 1000 nodes was 5 
hops.  Also, the replication rate was assumed to be 0.1%. 
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Figure 2.92: Average Hop Count 
From Figure 2.13, it can be seen that the average delay increased smoothly with the increase 
in query rate. However, a sudden increase in delay was observed as the number of queries rose 
above 15000 queries. This experiment was performed with 1000 nodes where each node 
generated equal traffic. Interestingly, the same pattern was shown in [16]. 
 
Figure 2.103: Delay in GIA 
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With a 0.01% replication rate, it can be seen that the success rate of queries dropped 
significantly (Figure 2.14). This is due to the limited capacity of nodes to handle the requests 
and therefore result in time-out even if the resource is present in the network. 
 
Figure 2.114: Success Rate of Query in GIA 
2.12.   Comparative Analysis of ABM and Conventional Simulation Tools 
GIA protocol was implemented in OverSim simulator and with Netlogo tool. The machine on 
which the results were generated was core2duo with 6 gigabyte (GB) of memory capacity. 
During the implementation and result generation, the following critical differences were 
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1-   The run-time of the simulation, even for a smaller number of nodes, was too long in 
the Oversim simulator, while the run-time of the model execution and the results 
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2-   The Oversim simulator crashed after a long execution time for simulation of more than 
3000 node network. During the execution process, a linear increase in memory over 
time was observed. This phenomenon reveal memory leak problem in the code and 
hence the program crashed. Since Netlogo is based on the Java programming language 
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protocol behaviour. It requires a significant learning curve while, at the same time, not 
much support is available for the configuration setting for the simulator. On the other 
hand, Netlogo not only provides the parameter setting using different GUI controls but 
also a programming option in Logo programming language. Different built-in models 
increase the support at the next level. 
4-   ABM tools (including Netlogo) are general-purpose tools to solve problems of 
complex adaptive systems [77]. These tools, however, are not explicitly designed to 
simulate networking-related processes. For example, in a network simulation, 5000 to 
10,000 nodes are normally required. Netlogo can support a limited number of nodes 
due to the implicit constraints imposed by the visualization of the process at the same 
time.  
5-   The ‘behaviour space’ tool in Netlogo is provided in order to understand the overall 
behaviour of the process under different parameter combinations, such procedure is 
not possible manually. The same support to understand the behaviour of a model is not 
provided in Oversim. The ‘behaviour space’ module of Netlogo, however, provides 
promising support to repeat the simulation virtually any number of times and to record 
the results in common formats such as XSL, CSV or simply a spreadsheet. The 
extraction of results thus becomes uncomplicated, as compared with a conventional 
tool such as Oversim, which records the results in a log file. These results can then be 
extracted using a certain extension, which itself requires significant configuration. 
6-   The description of any process with respect to time is handled in customized units 
‘ticks’ instead of standard units such as ‘seconds’. The ‘tick’ parameter could have 
varying units of time and the process cannot be explained in terms of standard units. 
This is a major weakness of Netlogo. 
In the next section, the findings and differences between the two different types of simulators 
for modelling P2P networks will be discussed. The advantage of using Netlogo for studying 
P2P models will also be covered. 
2.12.1.   Ease of Implementation 
Compared to conventional simulators, it is noticeable that the time needed in Netlogo to build 
up the protocol or the program is significantly less. The Netlogo interface is well-suited to be 
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a useful tool for understanding how nodes interact according to their predefined behaviour. 
Furthermore, the source code for several example models, covering different scenarios and 
subjects, is fully available in the models library. These models can be found in the integrated 
library with the Netlogo package. These examples enable a new model to be easily produced 
simply by modifying existing models.  
2.12.2.   Real-Time Analysis 
The OverSim simulator represents a promising tool for P2P overlays, especially for structured 
P2P networks. The simulation results are stored in the result files (scalar and vector files). 
There is, moreover, no easy way to visualize and analyse the result with a large number of 
nodes. In order to do so, the user needs either to add graphical user interface (GUI) scripts to 
the main implementation or to export the results file to the integrated development 
environment (IDE) of OMNeT++ tool. While the process of analysing the data is 
straightforward in NetLogo, the results are automatically generated in real-time while the 
simulation is running. The results can be visualized using real-time monitors and graphs on 
the user interface panel.  
2.12.3.   Design Evaluation 
Since classical simulators such as OverSim require a sizable chunk of the system memory to 
implement the TCP/IP stack, the run-time for some scenarios is very long to get the results. 
However, since ABM relies heavily on abstraction, the run-time for comparable processes is 
significantly shorter. Moreover, the number of simulated nodes in unstructured overlays is 
limited in OverSim to fewer than 4000 nodes. Although OverSim is built over an INET 
framework, the platform is not very up-to-date as it depends on an old version of INET, thus 
preventing the user from using the new features in the new release of INET and OMNeT++.  
OverSim is also not a completely open source project, and this limits the users from learning 
the core of this framework. 
Netlogo not only enables the active participation of users in all design, implementation and 
evaluation/prototyping of unstructured P2P overlays but also facilitates, through HubNet, 
user-learning through participatory simulations where users can, for example, in a future case 
66	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
study, act as super nodes in order to learn about various aspects of the complex GIA protocol, 
such as network topology adaptation, flow control and search mechanisms. 
2.12.4.   Visualization 
One of the underlying reasons for using NetLogo is that it comes with a friendly graphical 
user interface, comprising a dynamic communication between nodes, a collection of buttons 
and sliders to facilitate control of the variable inputs and automatic real-time monitors 
illustrating the current statistics. While OverSim has some visualization implementation, it is 
not as easy or as straightforward as Netlogo. This is mainly due to the fact that OverSim is 
result-oriented with little attention paid to the real-time visualization of the different 
interaction of nodes in the systems. However, NetLogo was built with the visualization aspect 
in mind. NetLogo programming language “logo” also has a very strong library of visualization 
commands, which allows the developer to demonstrate and visualize various interactions and 
mobility events effectively. 
2.13.   Summary 
This chapter has provided an introduction to P2P networks, common P2P protocols, and the 
issues and challenges that exist in P2P networks and given a brief overview of network-
modelling tools. A comparative analysis of conventional and ABM network modelling tools 
was provided for which GIA protocol from P2P networks was selected as the case study for 
implementation. The results were analysed for different metrics. Certain benefits of the results 
from ABM over those derived from conventional tools were observed while the limitations of 
both types of tools to model the complex networks were also noted.  
The next chapter will provide a review of P2P worms and discuss the need for the development 
of a more realistic analytical model for worm propagation process. Also, a novel SEIR model 
will be proposed, which integrates important factors that affect the whole worm propagation 
process. 
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  : SEIR: A NOVEL ACTIVE 
WORM PROPAGATION MODEL 
3.1.   Introduction 
This chapter provides an insight into existing P2P worms, their propagation behaviour and the 
type of vulnerabilities that they exploit from host operating systems/platforms. A brief 
description of the reported P2P worms will be provided, followed by a detailed review of the 
factors that affect the propagation process. Different analytical models, provided in literature, 
will be used with markedly different factors and different configuration settings. A brief 
classification of the existing models, based on parameters, will be presented. Taking into 
account the shortcomings of the existing worm propagation models, a stochastic discrete-time 
active worm propagation model will be proposed. A detailed description of each of the factors 
addressed in the proposed model will be given. 
3.2.   Worm Propagation in P2P Networks 
A P2P worm is a software program that has a malicious code which takes the network as its 
medium of spreading. There are many reasons that make P2P networks vulnerable to the 
worms. One major reason is that many P2P networks, such as Kaaza, Fasttrack and eDonkey, 
are able to share executable files [78]. The second reason is that at any given time a huge 
number of common users are connected to P2P network. These users are normally not aware 
of the security concerns related to P2P networks. 
Worms and viruses are often treated interchangeably. However, there are technical differences 
between them [79]. A worm self-propagates in the network without any external assistance or 
action. It exploits the loop-holes in operating systems or programming errors. While a 
computer virus is a code script, it attaches itself to a computer program. Such a virus is 
dependent on the actions of its host program. It does not propagate itself but rather it requires 
a human action to get launched. By design, a worm could be said to be a sub-class of a virus. 
However, the worm is not just parasite but is an entirely autonomous body in terms of its 
propagation.  
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Worm can be categorized into two major categories based on scanning behaviour. These 
categories are scan-based worms and topology-based worms. The scan-based worms scan the 
entire address space using different scanning techniques, such as random scanning or hit-list 
scanning [13]. Examples of these worms are Slammer/Sapphire, Code Red I v2 (Moore, 
Shannon, & Brown, 2002, Code Red II[80], Conficker[81], [82], Blaster [83], Witty, Sasser. 
These worms are not dependent on network topology or neighbourhood information and an 
infected host is able to infect an unlimited number of computers. However, topology-aware 
worms have a knowledge of the network they intend to propagate or, at least, have the 
capability to discover topological information about the network if they do not have it in 
advance. Typical examples of topology-aware worms are email worms and social networking 
worms, which attack an exposed vulnerability in the systems and get list of neighbours from 
victims and further attack other peers. Slapper worms are a classic example of topology-aware 
worms. An overview of different worms in provided below: 
3.2.1.  Code Red & Code Red II 
Code Red exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability, reported in Microsoft’s IIS web server. 
The first occurrence of Code Red was reported in July, 2001. The worm checks the date of the 
infected system to be from the first to the nineteenth of the month. Random IP addresses are 
generated using a random number generator using static seed values. It is programmed to 
launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack from the twentieth to the twentieth-eighth of the 
month.  
Code Red II is an extended version of Code Red I which uses a dynamic seed value instead of 
static seed value for a random number generator for an IP list [84]. Code Red II has a greater 
impact than Code Red I due to the large volume of infected hosts and requests sent to different 
hosts. It also infects devices such as routers, switches, printers and DSL modems. 
3.2.2.  Nimda 
Nimda [14] is a self-propagative worm that was initially thought to be Code Red I due to its 
web-scanning activity. E-mails containing attachments and web-based probes differentiate 
Code Red I from the new worm “W32/Nimda-A” which is commonly called a Nimda worm. 
This worm affects the Microsoft Windows operating system and the name was chosen because 
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it represents “Admin” spelled backwards.  The worm can spread via the following three 
means: 
•   E-mail: One of the delivery mechanisms of the worm is e-mail containing the 
attachment “readme.exe”. The subject e-mail pretends to be an IP address spoofed 
from the infected host. As soon as the e-mail is previewed, the host becomes infected. 
•   Web Server Attacks: Code Red II worm creates a backdoor on the IIS web server. A 
Nimda worm can exploit the backdoor and attempt to gain control of the web server. 
•   Open Network Shares: Networks that share contents with users, do not apply security 
policies and do not restrict unauthorized access could be a target of Nimda. This then 
allows for the possibility of distribution within internal networks.  
3.2.3.  Slammer 
Slammer (also called Sapphire) [85] spreads by exploiting the buffer-overflow vulnerability 
in the Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE). It is in fact the fastest spreading worm 
in history and can infect more than 90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes. The first 
outbreak of this worm was reported in January 2003. Although the vulnerability in MSDE was 
identified in July 2002 and its patch was provided, the outbreak nevertheless still caused 
75,000 vulnerable hosts to be immediately infected and caused significant financial losses. 
The distinctive feature of this worm is its propagation speed. A full scanning rate (of more 
than 55 million scans per second) is achieved within three minutes by the worm. The growth 
rate is slowed down because significant portions of the network have insufficient bandwidth 
to accommodate it. 
3.2.4.  Blaster 
The Blaster worm first struck in August 2003. It exploits the bug in the Remote Procedure 
Calls (RPCs) library in the Windows operating system [86]. The worm creates backdoors by 
copying all the code from the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) library and then 
injects its own code. This malicious code further launches a denial of service (DoS) attack on 
the Windows update server by using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 80 SYN 
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flooding. It also uses the backdoor mechanism from this example exploit to transfer the worm 
payload to newly infected systems. 
3.2.5.  Conficker 
First appearance of Conficker worm is reported in November 2008 which immediately 
infected millions of system world-wide [78]. Basically, it exploits the vulnerabilities in 
Windows-based operating system and spread through different techniques such as domain 
generation algorithm, defence mechanism and local propagation. Consequently, it has infected 
millions of victims in the world and even now the number is still increasing. A detailed review 
of the Conficker worm will be provided in Chapter 5. 
3.3.   Modelling P2P Worms 
P2P networks have attracted significant attention due to their sharing of valuable data. The 
equal-sharing theme not only distributes the contents among different peers but also helps to 
handle any failover situation, which is the issue of conventional single-server-based content-
sharing. While P2P networks provide unique benefits, they still pose a serious threat to social 
and economic domains. There are certain emerging issues and challenges that need to be 
addressed through focused research efforts. One of these issues is modelling the propagation 
of worms in a large P2P network, which consists of wired and wireless devices. Another issue 
is investigating the behaviour of worm propagation in P2P network considering different 
protocols such as GIA and Gnutella. Continuing the investigation of these issues, factors such 
as the effects of user behaviour, node mobility, configuration diversity and infection time-lag 
on the propagation of worms will be analysed within the context of P2P networks. 
3.3.1.   Worm Propagation Models and Classification 
Worms in P2P networks pose a serious threat to all peers in the network. A worm attack can 
make a large portion of the internet unavailable. To take appropriate safety measures, apply 
efficient patching of nodes and ensure proper immunization of the influential nodes, it is 
essential to fully understand the propagation behaviour of worms [13].  
P2P worms can generally be categorized into three categories based on their propagation 
method. Passive P2P worms usually copy themselves in the shared folder and then spread by 
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luring users to download and execute them. Reactive worms spread by means of exploiting 
vulnerabilities that exist in the software. They are spread only in the case when other hosts 
request files from the infected hosts. Proactive worms also spread through vulnerabilities, but 
they attempt to infect other hosts as quickly as possible with the help of neighbourhood 
information. An example of proactive worms is Code Red [87], Code Red II [80], Nimda, and 
more recently Slammer [88] and Blaster [83] and the Conficker worm [81], [82]. The Hybrid 
worm is new hypothetical worm that could emerge in the future. The worm can adopt two or 
more propagation behaviours based on the circumstances. The existing research revolves 
mostly around these types of worm. However, proactive and hybrid worms have recently been 
gaining more attention from researchers. 
The approaches followed in this research are based on developing analytical models and 
generating simulations of the worm propagation process in order to understand the behaviour 
of the worm. This helps when applying security updates, immunization strategies and recovery 
options. However, an analysis of large-scale networks with millions of nodes is practically 
impossible [5]. The analytical and simulation models are inspired by epidemiological disease 
spread models such as SI (Suspected-Infectious), SIS (Suspected-Infectious-Suspected) and 
SIR (Suspected-Infectious-recovered).  
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Figure 3.1: Simple SIR Epidemic Model [89] 
The need for the development of analytical models has arisen due to one or more of the 
following reasons [79]: 
1.   To get a deep understanding of worm propagation behaviour; 
2.   To analyse and predict loss in cases of worm outbreak; 
3.   To evaluate network parameters such as node mobility, user behaviour, network 
link quality, configuration diversity and the degree of peers that affect the worm 
propagation; 
4.   To characterize how the worm infects the node and the device itself; 
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5.   To devise immunization/patching/countermeasure strategies to contain and 
mitigate the outbreak. 
A review of the existing worm propagation models in P2P domain will now be provided. These 
models have been classified according to the type of propagation adopted by the worm.  
3.3.1.1.   Active Worm Propagation Models 
Different models exist in the literature and are based on the reasons for the development of 
analytical models mentioned in the previous section. A stochastic, discrete time model for 
active-worm propagation is based on the SIR epidemiological model, proposed in [7], and 
called STAWP model. This model does not consider the time a node takes to get infected but 
the unit infection time is nevertheless considered during the simulations. The major 
contribution of this work is to consider the dynamicity of network topology during active-
worm propagation. The model is stochastic in considering a random value representing the 
number of nodes joining and leaving the networks. This random value is selected from the 
Probability Density Function (PDF) generated using Gaussian distribution. It assumes the 
infection time lag as the unit time, which is an important parameter in the infection process, 
as described by [67]. The impact of other important factors, such as node mobility, 
configuration diversity and user-behaviour, however, they are not considered in this model. 
The results presented in [90] are not more accurate than those from the Extended Topology 
Logic Matrix (ETLM) model due to the less supported precision of the floating-point values, 
which are computed during the validation of the analytical model. Since the floating-point part 
consists of more than 40 decimal places, a rounding-off of decimal places to achieve results 
with the available hardware resources is not possible. On the other hand, ELTM models are 
based on matrices and the large number of rows and columns of matrices make computation 
quite complex and practically impossible within the available computational resources [7]. A 
logic matrices-based approach is used to develop an analytical model for the propagation of 
worms from the  difference equations of the logic matrix [91].  
A discrete-time worm propagation model is proposed in [92]. The model (SEIRS) is an 
extension of the SIR epidemiological model with additional exposed state and cyclic 
behaviour (Figure 3.2). The model is assuming that a peer, once it is recovered, can revert to 
the suspected state again. However, this is a strong assumption because the peer goes to 
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recovered state only after particular operating system patches/updates are applied or 
antivirus/antimalware signatures are updated for particular worm. This model also addresses 
the heterogeneous behaviour of nodes. However, this model provides partial diversity by 
dividing the network into different sets of monoculture nodes. Moreover, no attention is given 
to node mobility and user-behaviour. The infection time-lag factor is addressed in [67] based 
on previous work by [93]. The model is constructed based on Four-Factor model. These factors 
are (1) the human countermeasures, (2) the configuration diversity, (3) P2P topology and (4) 
the attack and defence strategies and are based on assumptions of a static network topology 
and a constant configuration diversity. Thus, this model does not address the infection time-
lag and mobility of nodes. 
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Figure 3.2: SEIRS Model [94] 
The author in [95] discuss the impact of node joining and leaving behaviour on the propagation 
ratio of topology-aware active worms. It shows that network size is independent of infection 
ratio and that the out-degree of nodes plays a vital role in worm propagation as the infection 
ratio increases to 90% as the node degree increases from 2 to 3. It also highlights the fact that 
the number of initial infectious hosts does not have a significant effect on the steady state 
propagation ratio.  
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Moreover, a ternary-matrix based approach is used to model the behaviour of active worm 
[96]. This work represents the overlay topology in the form of matrices, knowing the state of 
each node at any instant of time and the backtracking of infection from infected node to the 
infection-outbreak node. However, the matrix operation for large topologies containing 
hundreds of nodes does become difficult. 
A discrete time deterministic propagation model of topology-aware worms is proposed in [97]. 
The worm propagation process is performed as a sequence of matrix operations by considering 
random graph topology and power-law topology. An extension of this approach for structured 
P2P networks considering different factors is proposed in [91]. However, the matrices used as 
the foundation of the analytical model are inappropriate for a large set of parameters and 
complex mathematical operations.  
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is used as a tool to reflect the active worm propagation 
behaviour in [98]. This study considers the configuration diversity in relation to the degree of 
network nodes to reflect the immunization offered by such a combination. The complex 
behaviour of the worm in the presence of these factors is represented by taking advantage of 
the ABM tool. However, the ABM simulations require following the standards of modelling, 
such as, for example, ODD [99]. To achieve better results, it is suggested to follow the 
standards of modelling proposed by the modelling tool e.g. Netlogo proposes ODD as 
standard. The accuracy of the results also depends on the average values of multiple 
executions, which can be achieved in Netlogo using the Behaviour Space tool [100]. 
A hypothetical worm for BitTorrent (BT) networks is proposed in [101]. The impact of 
different parameters such as the Time-to-Live (TTL), the number of peers, the bread-first 
search and the depth-first search is evaluated. The behaviour of the worm is self-stopping after 
destroying a large fraction of the nodes in the network. 
An SEIR model is developed in [102] with the focus on finding network conditions to achieve 
a malware-free equilibrium. An active worm affecting the file-sharing network is considered 
as an example for the study. The results indicate that users’ online/offline behaviour and the 
degree of nodes are important factors that can help to achieve a malware-free equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the impact of network size on worm propagation is studied in [103]. It considers 
a two-layer epidemic model: the first layer considers all the networks and sub-networks in the 
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wild while the second layer deals with individual hosts. Its results indicate that the worm 
propagation process is slow at the initial stage but speeds up after some time and follows a 
short exponential tail at the end. 
3.3.1.2.   Passive Worm Propagation Models 
Passive-worm propagation in file-sharing P2P networks is discussed in [104]. Considering the 
network as static and eMule [105] as protocol, they conclude that passive worm propagation 
can be reduced by decreasing the download rate before the corresponding patch is applied. An 
analytical model of the propagation of passive worms addresses binding, configuration 
diversity, online/off-line behaviour and the download duration of the file [106]. The results 
indicate that the worm files increase rapidly but, after a defined value, remain stable. The 
configuration diversity of the network is inversely proportional to the worm propagation and 
the increased values of diverse nodes reduce the infection density peak value.  
The performance of passive worms over unstructured P2P networks is evaluated in [107]. The 
analytical model is developed based on the online/offline rates of the user and death rate of 
the nodes. The impact of different time delays during the different states of nodes is observed 
and has been shown to be the critical parameter in the epidemic spreading process. 
Network throughput is considered as a factor impacting on passive worm propagation in [108]. 
This model was developed based on the SEI epidemiological model and further suggests the 
worm-defence strategy to be in accordance with file popularity, following Zipf distribution. 
These limited studies indicate that user online/offline behaviour is a key factor in modelling 
passive worm propagation models. Passive worms have received relatively little attention, 
compared with proactive or reactive worms. 
3.3.1.3.   Hybrid Worm Propagation Models 
A hybrid worm propagation model based on the Bluetooth channel and SMS/MMS services 
is proposed in [109]. The propagation model extends the SIR model to SEIRD (susceptible, 
exposed, infectious, diagnosed, and recovered). The foundation of this model is based on two-
dimensional cellular automata. However, the factors affecting the propagation of hybrid 
worms and the impact of node mobility are not considered in this work. 
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3.3.1.4.   Mobile Models 
SMS worm propagation based on the social network graph is modelled in [110]. The RTSS 
(Reputation, Trust, and Susceptible) model is topology-aware and discrete-time model. This 
model considers the node reputation (R) and edge trust (T) degrees while SS refers to two 
susceptible (S) states. 
An analytical model for worm spread via SMS and Blue-tooth channels is proposed in [111]. 
This model is an SI epidemiological model and demonstrates the simplistic behaviour of 
mobile malware spread. However, wireless-environment-related parameters such as channel 
contention, interference and path fading are ignored when modelling the worm propagation 
process. 
The Agent-Based Malware Modelling (AMM framework) [112] is composed of a collection 
of networked and autonomous decision-making entities called agents. Any network device 
such as a mobile phone, a laptop, a server, an access point or a PDA is represented as an agent. 
The AMM framework is generic and represents many aspects of communication. However, 
we shall only consider P2P networks. AMM assumes that an agent could take place in some 
logical topologies corresponding to various services like e-mail, online messaging, P2P and 
social network. The agents are collected together in hierarchical manner. Few agents behave 
as access points in the wireless LAN and collect information from other devices, which reflect 
the real-life processing of information in such environments. The frameworks employ both 
mobility models, namely, Gauss-Markov (GM) and Random Way Point (RWP). 
A study about the maximum possibility of infection in Mobile-to-Mobile communication is 
detailed in [113]. By utilizing the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (PMP) for the optimal 
control theory, the damage caused by a worm in a given network can be quantified. This study 
shows the impact of the mobile-device battery on infection and demonstrates that the infection 
is effective at the initial phase of an outbreak but and reduces as a function of time. 
The worm spread of worm in a mobile ad-hoc network is considered in [114]. This framework 
considers SIS model as an epidemiological model and claims that any mobility model can be 
integrated with the framework using a set of adjacency matrices. Node velocity is also found 
to be an irrelevant factor in worm propagation in wireless. 
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The impact of the time-zone of the location of the peer in worm propagation and of the 
modelling P2P worm in social networks and in mobile networks are suggested as future 
directions for research in  [13]. In the light of the recent increase in smart-phone users,[79] 
highlight the need for a general worm propagation model instead of a protocol- or worm-
specific model. 
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Figure 3.3: Classification of Worm Propagation Models and Addressed Parameters 
Different types of propagation models have been reviewed. It has been noted that most of the 
work reported in the literature is oriented towards the modelling propagation behaviour of 
active worms. Both fixed and mobile networks are targeted by the research community. A list 
of the factors addressed in different analytical models can be seen in Figure 3.2. Contrary to 
what one would expect, very less attention has actually been paid to passive and hybrid worms 
and their propagation behaviour. A possible reason for this is that the quick spreading 
behaviour of active worms can cause a huge damage before any preventive measure can be 
taken. Moreover, passive worms are usually dependent on human actions and, as a result, trick 
users into downloading vulnerabilities from the internet and executing them [106]. Therefore, 
passive worms spread more slowly than active ones. The presence of hybrid worms is not 
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reported in the literature. However, analytical models have already been developed that 
portray different propagation behaviours in fixed and mobile networks [109]. 
The impact of passive, reactive and proactive worms being non-scanning worms is discussed 
in [115]. The results are generated based on a simulation for three different types of worm. 
These results indicate that the proactive worm is the most dangerous in terms of spreading 
activity while the impact of the passive worm is minimal, compared to that from other worms. 
3.3.2.  Immunization Strategies for P2P Worms 
Immunization is a strategy to prevent a node and all its neighbours from being attacked by 
malicious software [116]. In the case of a P2P network, an efficient immunization strategy 
becomes important where worms can propagate quickly due to high connectivity and to the 
worm behaviour itself. Various immunization strategies have been developed and described 
in the literature dealing with P2P worms. 
An immunization strategy for a social network worm is proposed in [117]. Although finding 
the most influential nodes in complex network is an open issue, attempts are still being made 
to find the key nodes based on vertex degrees, between-ness centrality, closeness centrality, 
Katz Centrality and the minimum dominating set. It is argued that the selection of these 
parameters for influential node selection rather choosing random influential nodes improves 
the patching scheme results. It is further suggested human behaviour when using a social 
network be incorporated in analytical models in order to estimate the worm-propagation 
behaviour more accurately.  
The impact of heterogeneous immunization on worm spread is evaluated in [118]. Based on 
the SIR epidemiological model, two different types of immunization levels are assumed in this 
work. The results achieved indicate that most of the nodes maintain strong-immunization in 
order to reduce worm propagation. 
The immunization strategy discussed in [119] is based on choosing the top ‘k’ influential 
nodes by voting. The election is done based on factors such as a social relationship graph and 
the node degree. However, the authors explain that more realistic parameters of social 
behaviour are required to more fully understand worm propagation and thereby the 
containment. Models of both Bluetooth and SMS/MMS worms are proposed using two-
dimensional cellular automata in smartphones [120]. The behavioural characteristics of peers 
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are studied in [102], based on the SIR model. It shows that the bound on the spectral radius of 
the network needs to be revised. Furthermore, the user behaviour characteristics (e.g. offline-
to-online transitional behaviour) and the communication patterns (e.g. neighbourhood size) of 
node result in an over-estimation of the epidemic threshold metric. 
3.3.3.  Stochastic versus Deterministic Behaviour of Worm Propagation 
The stochastic and deterministic models can be divided according to the type of outcome they 
predict. The same output from given inputs is expected from a deterministic model which does 
not handle the random variation. On the other hand, the model may be more statistical in nature 
and so may predict the distribution of possible outcomes. Such models are said to be stochastic 
[121]. The deterministic models are not stable for even small variations in inputs and thus 
predict only well-defined cycles. The stochastic model predicts the extinction of at least one 
type for large populations. 
If analysis is possible with many variables, there are then several reasons to develop a 
stochastic model [121]. Firstly, the natural way of spreading worms is stochastic, and there is 
always a chance of worm transmission from one individual to another. Secondly, the 
deterministic models are based on the law of large numbers but there are nevertheless 
phenomena that are stochastic by nature. For example, in a large community, a minor outbreak 
can infect a small portion of the network nodes while a major outbreak can indeed infect more 
or less than that. This does not reflect deterministic behaviour and a representation of the 
process is only possible through stochastic settings. These settings are a function of parameters 
that affect the worm propagation process. These parameters, such as user-behaviour, node 
mobility, and node degree, are computed randomly through probability distribution functions 
(PDFs). The third important point is about estimation. A stochastic model is required when 
there is some knowledge of uncertainty in the estimates. An estimate is invalid if there is no 
knowledge about uncertainty. 
3.4.   Factors Affecting the Worm Propagation Process 
Different factors have been considered in the literature about the various analytical models 
that explore the different aspects of the worm propagation process. To overview on the 
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utilization of important factors in the proposed stochastic model, a brief and explicit review 
of each factor is now provided. 
Ø   Configuration Diversity: The heterogeneity of nodes is a network in terms of 
operating systems, software applications and configuration settings and can be referred 
to as configuration diversity. It becomes important when considering the impact of 
propagation dynamics at an individual user level or at a node level. Configuration 
diversity values are assumed to be constant in the existing analytical models rather 
than focusing on the mechanism of generating them from a given network [67] [93]. 
Configuration diversity also refers to the application installed on different platforms 
that may be running similar services. These nodes are not equally vulnerable because 
the same software may have different versions [122].  
Different researchers have modelled the phenomenon in different ways. Configuration 
diversity is modelled as a message-level interaction among users, or as a package 
installed on the host operating system [122]. Another study has indicated that software 
monoculture among nodes in a network can raise the security issues [92]. 
Diversification of client applications, the operating environment and software 
packages reduce the risk of worm propagation [92]. A colouring algorithm is used to 
represent the different sets of packages installed on different nodes in order to compute 
the configuration diversity. A unique colour is assigned to each node based on the 
number of packages installed on the node [92]. However, this theoretical foundation is 
not based on any statistical values generated by a real network. For example, the 
configuration diversity can be modelled more realistically pertaining to the fact that 
75% of the nodes in P2P network are homogenous and they are configured with the 
same P2P client and operating system [123].  
Ø   User Behaviour: This is a broad term which includes the online/offline behaviour of 
nodes, the setting up upload/download limit by P2P client users, the free-rider problem 
and many more user behaviour issues. During the worm propagation process, different 
P2P clients log on and log off frequently on the nodes. Similarly, the upload and 
download limit of P2P clients is changed frequently. 
Different studies identified user-behaviour as random value [124][125]. However, 
Weaver [125] quantified user behavioural issues using statistical methods. These 
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studies indicate that, on average, 30 connection attempts by a single machine are made 
in a network infected by Conficker [125]. 
Preliminary studies  show that the time duration needed for the propagation of passive 
P2P worms to reach a steady state is hundreds or even thousands of hours [6]. This 
work demonstrated files downloading and execution behaviour for passive worms. 
However, the analytical model partially addressed user-behaviour phenomena by not 
providing the logical statistical foundation. 
The behaviour of users for checking short messages in social networks was modelled 
by introducing two susceptible states [110]. Empirical models are similarly used to 
model user behaviour in [112] and the results are based on the SMS data collected over 
a three-week period from a large scale cellular carrier with over 10 million mobile 
users. User behaviour is modelled as the offline/online behaviour of users in [126] 
where the probability of being online is simply considered to be a ratio of online users 
to the total number of users. 
It is observed that the user behaviour is modelled only partially while its important 
components such as the upload/download limit and the free rider problem are ignored. 
Moreover, the statistical foundation and theoretical background could not receive the 
appropriate attention in order to achieve more realistic results. 
3.5.   Requirements for a New Stochastic Analytical Model of P2P Worm 
Propagation 
Configuration diversity in P2P networks is addressed as a parameter in analytical models 
provided  in [92][67][93]. Performance improvement mechanisms such as  dividing the traffic 
load according to the capacity are proposed in [127]. The use of trusted-networks is similarly 
proposed by [128] for performance improvement. The impact of the behavioural 
characteristics of users and communication patterns in P2P networks are studied in 
[102][112][110]. The infection time-lag can be defined as the time a node takes to get 
completely infected from the starting-time of infection. The models presented in [92][67][129] 
considered the infection time delay involved during the worm propagation process. 
The analytical models developed for modelling the worm propagation process are either 
stochastic or deterministic. The stochastic behaviour of worm propagation is reported by the 
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analytical models provided in [7][89][130][121]. However, the deterministic models have 
received relatively more attention in the literature than the stochastic models. The simple 
analysis of factors is the main advantage of deterministic models. A stochastic model needs to 
be developed with simple and relatively fewer parameters in order to be more mathematically 
manageable, but  the results would still not be entirely realistic [121]. Deterministic models 
are solvable, even if they are more complex than stochastic models, where numerical solutions 
suffice [121].  
Following these arguments, the need for the development of a generic worm propagation 
model is evident. This model should address and include important factors such as the 
infection time-lag, the configuration diversity and the user behaviour. The randomness 
characteristic of user-behaviour parameter makes the model stochastic. 
As a result of the above-mentioned arguments, discussions and findings, the major research 
question addressed in this chapter can be stated as follows: 
•   What is the need/potential utility of introducing a discrete-time, stochastic, 
epidemiological model for the propagation of active worms that takes the infection 
time-lag, the user-behaviour and the configuration diversity of nodes into 
consideration? 
3.6.   Proposed Discrete-Time Stochastic Active Worm Propagation Model 
(SEIR Model) 
There are important points to be considered prior to the development of the analytical model. 
1-   The model should consider active worm propagation in unstructured P2P networks. 
2-   The model should assume worm propagation to be a stochastic process that depends 
on factors such as infection time-lag, user behaviour and configuration-diversity. 
3-   The extended SIR model that is SEIR should be considered during the development of 
the analytical model in order to address the infection time-lag phenomena. Each 
infectious node has a specific capacity for infection which is directly proportional to 
the infection time-lag where the infection time-lag can be defined as the time that a 
node takes to get infected as soon as it gets exposed [90]. 
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The major focus of this model is to study holistically the factors, namely, the configuration 
diversity of nodes in a network, the impact of variation in user behaviour and of the infection 
time-lag on worm propagation. All of these factors are assumed to be independent variables 
that affect the process of worm propagation. A description of different states is provided as 
follows: 
•   Susceptible: these nodes are part of network and susceptible to infection. 
•   Exposed: it is a state of nodes when they get exposed of worm. The node is not infect 
yet and worm may take time from few seconds to number of hours in order to infect 
the machine. This time depends on many factors such as node configuration or the 
worm behaviour itself. 
•   Infected: the state of a node in which it has been infected from the worm and has done 
the damage. 
•   Recovered: it is the last absorbing state. From any of the other states, a node can go to 
recovered state depending on that stage specific settings.  
 A graphical representation of this is shown below in Figure 3.4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recovered state is the absorbing state and is represented by “R”. Initially, in steady state, 
all the nodes are in the susceptible state. There are four states and five state-transitions. These 
transitions are explained below: 
1.   A node can transit from a suspected “S” to a recovered “R” state. The rate “A” depends 
on the configuration diversity, the user-behaviour and the degree of node where the 
degree refers to number of neighbours of the nodes. 
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Figure 3.4: The States and Transitions 
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2.   A node can transit from a suspected “S” to an exposed “E” state at rate “B”. The rate 
is dependent on the configuration diversity, the user-behaviour and number of 
neighbours. 
3.   The exposed to the infected state transition is only dependent on the birth and death 
rate of nodes in the network.  
4.   The infectious-to-recover transition is done at rate “γ” and the number of nodes 
transiting from the infectious-to-recovered state at time t are equal to γ I (t). 
5.   The node can transit from exposed to a recovered state at the rate “E”. The factors that 
can affect the state transition are configuration diversity and node mobility. However, 
a discussion on node mobility is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is important to 
note that once a node get exposed, it will eventually be infectious even if disconnected 
from the network due to mobility. However, the disconnected infectious node does not 
have an impact on worm propagation in the network.  
The state transition also takes fractions of a second to execute where a human counter measure 
is impossible within this minimal period of time. The time of the state transition varies from 
node to node due to the variation in operating systems, software packages and antivirus 
programs. 
3.6.1.  Notations 
The symbols and notations used to describe the proposed model are provided in Table 3.1:
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Table 3.1: Notations and Description 
Notation Description 
N Total number of nodes in the network 
S(t) Number of suspected nodes at time (t) 
E(t) Number of exposed nodes at time (t) 
I(t) Number of infectious nodes at time (t) 
R(t) Number of recovered nodes at time (t) 
δ Configuration diversity. 0 ≤δ ≤ 1 
β User behaviour. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 
Ki Degree of node i 
ε Infection time lag 
γ Infectious to removal rate 
τ Rate of transition from exposed to infectious state 
ρ Rate of transition from exposed to recovered state 
b Birth rate of nodes in the network 
d Death rate of nodes in the network 
3.6.2.  Derivation of Factors and Sub-Factors 
3.6.2.1.   User Behaviour 
The user behaviour includes the setting-up of P2P clients, of the upload limit, the download 
limit, the user offline/online behaviour and the custom setting for data sharing. User behaviour 
varies from client to client and from application to application [131]–[133]. These are user-
defined parameters that affect P2P client and hence the worm propagation process. User-
behaviour may include user actions that a user performs with P2P client. These actions are 
dependent on the type of client application. If the client application is for video streaming, the 
client may select priority videos or search for specific keywords. If the client application is for 
a file-sharing client, the user may want to set an upload and download limit for the file. The 
on/off behaviour itself of users for applications or nodes also plays a major role. 
Considering that user-behaviour is only dependent on the probability of user offline/online 
(κ), on the probability of setting up an uploading/downloading limit (µ), on the probability of 
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human counter measures (π) and on free-rider probability (σ), it is important to note that µ, π 
and σ are mutually independent but dependent on online/offline probability, κ. As a result, the 
user-behaviour (β) can be computed as follows: β = 𝑃 µμ k ∗ 𝑃 π k ∗ 𝑃 σ k 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3.1) 
Since the upload/download limit set up by the individual user, the human counter-measures 
taken by an individual and the probability of an individual being a free-rider at any instant in 
time are considered as random variables their values are drawn from the Probability Density 
Function (PDF), generated using Gaussian distribution with given mean and standard 
deviation values. It establishes the fact that the user-behaviour (β) is a random variable for a 
given P2P node. 
3.6.2.2.   Configuration Diversity 
With a given network topology, the configuration diversity can be computed using the Bucket 
theorem. This theorem is based on set theory and assumes number of sets initially equivalent 
to the number of nodes in the networks. Basically, each node belongs to a set and added in the 
sets one by one based on defined criteria. As soon as, all the nodes are added to the buckets 
(sets), the remaining buckets are discarded. This theorem assumes that the number of nodes in 
a network ‘N’ are known and each node has one operating system installed. This theorem 
disregards the software packages and utilities on the node. Initially, ‘X’ buckets are created 
and initialized with zero nodes in them where X ≤ N. Consider the following sample topology 
with N=10. 
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Figure 3.5: Network Topologies 
Each node is traversed and it can be seen that only 3 buckets have nodes while other buckets 
have zero items according to the number of different operating systems. By considering only 
the number of Windows-based clients (W), the configuration diversity can be computed as: δ = 	  +,-+ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3.2) 
The computation of the configuration diversity can be extended by considering the packages, 
updates and software development kits (SDKs) installed on the machine. 
3.6.3.  State Transitions and Factors 
3.6.3.1.   Suspected-to-Exposed Transition 
The impact of parameters at time ‘t’ is given as: 
•   User-behaviour (β): If (1-β) is the state transition probability from the suspected-to-
exposed state, then the probability to transit from the suspected-to-recover state is (β).  
•   Configuration diversity (δ): It plays a major role in worm propagation. (1 – δ) is the 
probability of a node to go from the suspected-to-exposed state while δ is the 
probability to go from the suspected-to-recovered state.  
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•   Infection time lag: This factor is irrelevant from the suspected-to-exposed state and 
the suspected-to-recovered state [90][92] . 
3.6.3.2.   Exposed-to-Infectious Transition 
A node in the exposed state can transit from the Exposed-to-infectious state. The probabilities 
to transit from the exposed to the infectious state are discussed below: 
•   User-behaviour: Since only the propagation of active worms is considered, the user-
behaviour becomes irrelevant in worm propagation for the exposed state. The reason 
is that active worms can take a fraction of a second to make the node infectious.  
•   Infection time-lag: Due to the different configurations of each node, the infection time 
lag is different as well. The maximum time for a node can take to transit from exposed 
to infectious is T. There are n intervals each with t duration where n × t ≤ T and T % t 
=0. The infection time-lag is a function of configuration diversity and ε ~ δ. Where ε 
is the infection time-lag. 
3.6.3.3.   Exposed-to-Recovered Transition 
A node can transit from the exposed to the recovered state. The factors that may affect the 
state transition are antivirus or antimalware programs installed on the machine. 
3.6.3.4.   Infectious-to-Recovered Transition 
If the removal rate from the infection state is γ, so the number of nodes in the recovered state 
at time t from infectious state is γ I (t). 
3.6.4.  Model Assumptions 
The assumptions that are taken to develop the analytical model are as follows: 
1-   Initially, all the nodes are in the suspected state. 
2-   Initially, the infection starting nodes are chosen randomly. 
3-   The value of the configuration diversity (δ) is computed using the Bucket theorem 
(Equation 3.2) and the value of the user behaviour (β) is computed using Equation 3.1. 
4-   The factors (δ, β) are independent of each other. 
5-   At any given time, a node can be in any of the four states that are susceptible S(t), 
Exposed E(t), Infectious I(t) and Recovered R(t), where S(t) + E(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N 
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3.6.5.  Relationship among Parameters 
•   Suspected-to-Recovered State: ‘A’ is the rate of transition and ~ is the symbol of 
proportionality. 
A ~ (δ)                    (3.3) 
A ~ (β)                     (3.4) 
The infection time lag is irrelevant for this state transition. The value δ = 0 means 
homogeneous network of nodes while δ = 1 means perfectly heterogeneous network.  
K is the degree of a node and P (k) is the probability of the K neighbours to go in the 
corresponding state. The higher the degree of a node, the higher will be the probability 
of neighbours going into the corresponding state. It is also important to note that the 
probability of infection increases with an increase in the degree of nodes. 
•   Suspected-to-Exposed state: ‘B’ is the rate of transition from the suspected to the 
exposed state. 
B ~ (1 - δ)                 (3.5) 
B ~ (1- β)                  (3.6) 
•   Exposed-to-Infectious State: The exposed interval maximum upper bound is T i.e. the 
maximum time a node takes to go from the exposed to the infectious state. It is divided 
into n subintervals of length t. Any node can go form the exposed to the infectious state 
in n x t ≤ T where T % t = 0. 
In the exposed state, the infection time-lag is a function of the configuration diversity, 
so the relation Θ =δ x T. For the population that can go from exposed to infectious 
state is: 
I (t+1) = τE (t) - γ I(t) – dI (t)              (3.7) 
Where ‘τ’ is the transition rate from the exposed to the infectious state, ‘d’ is the death 
rate at the infectious state and ‘γ’ is the recovery rate, since the only factor affecting 
this transition is configuration diversity.  
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•   Exposed-to-Recovered State: The number of recovered nodes at time t from the 
exposed state are 
R (t+1) = ρE(t) + γ I (t) - dR (t)                      (3.8) 
3.6.6.  Complete System of Equations 
Consider a network of N peers when the probability of a peer being attacked by at least one 
attacker is 1/N. If (β) is the user behaviour, then the probability of a peer being attacked by 
one attacker is (1-β) /N and the probability of not being attacked is (1 – ((1-β) /N)). If Ki is the 
degree of the node, then the probability of not being attacked by Ki neighbours is (1 – ((1-β) 
Ki /N)).   
Most empirical networks share common properties in terms of their local features. For 
example, some networks have very skewed degree distribution so that most individuals have 
few neighbours but there are a few exceptional individuals that have high degree distribution. 
The latter type of nodes is often called ‘hub’ or ‘super-spreader’ [134], [135]. In the context 
of P2P networks, it is called a ‘Super-Peer’. The skewed distribution is often modelled using 
a power-law where it is assumed that for some φ ≥ 1, P(k) ~ k- ϕ for large degrees, where k is 
degree of a node [136]. The case where 2 < φ < 3 gained significant attention and is called 
scale-free distributions [136]. To calculate the value of ϕ using networks structure, let {K1, 
K2, K3, …………. KN} be the degree of each node in the network and Mean, M = 
/01234+ . The 
super-spreading parameters, φ, can be computed as: 
𝜑 = 𝐾𝑖 − 𝑀+0:; + 1                       (3.9) 
Where ϕ ≥ 1, it is to be noted that the mass action law applies with the homogenous mixing 
assumption that each individual has the same chance of coming into contact with an infectious 
individual [137]. This hypothesis eliminates the need to know the precise contact network on 
which the disease spreads. However, true populations violate some mass-action assumptions 
in a manner affecting the epidemic dynamics [138]. The true population is based on a random 
mixing assumption.  
If a suspected node is attacked, it has the probability (1 – δ) to be exposed. So the number of 
exposed hosts from time (t) to (t+1) is calculated as: 
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E (t+1) = S (t) 𝐼(𝑡) B (1 – δ) (1 − 𝛽) - τ E (t) - ρE(t) - dE(t)              (3.10) 
So the number of peers in the recovered state is: 
R (t+1) = γ I (t) + S (t) 𝐼(𝑡) B (δ)(𝛽) - dR (t) + ρE(t)                       (3.11) 
The number of nodes in the infectious state is: 
I (t+1) = τ E (t) - γ I - dI (t)                                                            (3.12) 
The number of nodes in the susceptible state are: 
S (t+1) = - S (t) 𝐼(𝑡) B [((1 – δ)(1 − 𝛽) + δ𝛽 ] + 𝑏𝑁 - dS (t)            (3.13) 
Where S(t) + E(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N(t) is true if and only if the birth-rate of nodes in the network 
is equal to the death-rate in the network i.e. b = d. 
3.6.7.  Boundary Conditions for SEIR Model 
The validity of analytical model is evaluated using convergence or boundary conditions. The 
boundary conditions validate the operating range of the analytical models. Convergence 
conditions for SEIR model are applied in order to understand the behaviour of system on 
boundary conditions. 
For state transitions, at time t=0, S(0) = N and E(0) = I(0) = R(0) = 0. Also, any time t, S(t) = 
E(t) = I(t) = R (t) > 0. 
Case 1: The boundary conditions for equation 3.10 are described as follows: 
E (t+1) = S (t) 𝐼(𝑡) B (1 – δ (1 − 𝛽) - τ E (t) - ρE(t) - dE(t);  ∀ 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤1, 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤1, φ ≥ 1 and  
τ, ρ and d in the range of [0,1] 
Example: Consider lower bound of parameter values for the exposed state equations converges 
the equations as follows: 
E(t+1) = S (t) 𝐼 𝑡 ;       ∀ 𝛿 = 0, 𝛽 = 0, φ = 1, τ = 0, ρ = 0, d = 0 
Above equation represent the uniform spreading of worm. 
Similarly, consider upper bound of parameter values for the exposed state equations converges 
the equations as follows: 
E(t+1) = - 3E (t);      ∀ 𝛿 = 1, 𝛽 = 1, φ > 1, τ = 1, ρ = 1, d = 1 
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The above equation indicates that the infection process stops completely. No new nodes are 
getting exposed while existing exposed nodes can go to infectious state or recovered state or 
die out from the network. 
Case2: The whole system of equations without applying any boundary condition is provided 
in equation (3.14). Consider the boundary conditions as follows: ∀ 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤1, 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤1, φ ≥ 1, and γ,  τ, ρ and d in the range of [0,1] 
Consider lower bound of parameter values for SEIR model converges the equations as follows: ∀ 𝛿 = 0, 𝛽 = 0, φ = 1, τ = 0, γ = 0, ρ = 0 b = 0, d = 0 
Consider upped bound of parameter values for SEIR model converges the equations as 
follows: ∀ 𝛿 = 	  1, 𝛽 = 1, φ > 1, τ > 0, γ > 0, ρ > 0 b > 0, d > 0 
The upper bounds of parameter values indicate that all the nodes in susceptible state will go 
to recovered state and do not transit to exposed state. All the nodes in the exposed state will 
die or transit to infectious or recovered state. All the nodes in in infectious state with die or 
transit to recovered state with time. 
At any time t, S (t) < N, R (t) < N, E (t) = 0 and I (t) = 0 where S (t) + R (t) = N. 
3.7.   Conclusion  
In this chapter, an extensive analysis and review of the state-of the art of P2P worms in P2P 
networks has been provided. Different analytical models addressing a variety of parameters 
were studied and classified. These studies revealed that the important factors in the worm 
propagation process are either neglected or only partially addressed in the analytical models. 
This inspired the development of a new stochastic and discrete time SEIR model for worm 
propagation modelling, which could holistically integrate the configuration diversity, the 
infection time-lag and the user-behaviour in an integrated analytical model.  
In the following chapter, exhaustive results based on the variety of values of the parameters 
addressed in SEIR model will be provided. The proposed model will be evaluated using 
conventional and ABM tools, by considering two common unstructured P2P protocols, GIA 
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and Gnutella. This will not only help in the comparative evaluation of different tools in terms 
of modelling but will also ensure the accuracy of the results and features provided by this 
particular modelling paradigm.  
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  : SEIR MODEL: 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
4.1.   Introduction 
A discrete-time analytical model (SEIR model) was proposed in Chapter 3 in order to reflect 
P2P worm propagation process and its associated factors. The proposed model addresses user 
behaviour, configuration diversity of nodes and infection time lag.  
In subsequent sections, the implementation of SEIR model using a conventional network 
modelling tool and an ABM tool will be provided. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis 
provides the first integrated implementation of common, complex P2P protocols, such as 
Gnutella and GIA, along with SEIR model. The impact of a variation of different parameters 
will be observed, analysed and discussed in order to investigate their role in the worm 
propagation process and this will subsequently help in the development of immunization 
strategies. 
4.2.   Performance Evaluation of SEIR Model Using Conventional 
Modelling Approach 
In this section, Matlab is selected as the modelling tool for the evaluation of the proposed 
SEIR model. Matlab is specifically designed to solve scientific and engineering problems. To 
express computational mathematics, it uses a matrix-based language. A library of built-in 
algorithms and codes provides the essential domain-specific support. Being based on a desktop 
environment, it provides support for experimentation, exploration, and discovery. The tool has 
been rigorously tested for its capabilities for modelling the worm propagation process. 
The proposed (SEIR) model is evaluated by comparative analysis with two selected 
benchmark models,  STAWP model [7] and with the Time Four-Factor model [93]. 
Since unstructured P2P networks have the properties of scale-free networks [139], for the 
implementation of these analytical models, the Barabasi-Albert Scale Free Network (BA – 
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SFN) [140] is used to generate the network topologies. All subsequent networks will be 
generated using the same approach. The details of the benchmark models used are as follows: 
1-   STAWP Model [7]: This model is a discrete time, active worm propagation stochastic 
model. It is based on the SIR epidemiological model that takes into consideration the 
impact of dynamic network topology on the worm propagation process while ignoring 
the infection time-lag and node heterogeneity.   
2-   Four-Factor Model [93]: This discrete-time analytical model has been paid attention 
in the literature because it handles four factors simultaneously. These factors are 
network topology, countermeasures considered by users and Internet service providers 
(ISPs), configuration diversity of nodes in the P2P network, and attack and defence 
strategies. It introduced an exposed state to the standard SIR model and modified the 
SIR model to SEIR. It proved that the infection time-lag of each node in an 
unstructured P2P network is different from that of other nodes due to configuration 
diversity. However, the impact user-behaviour of nodes is not specifically addressed 
in this model. 
In the following section, the process of worm propagation will be discussed considering our 
proposed SEIR model in comparison with the benchmark models. It is important to note that 
in all plots in Section 4.2, the unit of time along x-axis is second. The results are presented for 
all the models, showing the influence different values of configuration diversity, infection 
time-lag and user behaviour. 
4.2.1.  Infection Propagation over Time 
To measure the number of infectious hosts over time, a Scale Free Network (SFN) of 100 
nodes is generated. All the nodes are considered vulnerable before infection starts. The 
infectious node is randomly selected from all the nodes in the network. The implementation 
of all benchmark models is carried out in Matlab considering two common unstructured P2P 
Gnutella and GIA protocols.  
The infectious population density over time during the worm propagation process is shown in 
Figure 4.1: 
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Figure 4.1: Infectious Population Density (STAWP model) 
The average value of 20 executions from STAWP model for the propagation of active worms 
demonstrates a maximum infection density of 90%. The removal rate from the infectious to 
the removed state is considered to be 0.05%.  
The results are comparative with that in [7], whose results show peak infection density to be 
80%, with a 0.05% removal rate. Such a high infection density demonstrates that the model 
does not consider the important factors that may affect the worm propagation process. 
Considering these factors may result in a lower infection density when compared with the one 
derived from STAWP model (Figure 4.1). 
Infection propagation over time using Four-Factor Model is shown in 4.2: 
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Figure 4.2: Infectious Population Density (Four-Factor Model) 
The plot shown in Figure 4.2 is averaged out from 20 executions with a configuration diversity 
value considered to be 0.2 for all executions. This means that 20% of the nodes are different 
from each other in terms of operating systems, installed packages and P2P clients. The results 
show that in the presence of an additional parameter (configuration diversity), the worm 
propagation process decreases significantly, compared to STAWP model. 45% of the nodes 
are shown to be infectious which are order of magnitude less than that infectious nodes by 
STAWP model. 
The plotting of infection propagation over time using SEIR model along with STAWP and 
Four-Factor Models is shown in Figure 4.3: 
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Figure 4.3: Infectious Population over Time without Parameter Values 
It can be seen that, ignoring configuration diversity and user-behaviour, the infection density 
tends to peak with its highest value being 30% for a network of 100 nodes. At the same time, 
the infection density, according to Four-Factor Model is more than 40%, which is due to the 
additional exposed state in SEIR model. It can be seen that the presence of different factors 
affects the worm propagation process. The more the number of parameters and factors, the 
higher will be the impact on infection density.  
In the following sections, the impact of different factors on the worm propagation process 
considering different P2P protocols will be examined. A comparative analysis of the 
benchmark models and the proposed model is given in detail. 
4.3.   First Case Study: Comparative Evaluation of the Analytical Models 
Considering Gnutella Protocol 
The impact of different factors on the worm propagation process using SEIR, STAWP and 
Four-Factor models will be examined. In this section, all the models are implemented using 
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Matlab with Gnutella being the underlying P2P protocol. A network of 500 nodes will be 
generated. It is assumed that all the nodes are vulnerable to infection with equal probability. 
4.3.1.  The Impact of Configuration Diversity on Infection Propagation 
Configuration diversity is addressed by Four-Factor and SEIR models. The results showing 
the different values of configuration diversity and the impact on worm propagation are shown 
in Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b).  
STAWP model shows a rapid increase in the worm propagation process, where it quickly 
reaches between 400 and 450 nodes but then drops exponentially. Four-Factor and SEIR 
models, on the other hand, show an exponential increase in node infection, reaching a 
maximum value of between 100-200 for a configuration diversity of 0.3 and 0.5.  
There are two major differences between Four-Factor and SEIR models (Figure 4.4(a)). The 
infectious nodes Four-Factor model are almost 10% more than those of SEIR model. The 
reason for this is that SEIR model involves an additional exposed state, from which some 
nodes directly transit to the recovery state instead of transiting to the infectious state. This 
difference in the number of infectious nodes depends on the rate of transition to the recovery 
state from the exposed state. The second observation is the time-delay in SEIR model results, 
compared to Four-Factor Model results. The underlying reason is the infection time-lag, which 
occurs in the exposed state due to the different operating systems, packages and programs 
configured on the different nodes in the network. 
 
Figure 4.4: Configuration Diversity for all Models 
 (b) Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (a) Configuration Diversity = 0.3 
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4.3.2.  The Impact of User Behaviour on Infection Propagation  
The impact of the different values of user-behaviour on infection density is observed in Figure 
4.5(a) and 4.5(b). Since Four-Factor and STAWP models do not consider user-behaviour, the 
observed infection density, based on these models, is much higher than that from SEIR model. 
The results are generated by considering a homogeneous network of nodes i.e. the 
configuration diversity is equal to zero. The intent is to highlight the impact of this factor on 
the worm propagation process, as compared with other analytical models. It can be seen that 
the infection density is 20% less than that from Four-Factor Model with a value of 0.3 for user 
behaviour while it is more than 30% less than that from Four-Factor Model with a value of 
0.5 for user behaviour. The reason for this is that SEIR model takes into account for user-
behaviour as factor while other models ignore it. 
     
 
Figure 4.5: User-Behaviour for all Models            
4.3.3.  The Impact of Random Values on Infection Propagation 
Since SEIR model considers user behaviour and configuration diversity as factors that impact 
on the worm propagation process in P2P networks, a heterogeneous network in which nodes 
are affected by user-behaviour is considered. The infection population density over time is 
computed in such a network and shown in Figure 4.6 along with the findings from Four-Factor 
and STAWP models. The results demonstrate that for a heterogeneous network in which users 
are continuously affecting P2P clients, the infection density is very less which is around 20-
(b) User Behaviour = 0.5 (a) User Behaviour = 0.3 
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30% of the total susceptible population. A drop in infection ratio of up to 30-40% can also be 
observed for Four-Factor model because it considers the impact of configuration diversity on 
only the worm propagation process. However, there is no impact of any of the considered 
factors on the worm propagation process for STAWP model and it shows a high infection 
density of more than 90%.  
 
Figure 4.6: The Impact of Random Values of Parameters  
4.3.4.  Random Values of User-behaviour for Homogeneous Network 
For a homogeneous P2P network of nodes where all the nodes are assumed to have a similar 
number of package and configuration diversity the value is zero. The users are operating P2P 
clients randomly, the infection propagation reach a maximum peak value of between 20-25% 
for SEIR model and then decreases, as shown in Figure 4.7. It can be observed that Four-
Factor and STAWP models remain at the highest of their infection density values of 50% and 
90% respectively. This is due to the fact that only Four-Factor Model considers configuration 
diversity, which is assumed to be zero due to the homogeneous network of nodes. While 
STAWP model does not consider any of the factors. 
102	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
 
Figure 4.7: The Impact of Random User-Behaviour  
4.4.   Second Case Study: Comparative Evaluation of Analytical Models 
Considering GIA Protocol 
A scale-free network of 500 nodes is generated using the BA-algorithm. The features of GIA 
[16] such as biased random walk, one-hop replication and active flow control are also 
implemented. The capacity of each node is assigned based on the number of neighbours the 
node has. The infection starting-point is selected randomly in the network. In the following 
section, the infection density over time is derived using different parameter values and then 
evaluated with selected benchmark models. 
4.4.1.  The Impact of Configuration Diversity on Infection Propagation  
The results of different values of configuration diversity and their impact on worm propagation 
are considered in this section. A significantly faster worm propagation process is observed in 
P2P network based on GIA protocol as compared with the network based on Gnutella protocol. 
The number of infectious nodes is between 30-40% with configuration diversity values of 0.3 
and 0.5 for SEIR while the number of infectious nodes is more than 70% for Four-Factor 
Model with similar values of configuration diversity. There is no impact of configuration 
diversity on STAWP model (Figure 4.8).  
It can be noted the trends so far observed that Four-Factor and STAWP models are of an 
exponential nature while SEIR model shows relatively linear trends. Another observation is 
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that the infection time increased, compared with that for Gnutella under the same assumptions 
(Figure 4.4). The reason for this is that the additional parameters, such as user-behaviour and 
infection time-lag in SEIR model, make the worm propagation process relatively slower, thus 
representing relatively realistic view as compared with that provided by Four-Factor and 
STAWP models. 
      
Figure 4.8: Configuration Diversity for all Models 
4.4.2.  The Impact of User Behaviour on Infection Propagation  
The impact of different values of user-behaviour is shown in Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) for 
SEIR model in comparison with STAWP and Four-Factor models. 
The difference in infectious population following all models is shown in Figure 4.9. The 
infectious population following SEIR model is much less than the infectious population using 
Four-Factor and STAWP models. The reason is that both Four-Factor and STAWP models do 
not consider user behaviour as a parameter that can affect the propagation process. 
(b) Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (a) Configuration Diversity = 0.3 
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Figure 4.9: User-Behaviour for all Models 
4.4.3.  The Impact of Random Values on Infection Propagation  
In this section, all of the various factors (user-behaviour and configuration diversity) are 
randomly considered for simulating worm propagation. A relatively lower infection density is 
observed following SEIR model under the given values, compared with Four-Factor and 
STAWP models. 
It can be observed in Figure 4.10 that, for SEIR model, the infection density reaches a 
maximum value of 30% -35% due to the handling of random values (in a range of 0 to 1) of 
configuration diversity and user behaviour. However, infection density is near to 60% for 
Four-Factor and 90% for STAWP model. 
While other observations were discussed in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2, the drop in the 
curve starting from 75 to 90 units of time is approximately the same for all the analytical 
models. It shows that when most of the nodes in the network get infectious, the worm 
propagation trends are similar for all analytical models regarding the active worms.  
(b) User Behaviour = 0.3 (a) User Behaviour = 0.3 
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Figure 4.10: Impact of Random Parameter Values  
4.4.4.  Random User-Behaviour Values for Homogeneous Network  
With a homogeneous network, considering the random values of user-behaviour (in the range 
of 0 to 1), the infection density over time for SEIR, STAWP and Four-Factor models is shown 
in Figure 4.11. It can be seen that the random values of parameters reduce the infection density 
significantly, compared to Four-Factor and STAWP models. However, the infection 
population over time for Four-Factor model in the absence of configuration diversity is higher 
(Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11: The Impact of Random Values for a Homogeneous Network 
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4.5.   SEIR: The Impact of Different Parameter Values  
The proposed SEIR model is evaluated for all the parameters (configuration diversity, 
infection time-lag and user-behaviour). The impact of variation of the parameter values on 
infection propagation is discussed considering Gnutella protocol. A scale-free network for 500 
nodes is generated and the infection starting-point is chosen randomly among all the nodes in 
the network.  
4.5.1.  The Impact of Configuration Diversity on Infection Propagation 
Different values of configuration diversity are considered and infection propagation graphs 
are recorded for each value. The observations are summarized in Figure 4.12 below: 
  
Figure 4.12: Impact of Configuration Diversity over Time on Infection Density 
The values of configuration diversity are considered to be 0.3, 0.5 and 0.8 to evaluate the 
impact on infection propagation using SEIR model. A significant decrease in infection 
propagation is observed with the increasing value of configuration diversity in the network 
(Figure 4.12). It also highlights that the homogeneous network can more rapidly serve as a 
medium for infection propagation. 
A node could be different from any other node in terms of the packages, updates or service 
packs installed on it. Anti-malware and antiviruses could also be configured on nodes as well. 
The programs on a node can work as immunizers, because worms are designed to exploit 
certain vulnerabilities in the operating system. If the vulnerability is patched or an antivirus is 
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configured, the node not only immunizes itself but also stops the worm propagation process 
at this point in the network. A node in a susceptible state can transit from a susceptible state 
to an exposed state or a recovered state. For a high value of configuration diversity, more 
nodes transit to recovered state instead of to an exposed state. 
4.5.2.  The Impact of User Behaviour on Infection Propagation 
SEIR model considers user-behaviour an important parameter and contends that it impacts the 
worm propagation process in different states. The impact of different values of user-behaviour 
on infection density is therefore shown in Figure 4.13: 
 
Figure 4.13: Impact of User Behaviour over Time on Infection Propagation 
Similar to the configuration diversity variation results (Figure 4.12), user-behaviour can be 
seen to have a significant impact on the worm propagation process. The results confirm the 
claim of analytical models that higher user actions with P2P clients slow down the worm 
propagation process [141]. 
4.5.3.   Random Parameter Values for Different Network Sizes  
The random values of configuration diversity and user behaviour are considered in this section. 
The results are computed for homogeneous networks of 100, 300, 500 and 1000 nodes. The 
user-behaviour and configuration diversity values are computed randomly in the range of 0 to 
1. The results of infectious population density over time for four different network sizes are 
given in Figure 4.14:  
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Figure 4.14: Impact of Network Size on Worm Propagation (SEIR Model) 
The results are computed with an average of 20 executions for all networks. The results show 
the infection density to be 25% for 100 nodes, more than 30% for 300 nodes, 36% for 500 
nodes and 37% for 1000 nodes. These results indicate that infection density increases as the 
network size grows, irrespective of the fact that the nodes experience different configuration 
diversity and user behaviour values. The reason for this increase is the alternate query routing 
options available to the node. 
4.5.4.  The Impact of Super-Peers on Infection Propagation 
Super-peer is defined as a node with which large number of nodes are connected [142]. Super-
peers are not explicitly defined in Gnutella while the feature of topology adaptation based on 
capacity generate super-peers in GIA. This definition is valid for Gnutella and causes 
scalability problems as well. To counter the problem, GIA protocol define super-peer as a 
well-connected node along with high capacity as well. 
The impact of super-peers on the worm propagation process can be seen in Figure 4.15. The 
infection population density over time for SEIR model is measured for Gnutella and GIA 
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protocols without considering any value for configuration diversity and user-behaviour 
parameters. The infection population density is found to be 15% more in GIA as compared 
with that in Gnutella. The reason is the biased random walk towards high capacity and the 
connected peers in GIA, compared with a random walk with no super-peer in Gnutella. 
 
Figure 4.15: The Impact of Super-Peer on the Worm Propagation Process 
4.6.   Discussion 
The impact of the configuration diversity of the nodes in P2P network has been observed for 
STAWP, Four-Factor and SEIR models, considering Gnutella (Figure 4.4) and GIA (Figure 
4.8). It can be seen in Table 4.1 that the infection propagation for GIA protocol is higher than 
for Gnutella protocol under the same values of configuration diversity. It can also be seen that 
STAWP and Four-Factor models show relatively higher values of infection, compared to those 
shown by SEIR model under both protocols. The reason for this is its efficient query-
forwarding mechanism due to the biased-random walk in GIA, compared to Gnutella. Another 
reason is the super-peers created in GIA due to a dynamic topology adaptation feature. These 
super-peers have the capacity to handle query requests, thus solving Gnutella scalability issue 
and achieving efficient query propagation. 
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Figures 4.4 and 4.8 show a delay in the curve of SEIR model, compared to Four-Factor model; 
this is due to an additional exposed state that SEIR model reveals. There is a quicker drop in 
the infection density when using SEIR model compared with Four-Factor model because some 
of the nodes go to a recovered state in SEIR model due to the high value of configuration 
diversity. 
Table 4.1: The Impact of Configuration Diversity on Different Models 
Configuration Diversity 
Protocols SEIR Four-Factor STAWP 
 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 n/a 
Gnutella < 30 % <25% < 40 % <30% 90 % 
GIA < 40 % 30-40% 70% 60-70% 90-95% 
Similarly, for a user behaviour value of 0.3, SEIR, Four-Factor and STAWP models show 
30%, 40% and 90% infection densities for Gnutella protocol and 35%, 90% and 90% infection 
densities for GIA protocol respectively. It can be seen that, for the same values of a parameter, 
SEIR model shows the least infection density, compared to Four-Factor and STAWP models 
under Gnutella protocol. The reasons for this are same as those mentioned above. However, 
for GIA protocol, Four-Factor model demonstrates a very high value of infection. The reason 
is that Four-Factor model is not addressing the user-behaviour factor and the results are 
generated for a homogeneous network. GIA protocol also has a high query propagation rate 
due to its topology adaptation and biased random walk features. In the absence of any of these 
factors, the infection density appears to be very high for Four-Factor model considering GIA 
protocol.  
Table 4.2: Impact of User Behaviour on Different Models 
User Behaviour 
Protocols SEIR Four-Factor STAWP 
Values 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 n/a 
Gnutella < 30 % 50% < 40 % 50% 90 % 
GIA 30-40% 30% >90% 80-90% 90% 
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The results are generated for random values of configuration diversity and user-behaviour in 
the range (0.2-0.8) (Table 4.3). The reason for not choosing extreme values of parameters is 
because the worm propagation process stops if the worm come across an immunized node. 
The results presented in Table 5.3 show that SEIR model shows a 20% infection density for 
Gnutella protocol but a 30-35% infection density for GIA protocol. Similarly, for Four-Factor 
model, there is an infection density value of 35% for Gnutella protocol and of 55-60% for GIA 
protocol. 
The parameter values are randomly produced in order to generate more realistic results. These 
results indicate approximately twice the infection population density value for GIA protocol, 
compared with that of Gnutella protocol. For a similar protocol, the infection density is twice 
for Four-Factor model as for SEIR model. This is due to the better query propagation and the 
biased random walk mechanisms implemented by GIA protocol. 
Table 4.3: The Impact of Random Values of Parameters on Different Models 
Random Parameter Values (0.2-0.8) 
Protocols SEIR Four-Factor STAWP 
Gnutella 20% 35% 90 % 
GIA 30-35% 55-60% 90% 
A homogeneous network is assumed in Table 4.4 for the generation of the results. It can be 
seen that the infection density is twice as much considering GIA as it is with Gnutella for SEIR 
or Four-Factor models. It can also be seen that the infection density is more than double for 
Four-Factor model, compared with SEIR model for both GIA and Gnutella protocols. The 
reason is that the assumption of a heterogeneous network is dropped and this causes the 
decrease in infection propagation. 
Table 4.4: The Impact of Random Values on a Homogeneous Network  
Random Values for Homogenous Network 
Protocols SEIR Four-Factor STAWP 
Gnutella 20-25% 50-60% 90 % 
GIA 30-40% >60% 90% 
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4.7.   Performance Evaluation of SEIR Model using ABM Approach 
4.7.1.  The Concept of Behaviour Space 
Analytical models have multiple settings with many input parameter values. All the 
parameters combined together are called parameter-space in mathematics and every output 
value has a particular combination of values. Running a model with different settings (and 
sometimes even the same ones) can lead to drastically different behaviour in the system being 
modelled. The question is how to produce a particular behaviour from the system with a given 
configuration of values. 
Behaviour space in Netlogo is a better way to solve this problem. The results are recorded for 
different combinations of input values specified from the Netlogo interface. The behaviour of 
the system is dependent on the values of the GUI controls representing the parameter space. 
During the process, the model’s parameter space is sufficiently sampled so that the relationship 
between the different slider values and the behaviour of the system can be fully understood. 
During the execution, the output data can be recorded and visualized in in a pre-defined output 
format such as tables on spreadsheets. 
4.7.2.  Description of SEIR Model based on ODD Protocol 
The ABM for SEIR analytical model, in terms of its purpose, state variables and scales, 
process overview and scheduling, design concepts, initialization, input and sub-models, is 
described below: 
4.7.2.1.   Purpose 
The purpose of the active worm propagation SEIR model is to study the impact of worms on 
the network within the given time. This model addresses the configuration diversity of the 
network and the user behaviour of nodes as parameters that affect the worm propagation 
process. The simulation considers only unstructured P2P networks with particular 
consideration being given to Gnutella and GIA protocols [16]. 
4.7.2.2.   State variables and scales 
The model consists of the following three levels: individual, network and environment. The 
individuals are nodes that are operated by a user. The user applies user-specific settings such 
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as antivirus or antimalware programs, or setting an upload/download limit. It also includes 
P2P client on/off behaviour by the user. The infection time-lag is dependent on the 
configuration settings of the individual node and hence is the property of individual nodes as 
well. On the network level, configuration diversity and a scale free network (SFN) with a 
minimum and maximum degree of nodes are the important properties. The environment 
consists of overall infectious, exposed, susceptible and recovered nodes. The protocol 
(Gnutella or GIA) followed by the peers for worm propagation is also under consideration. 
4.7.2.3.   Process overview and scheduling 
The model proceeds in discrete time-steps. With each time-step, a node can go from one state 
to another state from all the four defined states, namely, susceptible, exposed, infectious and 
recovered. The process starts from a node which is in an infectious state. The node can transit 
from a susceptible to an exposed state, which is a new state defined in the model to address 
the infection time-lag. The susceptible node can also transit from a susceptible to a recovered 
state if antivirus or other protection against the worm is available on the node. From the 
infectious state, the node goes to the recovered state, which is the absorbing state. The process 
overview and scheduling is shown below in Figure 4.16: 
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Figure 4.16: Life-Cycle of Worm for All States 
4.7.2.4.   Design Concepts 
•   Emergence: active worm propagation dynamics emerge from the behaviour of the 
worm on an individual node, but the propagation is dependent on many factors.  
•   Adaptation: all the nodes keep a timer for the infection time lag when exposed. As 
soon as, the time reaches zero, the nodes switch from the exposed to the infectious 
state [143]. 
•   Fitness: the nodes should be at least in one of the four states (susceptible, exposed, 
infectious and recovered).  
•   Prediction: the probability of neighbours being the next potential target of the worm 
is determined by computing the factors used in SEIR analytical model. 
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•   Sensing: the node must be in an infectious state in order to transmit the infection to its 
immediate neighbours. The modelling of each state and of the state-transition is 
explicitly performed. 
•   Interaction: nodes communicate with each other following Gnutella or GIA protocol. 
•   Stochasticity: the user behaviour and configuration diversity are the factors that 
introduce stochasticity into the model. The values of user behaviour and configuration 
diversity are determined from the probability density function generated using 
Gaussian distribution with mean and standard deviation values. 
•   Collectiveness: there is no grouping of individual agents. All nodes are spatially 
independent and purely distributed and connected using P2P scale free networks. 
•   Observation: for model testing, spatial distribution of individual nodes is not required. 
4.7.2.5.   Initialization 
The model can be initialized from 1 to 10 initially infectious nodes. The nodes are randomly 
selected from the whole network and the number can be predefined using the GUI of the 
model. 
4.7.2.6.   Input 
In general, the configuration diversity and user-behaviour are determined from the 
probabilistic distribution. The total number of nodes from which to generate the network is 
specified. Other inputs, such as the infection time-lag, are provided. The number of neighbours 
of each suspected node and the selection of its next target among the neighbours is done based 
on values computed by the analytical model.  
4.7.2.7.   Sub-models 
There is not sub-model involved in modelling the analytical model. 
4.7.3.  SEIR: Simulation Setup 
The analytical model is implemented in Netlogo based on Gnutella and GIA protocols. The 
parameters such as the configuration diversity, user behaviour, infection time-lag, state-
transition rate, node capacity, and minimum and maximum number of neighbours could be 
specified from the GUI of the Netlogo implementation. The results are generated using a 
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behaviour-space tool provided by Netlogo and from multiple simulated executions of the 
program. 
A brief description of the different parameters used in the analytical model and implemented 
in the modelling follows: 
1-   Number-of-node: the number of nodes in the unstructured P2P network. 
2-   Infection-time-lag: the time needed for a node to be infectious or to remain an exposed 
state. It is dependent on the number of packages installed and the presence of anti-virus 
or anti-malware on the machine. 
3-   Initial-breakout-size: the number of initially infectious nodes before the start of the 
worm propagation process. 
4-   Diversity: the configuration diversity value of each node. 
5-   Behaviour: the behaviour of the user computed within the range of 0 to 1: zero 
represents a no user action while one represents a maximum user actions with a P2P 
client that can stop the worm propagation. 
6-   Average token: this parameter is used to represent the capacity of a node to handle the 
request. The greater the number of tokens, the higher will be the capacity of the nodes. 
This term is specific to GIA protocol. 
4.8.   First Case Study: Comparative Evaluation of Analytical Models 
Considering Gnutella Protocol 
A network of 500 nodes is generated during the simulation set-up. The number of nodes is 
limited because Netlogo provides visualization support of the process, which needs relatively 
more processing and memory capacity from the hardware perspective.  
Initially, the values of different parameters, such as the configuration diversity and the user-
behaviour of nodes, are set to zero to monitor the worm propagation process. However, the 
impact of these values with different variations is checked and validated with conventional 
modelling results. The graphical user interface of a sample set-up is shown in Figure 4.17 
below.  
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Figure 4.17: Netlogo GUI for Implementation 
4.8.1.  The Impact of Configuration Diversity  
Two benchmark models, Four-Factor and STAWP models, along with the proposed analytical 
model SEIR are considered and simulated for different values of configuration diversity in 
order to understand the worm propagation process. The impact of configuration diversity on 
worm propagation is shown in Figures (4.18) and (4.19) because both Four-Factor and SEIR 
models consider configuration diversity to be an important factor while STAWP model 
ignores it.  
The results are generated for a configuration diversity value of 0.3 and 0.5. Similar to 
conventional modelling tool results (Figure 4.5), the implementation using ABM shows that 
SEIR model shows the lowest infection density among all the models. Comparing it with Four-
Factor model (Figure 4.18(b)), there is a minor delay (Figure 4.18 (a)) in infection density for 
SEIR model. The reasons are an additional exposed state and the number of nodes that are 
recovered from the exposed state. STAWP model achieves a very high infection propagation 
within a very short period of time. The reason is that it does not consider the configuration 
diversity factor. 
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Figure 4.18: Infection Propagation over Time for Gnutella with CD = 0.3 
(b): Configuration Diversity = 0.3 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): Configuration Diversity = 0.3 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.19: Infection Propagation over Time for Gnutella with CD=0.5 
(a): Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (SEIR Model) 
 
(b): Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(c): Configuration Diversity = 0 (STAWP Model) 
 
120	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
4.8.2.  The Impact of User Behaviour  
As demonstrated earlier, user behaviour describes the actions a user performs with a P2P 
client. Logically, these actions slow down the query propagation and hence the worm 
propagation process. A review of the actions, including the user-behaviour parameters, is 
provided in Section 4.3.2. The results, shown in Figures (4.20) and (4.21), are generated for 
different values of user behaviour for different benchmark models. 
SEIR model shows a 20% infection diversity for the user-behaviour value of 0.3 while it shows 
more than 20% of infection density for the value of 0.5. The results represent the direct impact 
of user-behaviour on the worm propagation process.  
STAWP and Four-Factor models remain unaffected from the variation in this parameter as 
these models do not address this particular parameter. These results agree with the results 
already obtained using conventional tools (Matlab) in Section 4.3.2. 
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Figure 4.20: Infection Propagation over Time for Gnutella with UB=0.3 
(b): User Behaviour = 0.3 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): User Behaviour = 0.3 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.21: Infection Propagation over Time for Gnutella with UB=0.5 
(a): User Behaviour = 0.5 (SEIR Model) 
(b): User Behaviour = 0.5 (Four-Factor Model) 
(c): User Behaviour = 0. (STAWP Model) 
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4.8.3.  The Impact of Random Values of Parameters 
The factors under consideration, namely, configuration diversity and user-behaviour, are 
considered with random values within the range of 0 and 1. These values are the lower and 
upper limits that apply to these variables. It can be seen that the infection density is in the 
range from 20-25% for SEIR model.  
The results provided in this section match with results in Section 4.3.3. However, there is an 
exception in the random and quick early-increase in infection density for Four-Factor and 
SEIR models. The major cause of this variation is the network topology and finding highly 
connected nodes at early stage of infection process leads to a high infection density in the 
worm propagation process. 
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Figure 4.22: Infection Propagation with Random Values 
4.9.   Second Case Study: Comparative Evaluation of Analytical Models 
Considering GIA Protocol 
In this section, GIA protocol is implemented with an ABM tool (Netlogo) and integrated with 
the proposed analytical model. The salient features of the implementation are as follows: 
1-   The size of a node is proportional to its capacity to handle requests. This feature is 
referred to as the topology adaptation [16]. 
2-   The token based mechanism of GIA for handling requests is implemented. This feature 
is also called the Active-Flow Control [16]. 
(a) SEIR Model  
(b): Four-Factor Model  
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3-   A biased random walk instead of a random walk is implemented as part of GIA 
implementation. This is also a core feature of GIA protocol [16]. 
4-   A network of 500 nodes is considered.  
5-   20 executions of each variable setup to obtain a better understanding of the behaviour 
of the worm in the network. 
6-   Active worms are considered which are worms that are topology-aware and know 
active IPs in the network [144]. 
The impact of different values of configuration diversity and of user-behaviour is measured. 
The purpose of these implementations is to verify the effectiveness of Agent-Based Modelling 
in comparison with conventional implementations. The results generated in this section are 
compared and analysed with the results generated in Section 4.4. 
4.9.1.  The Impact of Configuration Diversity  
The value of infection density is higher in GIA protocol. In Gnutella protocol, however, 
similar values for configuration diversity were observed for all analytical models. The results 
are shown in Figures 4.23 and 4.24.  
While the infection density is overall higher than that in Gnutella protocol results, there are a 
few observations concerning the simulation. First, there is a delay in the worm propagation 
process for some units of time and followed by a sudden increase. The reason for this is the 
token-based active flow control mechanism. A node that has to forward the query request asks 
the query handler to serve its request. If the serving node is busy and does not have the capacity 
to fulfil the request, it holds the request for some time until its resources are released to be 
served to the waiting node. This is the reason for the delay. The second observation is the 
relatively higher infection density. The reason is that the high-capacity nodes have a higher 
number of neighbours and a biased-random walk which forwards the query requests to highly 
connected nodes. The same formula is applied to all the infection propagation processes, 
regardless of the values of the parameters. The third and important observation is the die-out 
behaviour of simulations: this is when the simulation stops quickly and the worm does not 
spread with significant infection density. A detailed discussion of this observation will be 
provided in the next section. 
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Figure 4.23: Infection Propagation over Time for GIA and CD=0.3 
(b): Configuration Diversity = 0.3 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): Configuration Diversity = 0.3 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.24: Infection Propagation over Time for GIA, CD=0.5 
4.9.2.  The Impact of User Behaviour  
The impact of user behaviour is similar to the effect provided in Section 4.4.2. SEIR model 
shows relatively lower infection propagation for both values i.e. 0.3 and 0.5 (Figures 4.24(a) 
and 4.24(b)), while the other benchmark models have no impact on worm propagation for the 
variation of these values. These reasons and observations are same as provided in previous 
section while considering impact of configuration diversity on user behaviour. 
(b): Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): Configuration Diversity = 0.5 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.25: Infection Propagation over Time for GIA and UB=0.3 
(b): User Behaviour = 0.3 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): User Behaviour = 0.3 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.26: Infection Propagation over Time for GIA and UB=0.5 
4.9.3.  The Impact of Random Values of Parameters 
All the factors (user-behaviour and configuration diversity) are considered randomly for 
simulating the worm propagation process using GIA protocol for all analytical models. The 
trends are observed same as that were observed in Section 4.4.3.  
It can also be seen that all the graphs provided in Sections 4.8 and 4.9 do not exhibit the same 
decline in infection density over time as was shown with the implementation of conventional 
tools. The reason is the low recovery rate of the infectious population, apparent in Netlogo, 
compared with that in Matlab. 
(b): User Behaviour = 0.5 (Four-Factor Model) 
 
(a): User Behaviour = 0.5 (SEIR Model) 
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Figure 4.27: Infection Propagation with Random Values 
(a): SEIR Model 
(b): Four-Factor Model 
(c): STAWP Model 
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4.10.   Analysis and Discussion 
There are many dimensions to the results that have been generated in this chapter, using 
conventional and non-conventional modelling tools. One dimension is the comparative 
analysis of the proposed analytical model ‘SEIR’ with the benchmark models considering the 
different parameters. The second dimension is an evaluation of the conventional and non-
conventional approaches followed by an analysis of the variations in the results generated 
using SEIR model with different parameter values.  
The work was extended by providing an integrated implementation of SEIR model with P2P 
protocols such as GIA and Gnutella in Netlogo. We thus provided an integrated solution of 
P2P protocols and an analytical model (Figure 4.28). 
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Figure 4.28: Integrated SEIR Model 
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4.10.1.   Comparative Analysis of SEIR with Benchmark Models 
Considering the random values of parameters for Gnutella, (Figure 4.6) shows infection 
density values of 30%, 40% and 90% for SEIR, Four-Factor and STAWP models respectively. 
Similarly, for GIA protocol implementation (Figure 4.10), these values are 35%, 60% and 
90% for SEIR, Four-Factor and STAWP models. The infection density reported by GIA, 
compared with Gnutella, is higher for a similar network with SEIR model. The reason for this 
difference is the relatively efficient query propagation by GIA, using its topology adaptation 
feature and its biased random walk towards high-capacity nodes. 
4.10.1.1.   Simulation Die-Out Behaviour 
Most of the time, the simulations performed in the literature focus on the peak values of 
infection density during the worm propagation process. During the computation, the results 
from the different simulations are averaged out. It has been reported in the literature that the 
infection may quickly die out, even when the prediction models report very high values during  
the epidemic outbreak [145]. 
The simulation results obtained for 20 executions for each analytical model, running under 
Gnutella and GIA protocols with different parameter values, show that a large number of 
infection processes end up in the early stages of the simulation and do not pass the minimum 
defined threshold value. A quantitative analysis of different simulations is provided in Tables 
4.5 and 4.6. The results indicate that 55% of the time the infection dies out at maximum. On 
average, for any protocol, 41.66% of times the infection dies out quickly. Another important 
observation is that no die-out simulation is observed but only in GIA protocol. The reason is 
the topology adaptation feature in GIA, which tends to connect the nodes to a high-capacity 
node. The high-capacity node thus not only handles the load of queries (token-based flow 
control) but also acts as a super-peer for query propagation. 
4.10.1.2.   Network Lockdown 
The term ‘Network lockdown’ has been coined for the phenomenon when during infection 
propagation, the infectious nodes are isolated from the recovered nodes in such a way that 
they are not able to propagate the infection. Due to this phenomenon, susceptible nodes remain 
in a suspected state and cannot be infected by the infectious nodes. This phenomenon is 
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observed for all analytical models operating under different P2P protocols (Figure 4.20 (a), 
4.21(a), 4.22(b), 4.23(a), 4.23(b), 4.25(a), 4.26(a)). 
This indicates that the presence of factors, such as configuration diversity and user-behaviour, 
can lead to a situation where infection cannot be further propagated even in the presence of a 
susceptible population. So these factors contribute towards taming the outbreak by providing 
natural immunization against the worm intended to spread within the network. 
Table 4.5: Die-out Behaviour for Configuration Diversity 
Model Protocol Value Total simulations 
Die out 
Simulation Die out % 
SEIR Gnutella 0.3 20 11 55 
SEIR Gnutella 0.5 20 10 50 
SEIR GIA 0.3 20 0 0 
SEIR GIA 0.5 20 0 0 
STWAP Gnutella N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP Gnutella N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP GIA N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP GIA N/A 20 10 50 
FF Gnutella 0.3 20 3 15 
FF Gnutella 0.5 20 5 25 
FF GIA 0.3 20 0 0 
FF GIA 0.5 20 0 0 
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Table 4.6: Die-out Behaviour for User-Behaviour 
Model Protocol Value Total simulations 
Die out 
Simulation Die out % 
SEIR Gnutella 0.3 20 10 50 
SEIR Gnutella 0.5 20 4 20 
SEIR GIA 0.3 20 0 0 
SEIR GIA 0.5 20 0 0 
STWAP Gnutella N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP Gnutella N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP GIA N/A 20 10 50 
STWAP GIA N/A 20 10 50 
FF Gnutella 0.3 20 4 20 
FF Gnutella 0.5 20 4 20 
FF GIA 0.3 20 0 0 
FF GIA 0.5 20 0 0 
4.10.2.   Comparative Evaluation of Conventional and ABM Modelling 
Approaches 
The focus of this section is on the effectiveness and utility of the ABM and of conventional 
tools. The comparative analysis of the different worm propagation models will not be 
considered. Although a comparative analysis of ABM and conventional tools has recently 
appeared in the literature [98], However, the in-depth analysis of the role of tools in modelling 
the worm propagation process gained less attention. The comparative graph was generated for 
Matlab and Netlogo. The number of nodes for both simulations is 500, Gnutella is P2P 
protocol, the configuration diversity is 0.3, the birth-rate is 0.01 and the removal-rate is 0.01. 
The simulations are executed on the same hardware platform on the Windows operating 
system (Figure 4.29). 
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Figure 4.29: Comparative Evaluation of ABM and Conventional Tools 
The important observations are as follows: 
1-   Matlab provides a fine grained control over the implementation of analytical models 
by providing a rich set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), compared with 
Netlogo. The functions of Matlab are optimized for performance and can produce 
results for a larger number of nodes, whereas Netlogo is limited to a smaller number 
of nodes due to its additional tasks of visual display and GUI controls. Another reason 
is the backend language in which the Netlogo is implemented, namely, Java. Matlab is 
implemented in C++. 
2-   The visual output of Netlogo helps in understanding the details of the worm 
propagation process while Matlab generates final results, and the underlying process 
is hidden from the user. The output and results can be controlled by the rich graphical 
user interface (GUI) provided by Netlogo while Matlab provides a command level 
control.  
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3-   The support for debugging is an important aspect which has been missed by Matlab. 
Netlogo provides command level debugging. This function is achieved in Matlab by 
using output messages. 
4-   The results obtained for different states in the comparative graph (Figure 4.29) show 
similar trends but with minor differences. The worm propagation process in Matlab 
takes a longer time to start the transition for all states while the transition starts 
immediately in Netlogo. The reason is that the unit time considered by Netlogo can 
range from a few micro-seconds to many seconds depending on the actual processing 
time whereas Matlab provides the details about states at any instant in time. This is the 
reason for the delay in infection density trends with Matlab, compared with Netlogo. 
5-   Infection density requires both tools but minor difference have been found in their 
values. The principal reason is the network topology, which is a runtime variable and 
varies for each simulation. 
6-   A tool to monitor the behaviour of any process in Netlogo is provided; it is called 
‘Behaviour Space’. Using this tool, any number of simulations can be executed and 
the results are stored in well-known output formats (CSV, Spreadsheet). Furthermore, 
these results can be analysed quickly and help in understanding the working of the 
overall process.  
7-   The interaction of agents and its visualization not only helps in understanding the 
worm propagation process but has also led to the development of immunization 
strategies. 
4.10.3.   Variation of Different Parameter Values in SEIR Model 
4.10.3.1.   Configuration Diversity 
The impact of configuration diversity under Gnutella protocol for all benchmark models using 
conventional tools is shown in Figures 4.4(a) and Figure 4.4(b). Similar results for different 
configuration diversity values using conventional tools for GIA protocol can be found in 
Figures 4.8 (a) and 4.8(b). The results produced from conventional tools tally with the results 
generated from the ABM tools considering both protocols, Gnutella (Figure 4.18) and GIA 
(Figure 4.22).  
All the results verify the following points: 
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1-   The infection density observed in SEIR model is lowest in the presence of diverse sets 
of nodes in a network. The additional impact of suppressing the infection density in 
SEIR model is due to new states, such as the exposed state and more state transition 
options from any state to the Recovered state. 
2-   The higher the configuration diversity, the lower the infection density will be over 
time. It also implies that relatively more diverse networks have natural immunity 
against infection from a worm. 
3-   The value of infection density is higher for implementation using GIA protocol, 
compared with Gnutella protocol, under the same conditions. This verifies the 
efficiency of GIA for query propagation, by implementing one-hop replication, active-
flow control and a biased random walk. 
4.10.3.2.   User Behaviour 
The impact of user-behaviour under Gnutella protocol for all benchmark models using 
conventional tools is shown in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). Similar results are shown for different 
user-behaviour values using the conventional tools for GIA protocol in Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9 
(b). The results generated from the conventional tools are similar to the results generated from 
ABM tools under both protocols, Gnutella (Figure 4.19) and GIA (Figure 4.23).  
The findings are as follows: 
1-   The user-behaviour factor minimizes the worm propagation process. The more the user 
operates P2P application, the lower will be the chances of infection propagation.  
2-   The results of conventional and non-conventional tools for different values of user-
behaviour are the same under similar conditions. Minor differences in the results are 
due to the scale-free network that is generated during the runtime.  
3-   The value of infection density is higher for implementation under GIA protocol, 
compared with Gnutella protocol under same conditions. This is due to the same 
phenomenon identified in the previous section. 
4.10.3.3.   Random Parameter Values 
To achieve more realistic results, random values of configuration diversity and of user-
behaviour are taken within a range of 0 to 1. The results of this implementation using 
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conventional tool for different benchmark models under Gnutella are shown in Figure (4.6) 
and under GIA in Figure (4.10). The results using the ABM tool (Netlogo) are given for 
Gnutella in Figure 4.2) and for GIA in Figure 4.26. 
The findings can be summarized as follows: 
1-   A smooth but relatively higher infection density is observed for random parameter 
values (configuration diversity and user behaviour) using SEIR model in GIA 
simulations, compared with Gnutella-based simulations. The reason for this is the 
deficiency of node capacity to handle the request in Gnutella (the scalability problem). 
A node has to wait until the other node finds enough resources to serve the request.  
2-   The concept of handling super-peers mathematically is introduced in SEIR analytical 
model. For a network that has a skew-degree distribution, a sudden increase in 
infection density over time is observed. However, during the averaging out of the 
results from a large number of simulations, this effect was minimized, resulting in 
relatively smooth graphs. The reason is that the worm or query reaches a node which 
is highly connected and the query or worm is then spread very quickly. 
4.11.   Validation of Theoretical and Practical Bounds of SEIR model 
The theoretical limits of SEIR model are achieved using the parameters values described in 
the table 4.7. The same limits are validated by computing infection propagation with time 
using simulation. The upper and lower limits of parameters used in SEIR model are provided 
in table 4.7 as follows: 
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Table 4.7: The Bounds of SEIR Model 
Parameter Lower Limit Upper Limit 
δ 0 1 
β 0 1 
φ 1 3 
γ 0 1 
τ 0 1 
ρ 0 1 
b 0 1 
d 0 1 
Consider a networks of nodes with N = 500. At t=0, number of susceptible nodes are 499 while 
exposed and recovered nodes are zero. Only one infected node is considered initially. 
Complete system of equations for SEIR model is given below.  Apply lower limit to the model 
at t = X where X = 500, results in S(X) = -499, E(X) = 499, I(X) = 1 and R(X) =0. It indicates 
that all the nodes in susceptible state will transit to exposed state in a uniformly degree 
distribution network. However, since rate of transfer from exposed-to-infectious and exposed-
to-recovered is zero, all of the nodes will remain in the exposed state at lower limits. 
For upper limits, consider the value of φ = 1.5 and other values same as defined in Table 4.7. 
At time t(0), S(0)=499, E(0) = 0, I(0) = 1 and R(0) = 0. It indicates that susceptible nodes will 
go to recovered state and there is no infection density. 
To validate the theoretical limits, experiments with lower and upper bounds of values are 
performed in Figure 4.30 (a) and Figure 4.30 (b) respectively as follows: 
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Figure 4.30: Lower and Upper Bounds of SEIR model 
Confirming to the theoretical bounds, lower limits keep all susceptible population to exposed 
and then infectious state. For better visualization, the lower bounds of state transition values 
such as γ, τ and ρ are relaxed for minimal rate. Similarly, upper bounds values indicate that all 
nodes transit from susceptible to recovered state. There is no infection propagation in the case 
of upper bound of parameter values. These practical results validate the theoretical limits of 
SEIR model. 
4.12.   Summary 
This chapter discussed the implementation of SEIR model using conventional network 
modelling tools and the ABM tool. Moreover, the impact of a variation of different parameters 
was observed, analysed and discussed. There are many findings associated with this research. 
For instance, the query propagation is 40% to 90% more efficient in GIA as compared with 
Gnutella. The reasons for this are the active-flow control, the one-hop replication and the 
topology adaptation features of GIA. Moreover, the configuration diversity, the infection time-
lag and the user-behaviour combined together to show less infection density, resulting in hence 
less query propagation, as compared with other benchmark models such as (STAWP and Four-
Factor models), thus providing a more realistic picture of the whole worm propagation 
process.  
Another factor is the effect of super-peers in scale-free networks with skew-degree 
distribution, which causes a sudden increase in the infection density during the worm 
(a): Lower Bounds of SEIR model, δ = 0, β = 0, φ = 1, τ = 0, γ = 0, ρ = 0 b = 0, d = 0 (b): Upper Bounds of SEIR model, δ = 	  1, β = 1, φ > 1, τ > 0, γ > 0, ρ > 0 b > 0, d > 0 
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propagation process. The reason for this is that the degree is not evenly distributed and a worm 
on a high-capacity node can cause a sudden increase in infection density. Considering same 
parameter conditions, infection population density is 15% more in case of GIA protocol as 
compared with Gnutella protocols due to super-spreading phenomena in GIA protocol. 
Furthermore, the usage of the ABM tool (Netlogo) for modelling the worm propagation 
process provides a better understanding of about the under-observation process, as compared 
with conventional tools such as Matlab. The salient characteristics are visualization of the 
simulation, an interactive variation of the parameters using GUI controls to monitor the effect 
on the under-monitoring process, executing multiple iterations using the ‘Behaviour Space’ 
tool and exporting results to provide an appropriate choice for modelling. Moreover, agents 
are autonomous entities that that communicate with each other to make decisions. This option 
makes the ABM tool stronger, as compared with a conventional tool such as Matlab, which 
uses a static structure such as e.g. Classes.  In addition, modelling using ABM tools is 
relatively easier than using conventional tools due to the support of built-in constructs for 
writing simulation code. Although, the conventional tools have strong API’s, yet they are still 
not as effective as ABM tools. 
In this chapter an exhaustive comparative evaluation of SEIR model with different benchmark 
models was provided. While there are many findings from the research, there are still certain 
limitations; they are the following: 
1.   A simulation with a conventional tool (Matlab) restricts the use of APIs to those 
provided by the tool. Since Matlab is a closed-source tool, the underlying algorithms 
and implementations are hidden. Therefore, customized solutions and behaviours are 
difficult to achieve through Matlab. 
2.   The ABM tool (Netlogo) provides excellent support for the process visualization. 
However, this restricts the number of nodes that can be used in the simulation. 
Although no upper bound is provided by the simulator documentation, a network of 
1000 nodes significantly slows downs the process. 
In the next chapter, an evaluation of SEIR model from the perspective of a real-world worm 
will be provided.  
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  : SEIR: REAL-WORLD 
EVALUATION 
5.1.   Introduction 
In Chapter 3, an analytical model, SEIR, was proposed for modelling P2P worm propagation 
process. This model considers the different factors affecting the worm propagation process 
and assumes the guise of a hypothetical propagation model of active worms. Based on this 
behaviour, a comparative analysis of the results was performed with the existing benchmark 
models using conventional and ABM tools. 
To address the issues that are related to the absence of datasets for evaluation of analytical 
models, the data set and related case studies of Conficker worm are selected. In this chapter, 
the proposed SEIR model is evaluated in comparison with benchmark models which utilize 
the same worm propagation dataset obtained from the same data source on the propagation of 
the Conficker worm. 
5.2.   Conficker Spreading Mechanism and Behaviour 
The Conficker worm appears to be a dangerous worm that has infected over 3.6 million 
Windows operating system-based machines. Different variations of the Conficker worm are 
reported in the literature [146]. Conficker A only relies on MS08-067 vulnerability for its 
propagation, while Conficker-B has more depth and implements two additional strategies 
[147]. The behaviour of this worm is active because it exploits a bug in the Internet 
Information Services (IIS) of the Windows machine. Conficker follows the TCP protocol by 
targeting port 445 [148] and exploits a vulnerability in the Microsoft Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) procedure announced in MS08-067  released on 23rd October 2008 [147]. 
Conficker, just like other worms, adopts several advanced propagation strategies to infect the 
suspected hosts [149]. In the former study, the spreading mechanisms are classified into the 
following two categories: (i) global spreading hosts; and (ii) local spreading hosts. The 
infection spreads globally through Conficker by using a function for generating a random IP 
address. Although, this method has a global scale of infection, in the presence of devices such 
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as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) and Firewalls, an internal network 
has fewer chances of infection from external sources [149]. In local spreading, Conficker can 
spread through, infecting hosts in the same subnet, infecting hosts in the nearby networks 
[148] and infecting portable storage devices [150]. 
5.3.   An Analysis of the Conficker Worm Dataset 
The availability of a real data set showing infected nodes and the propagation behaviour of the 
worm is a real challenge. Much  of the state-of-the-art research on active worm propagation is 
based on hypothetical assumptions [148] [151] [95]. These works rely on simulations or 
analytical models to demonstrate the behaviour of worms. The major reason for such an 
approach by the researchers is the unavailability of a real dataset that would enable the severity 
of the worms’ attack to be accurately estimated [148][152]. The development of such models 
for worm propagation could then lead to the development of detection strategies with a 
potential high false-positive rate [153].  
The latest available dataset for the Conficker worm was obtained from the Centre for Applied 
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA3). The CAIDA network is a telescope, which scans the 
internet traffic by monitoring a large set of unusable IP addresses. Since these IP addresses 
are specifically for monitoring purposes, no normal network traffic is expected for these IPs. 
A detailed review of such traffic can thus provide a good insight into worm behaviour and can 
lead to an understanding of the propagation process. 
The data provided by CAIDA is in the form of a trace file with (. pcap) extension. Wireshark4 
is a tool that supports the extension and loads the trace files. The load test was performed on 
a 64-bit Windows operating system with a Wireshark packet capture tool (64 bit). The 
computation hardware was a quad-core machine with 32 GB of memory. However, due to the 
massive size of the trace file (3 GB approximately), it was not possible to load the whole file 
at once. The trace file was then split up into multiple trace files showing the data captured 
from a minimum of 200 seconds to a maximum of 600 seconds. 
                                                
 
3 www.caida.org 
4 https://www.wireshark.org/ 
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Random scanning by the Conficker worm-targeting TCP protocol and port 445 resulted in an 
enormous increase in unique IP addresses per hour, compared with normal traffic. The CAIDA 
data shows 3222 unique IP addresses per hour before the outbreak of Conficker on 20th 
November, 2008 from 1800 hours to 0200 hours while this number increased to more than 
100,000 unique IP addresses per hour on 21st November 2008 till 1600 hours5. This indicates 
that normal traffic is only 3.3% of the total traffic in cases of a Conficker outbreak.  
The following graphs have been plotted with the total number of IP addresses in the trace file. 
The plot of this data has been presented in Figure 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. In these plots, the green 
points represent total number of packets captured per second while red points represent packet 
captured with TCP error. The IP addresses communicating by using the TCP port 445 are 
around 63% while TCP erroneous data range from 16% to 20% (Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). This 
includes the packets infected from other worms as well. However, the upper bound of the 
traffic infected from Conficker is between 60-65% for all data packets. Considering the 
percentage of normal traffic, the infection density due to Conficker could ranges from 57 to 
62%. Also, it is important to note that the maximum value of the infection density with which 
Conficker can affect the network traffic has been considered.  
Table 5.1: Maximum Infection Propagation by Conficker 
IP  Addresses (millions) Packets port = 445 TCP Analysis Error 
1 62.5% 16.3% 
2 63.6% 21.7% 
4 63% 20.4% 
Table 5.2: Sample 1 from One Trace File of Conficker Worm 
 
                                                
 
5https://www.caida.org/research/security/ms08-067/conficker.xml 
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Figure 5.1: Sample 1 from One Trace File of Conficker Worm 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Sample 2 from One Trace File of Conficker Worm 
 
 
TCP Port 445 
TCP error 
TCP error 
TCP Port 445 
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Figure 5.3: Sample 3 from One Trace File of Conficker Worm 
From all the graphs generated from the data, the following important points have become 
evident: 
1-   The number of infected nodes in all graphs is less than 65%. The same finding is 
demonstrated in [139], [154], which shows that Conficker have a low killing rate and 
a long-term period of propagation. 
2-   A machine infected from Conficker-C demonstrates 4 to 30 connection attempts per 
hour in a controlled environment [125]. 
3-   The infection starting-point is missing in the data. As a result, the initial growth of 
infection is not determined. However, once it has reached the maximum infection, the 
graphs remain stable from that point onwards. This finding is compatible with the work 
done by Weaver [125], showing that the infection rate of Conficker is constant. 
4-   The data demonstrate that a large percentage of IPs in a network are getting infected, 
which contradicts our claim in Chapter 3. The role of factors such as Network Address 
Translators (NAT) requires to be further researched to understand the actual infection 
density in the network [149].  
5.4.   Related Work 
The first Conficker outbreak was reported in November 2009 and since then, nearly a million 
machines remain infected even though  the appropriate remedial measure have been taken 
TCP error 
TCP Port 445 
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[155]. The year-wise spread of the worm in the various countries of the world is shown in 
Figure 5.4; the maximum spread can be seen in 2010-2011. 
The researchers in [155] developed an analytical model for the propagation of Conficker. Their 
model consists of two parts: a logistic part that represents the growth of the worm and an 
exponential decay part. Moreover, two major issues with this model were identified. First, it 
does not consider the impact of different factors on the worm propagation process. Second, it 
does not provide any variation in the results with different parameter values.  VEISV 
(vulnerable – exposed – infectious – secured – vulnerable) network worm attack model has 
been proposed for measuring security counter-measures for worm propagation [156]. This 
model is based on SEIR epidemic model and its results are based on the data set obtained from 
CAIDA. The study provided in this work revealed that only 6% of the total host is infected 
from Conficker with an average infection time-lag for a host being found to be 3.5 hours. 
During this time, the worm performs the following tasks: checking the Windows operation 
systems version, copying the malicious code to the root directory of the operating system with 
a random file name, opening the firewall to create backdoors and randomly generating IP 
addresses. Conficker is reported as hybrid worm in [148] and combines three different 
spreading strategies, namely, local probing, neighbourhood probing, and global probing. The 
results are based on data provided by CAIDA. The traffic data captured by this project 
provides a good view of the various abnormal behaviours on the internet. Conficker is 
identified as a hybrid epidemic where different modes of spreading (local, global and 
neighbourhood) in isolation do not lead to the successful representation of the epidemic 
outbreak.  
There is a behaviour analysis of the Conficker-C worm on a heterogeneous network in [125]. 
A non-homogeneous model is built that represents the scan generation process. This model is 
developed for ‘infection in the wild’ rather for a sandbox environment. However, the 
knowledge from both sandbox and typical user activity is used to generate the results. 
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Figure 5.4: Conficker Trends for Four Countries  [125] 
5.5.   SEIR Model Evaluation with Conficker Worm 
In this section, SEIR model is evaluated for its accuracy and fitness for predicting the 
Conficker behaviour. To achieve these objectives, the results are generated using 
configuration diversity and user-behaviour values according to state-of-the-art research on 
these factors. These results are further evaluated with benchmark models that has been 
developed using the same dataset. 
Two benchmark models are considered for the comparative analysis with SEIR model results. 
These are VEISV model [156] and Hybrid model [148]. Both of these models do not address 
configuration diversity, infection time and user behaviour as parameters affecting the worm 
propagation process. A comparative evaluation of SEIR model with the benchmark models 
will be given, taking infection density values into account. The results of the different state-
transitions are shown below for the Hybrid model (Figure 5.5) and for VEISV model (Figure 
5.6) respectively.  
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Figure 5.5: Infection Propagation in Hybrid Model [148] 
 
Figure 5.6: Infection Propagation in VEISV Model with Different Reproduction Rates [156]  
5.5.1.  Performance Evaluation of SEIR Model 
This section evaluates the performance of SEIR model in comparison with the benchmark 
models that have been developed based on the Conficker propagation behaviour. Figures 5.5 
and 5.6 represent the Conficker worm propagation behaviour based on Hybrid and VEISV 
models. Figure 5.5 represent three different states such as suspected, infected and recovered 
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along with time. Similarly, figure 5.6 representing exposed and infectious states under 
different reproduction rates using VEISV model. The results indicate that higher the 
reproduction rate (R0) during infection process, higher will be the number of exposed and 
infected peer density. Thus in order to achieve network stability in shorter period of time, the 
security countermeasures taken in Vulnerable (V) state are effective. The decrease in infection 
outbreak in both infected and exposed state is observed by reducing the reproduction rate 
[156].  
It can be seen that both models endeavour to fit the model-generated pattern to the data pattern 
provided by CAIDA. In contrast to this approach, SEIR model has different parameters such 
as the infection time-lag, configuration diversity and user-behaviour. Realistic values for these 
factors are taken from an analysis of the literature and the graphs are plotted using SEIR 
analytical model. The peak infection density value computed by the Hybrid model is 11.11%. 
VEISV model, on the other hand, shows an infection density peak of around 14% with a 
reproduction rate of 0.013.  
Different types of network topologies such as star topology, ring topologies and networks such 
as small world, preferential-attachment and binary tree networks are considered when 
computing configuration diversity through the Shannon index in [157]. This study indicates 
that the power law network has a similarity index of nodes up to 62-65%. Another study about 
Gnutella-based clients shows that nearly 75% of clients run the same operating system, which 
is installed with similar packages [115], and therefore, considering all the other parameters to 
be the same, their chances of infection are also equal. The study concludes that only 25% of 
clients are diverse, using different operating systems with other packages installed Based on 
this argument, the value of configuration diversity remains at 25% and 35% in Figure 5.7(a) 
and Figure 5.7(b) instead of random numbers being used in order to achieve more realistic 
results.  
On the other hand, user behaviour is modelled as a random value in different studies [158] 
[159]. However, these studies indicate that there are, on average, 30 connection attempts by a 
single machine in a network infected by Conficker [125]. For the results generation, we also 
restricted the value of user-behaviour to be driven from [125]. 
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The results were generated using a Barabasi-Albert (BA) Scale-Free Network of 500 nodes. 
The minimum number for a neighbour of a node was one while the maximum number was 10. 
A random-scanning pattern was followed for simulations in Figure 5.7. Configuration 
diversity was assumed to be 0.25 and 0.35 while the user behaviour was computed as 30/3600 
connection attempts per second. Only a constant number of nodes in the network was 
considered with birth- and death-rate being zero.  
      
Figure 5.7: Infection Propagation considering Different Values 
It can be noticed that the graph generated using SEIR model considering Gnutella protocol 
(Figure 5.7) mirrors the graph shown for the VEISV model in Figure 5.6. The infected 
population density observed by SEIR model is 21% (Figure 5.7(a)) and 19% (Figure 5.7 (b)) 
while the VEISV model shows 14% and the Hybrid model shows 11.11%. The increase-and-
decrease behaviour of infection during worm propagation is similar for SEIR and VEISV 
models while the Hybrid model shows relatively smooth increase in infection density.  
It is important to note that all of the three models do not show the 63% continuous infection 
rate that was shown by the real data, as illustrated in Figures (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3). The high 
variation in infection ratios will be discussed in terms of the NAT protocol. 
Furthermore, the results are obtained using the ABM tool (Netlogo) to observe the propagation 
of Conficker with configuration diversity and user-behaviour values are considered to be the 
same as those in the previous section. The graphs shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 are similar, 
showing average infection density values of 22%.  
(b) Configuration Diversity = 0.35 (a) Configuration Diversity = 0.25 
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Figure 5.8: Infection Propagation over Time 
5.5.2.  Statistical Evaluation of Dataset 
The reliability of dataset computed during experimentation is measured using Cronbach’s 
Aplha test. SPSS is used as tool for the measurement. The reliability of data is dependent on 
following criteria: 
Table 5.3: Range of Crobach’s Alpha 
Range of Crobach’s Alpha. 
α ≥ 0.9 Excellent 
0.9 > α ≥ 0.8 Good 
0.8 > α ≥ 0.7 Acceptable 
0.7 > α ≥ 0.6 Questionable 
0.6 > α ≥ 0.5 Poor 
0.5 < α Unacceptable 
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The computed value of Cronbach’s alpha for the infection dataset is 0.965 using SPSS tool 
shows that data is reliable. 
To compute the other statistical results of data generated from simulation of SEIR model and 
Conficker data, following dataset is used: 
Table 5.4: Dataset from SEIR model and Conficker Dataset 
SEIR Max. Infection Data (%) Conficker Max. Infection Data (%) 
25.6 24.1 
25 19.8 
28.2 22.4 
25 25.8 
26.8 21.7 
25.8 18.8 
27.4 23.1 
22.8 24.9 
24.6 23.6 
24.8 25.7 
23.6 24.1 
25.8 26.4 
22.8 22.3 
Table 5.5: Statistical Evaluation of SEIR and Conficker Dataset 
 Variance (SEIR) Variance (Conficker) P-Value < 0.05 
Results 2.65 4.80 0.9999 
The P-value = 0.9999 which by convention means this difference is considered to be not 
statistically significant at P < 0.05. Also, the variance in SEIR data is observed to be 2.65 
where it is 4.80 for Conficker real dataset. 
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5.6.   Discussion 
A comparative analysis pattern was used to evaluate the different analytical models, as 
described in [145]. The infection population density from SEIR model was found to be 21% 
as a result of simulations using conventional and ABM tools. The variation in the results from 
SEIR model and the VEISV and Hybrid models is shown in Figure 5.9.  
 
Figure 5.9: A Comparative Evaluation of SEIR with Real Data and Benchmark Models 
The salient observations on Figure 5.9 are discussed below 
1-   The infection propagation appeared to be higher, compared with the VEISV and the 
Hybrid models. The reproduction rate from the exposed to the infectious states is 
considered to be 0.138 for SEIR and for the VEISV models. Hybrid, being a 
combination of different propagation behaviours, shows the least infection density, 
compared with SEIR and VEISV. This suggests that global spreading is relatively 
slower than local spreading because the hosts in the same network have the same set 
of software and hence no configuration diversity. However, for global spreading, it 
assumes hypothetical configuration diversity values.  
SEIR
VEISV
Hybrid
CAIDA
NAT	  estimated	  data
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5
In
fe
ct
io
n	  
pr
op
ag
at
io
n(
%
)
SEIR, VEISV and Hyrid model along with data from CAIDA and estimated infection 
propagation
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
155	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
2-   Raw data obtained from CAIDA shows 63% of traffic to be on port 445. Filtering the 
data by extracting the normal traffic produced Conficker traffic as being 55-60%. 
According to a recent study [81], around 34%–45% of DSL networks are using one IP 
address to serve multiple hosts. Since most of the Conficker-infected subnets are DSL 
networks, this ratio can be applied to results obtained using SEIR model. Since it is 
difficult to estimate the correct number of IP addresses due to NAT, an estimation 
ranging from 34% to 45% is provided in [81]. Applying the average value on Conficker 
traffic yields 20.5% IPs to be infected, which is closer to SEIR value of 21%. 
3-   The results of infection density obtained using SEIR model closely matches to the 
resultant infection density obtained from the data after NAT filtering.  
4-   The results provided by both conventional and ABM tools yields the same results the 
considering same values of parameters for SEIR model. The results are evaluated for 
a limited number of nodes (500). The evaluation of the scalability of the model for a 
large network size is reserved as a topic for future work. 
5-   Only a subset of the data can be evaluated due to the processing capability limitations 
of the tool ‘Wireshark’. It is required to load the large data set provided by CAIDA 
and to perform in-depth analysis. It is also suggested to develop customized 
applications that are based on low-level programming languages such as C or C++ that 
can load large datasets and perform an efficient analysis on such a dataset. 
5.7.   Summary 
This chapter evaluated the applicability of SEIR analytical model to the real-world worm 
‘Conficker’. The proposed model was evaluated in comparison with the benchmark models 
VEISV and Hybrid that had been developed based on a similar data set. The infection density 
computed using SEIR model based on real world values of parameters is compared with the 
results of dataset after NAT estimation. These results not only indicated that the infection 
density values achieved from SEIR model are relatively more accurate but also validated the 
application of SEIR model to a real-world worm and clearly proved the accuracy of SEIR 
model when compared with benchmark models. 
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  : A NOVEL M-SEIR 
MODEL: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE 
OF MOBILITY FACTOR  
In previous chapters, a novel active worm propagation SEIR model for unstructured P2P 
networks was proposed. This model addressed the impact of configuration-diversity, user-
behaviour and infection-time-lag factors on the worm propagation process. The model was 
not only inclusive but also even has the flexibility to accommodate other factors.  
In this chapter, the mobility of nodes, worm size, and wireless-link bandwidth and their impact 
on the whole worm propagation process will be considered. The node mobility factor will be 
proposed using the Gauss-Markov mobility model that will itself be integrated with SEIR 
model. The integration of these mobility-related factor will introduce an extended model ‘M-
SEIR’. 
6.1.   Introduction 
The evolution of smart phones with rich operating systems, a large number of installed 
applications and enhanced ease-of-use have resulted in a major focus-shift in users from 
desktop computers to smartphone devices. As a result, the Android, Symbian and Windows 
mobile operating systems are now major targets for malware [13]. Studies have  shown that 
more than 65% of the malware has targeted the Android operating system since 2011 [13]. 
The fundamental reasons for this increase in threats to smart phones can be summarized as 
follows [13]: 
•   The open source kernel of mobile operating systems (Android), allows the malware 
writer to acquire an adequate understanding of the platform. 
•   Technological advancements over time, strong market competition and low prices are 
the major reasons for the wide spread use of smart phones. 
•   The capabilities of smart phones in terms of processing have been increasing 
exponentially. This has provided more opportunities for malicious users to exploit the 
platform. 
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•   Writing malicious software for smart phones is similar to that for desktop computers. 
This makes it particularly easy for malware writers to move from one such 
environment to another very similar one.  
6.2.   Related Work 
Mobility is an important aspect which is related to mobile devices in P2P networks. A 
analytical models of P2P worms, such as SEIRS [160], Four-Factor [93] and STAWP [7] did 
not consider the impact of mobility on the worm propagation process.  
The impact of node mobility was not paid significant attention in the literature concerned with 
P2P worm propagation modelling. A survey of worms in mobile P2P networks, however, is 
provided in [161], according to which there are now over two billion mobile phones on the 
planet today. Statistics show that 63% of smart phones use Symbian operating systems. There 
are over 400 kinds of worm with 700 kinds of variant targeting the Symbian OS [161]. The 
propagation vectors of today’s mobile platforms are Bluetooth, SMS/MMS messaging, and 
situation applications, which are all being targeted by attackers [79].  
There are different issues related to the node mobility that can affect the worm propagation 
process. One of these is the change in the topology of the interacting mobile nodes over time 
as the nodes move around in the environment. Secondly, the work done in the literature related 
to mobility considers short-range radio frequencies (RF), such as Bluetooth. There are other 
communication channels with higher bandwidths and data rates, such as WiFi, GSM, 3G and 
4G that also need to be considered. In addition, the location of mobile devices in particular 
areas creates a certain density distribution, which itself can affect the worm propagation [122]. 
Another issue associated with mobility is that the worm spread is not studied in an 
environment consisting of wired and wireless nodes and in which the user is switching to 
different networks at different locations in an environment. 
To examine the issues concerning wireless P2P networks, an algorithmic approach has been 
used for this  can show the continuous availability of resources to mobile users throughout the 
wireless network environment  [162]. A Mobility-aware file discovery control (MAFDC) 
scheme is used to update the peer status for better query propagation. However, the 
experiments are based on an NS-2 simulator with 802.11b as the selected protocol. This study 
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does not provide any information about other wireless networks, such as Wi-Max, Cellular, 
MANETs and wireless ad hoc networks. The authors in [163] developed an analytical model 
based on the SI epidemiological model. Their model considered the spatial dynamics of 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs), assuming that the worms are channel-aware with no 
mobility. In this model, the configuration diversity and the infection time-lag of nodes are not 
considered. The behaviour of worms on a low bandwidth, contention-full wireless channel 
with mobile nodes, compared to high-speed wired internet, is another issue that needs to be 
addressed.  
The spread of a Cabir like malicious code via proximity-based, point-to-point wireless links 
has been studied in [145]. This work indicates that the existing worm propagation models 
provide hypothetical predictions and that, in fact, infection dies out early although these 
models show high infection values. 
The study in [145] also discuss the reasons for the failure of worm- spreading models that do 
not consider node velocity and the configuration diversity of the network. Their proposed 
model, called “probabilistic queuing”, explicitly incorporates the ideas of connectivity skew 
and node mobility.  However, their work does not consider the impact of interference and of 
the churn rate of nodes in the network on the worm-spreading process. The impact of worm-
size on the wireless channel, using the capacity theory of wireless networks, has been provided 
in [164]. The results were generated for an SI epidemiological model for nodes moving in a 
wireless ad-hoc network. The results indicate that infection spreads linearly with the scale of 
network and uniform scanning strategy should be adopted to deal with the worm attacks. 
A detailed description of worm propagation models for mobile networks is provided in Section 
3.3.1.4.  
6.3.   Mobility Models in Networks 
The mobility of nodes and the traffic communication patterns in an analytical model are 
important factors for modelling communication among mobile nodes. The movement of 
nodes, their location, velocity and acceleration are important parameters that need to be 
determined for the mobility of nodes. The objective of a mobility model is to emulate the 
object description as in a real-life. A list of the mobility models for Mobile Ad-hoc networks 
is shown in Figure 6.1 and overviewed below. 
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Figure 6.1: Mobility Models in Wireless Networks [165] 
Random Movement-Based Mobility Models: This model is based on the random movement 
of nodes without any restriction. The mobility-related parameters of one node, such as 
direction, speed and destination, are also random and independent of other nodes. The Random 
Waypoint Model (RWP) is an example of these models. The RWP model is limited in terms 
of temporal dependency on the velocity of the node, the spatial dependency of the node and 
the geographic restriction on the movement of the node. 
Temporal Dependence-Based Mobility Models: The movement information and patterns of 
a mobile node are effected by physical laws of acceleration, velocity and direction. The current 
speed and direction of a node are dependent on previous speed and direction. Therefore, the 
speeds and directions of a nodes at different time slots are correlated which is called ‘temporal 
dependency’. The Gauss-Markov (GM) mobility model is an example of such a model where 
the velocity of the mobile node is assumed to be correlated over time and modelled according 
to the Gauss-Markov stochastic process.  
Since most of the work in P2P networks makes use of these two types of model  [166][164], 
a brief overview of the usage of these models in the context of P2P networks is now given. A 
framework for modelling malware dynamic in P2P networks with a heterogeneous 
environment is presented in [122]. Their experiments were carried out using an OverSim 
simulator, and their results were obtained using both a Random Waypoint Model and a GM 
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Mobility model. A three-dimensional framework, based on three different sets of parameters, 
is formulated in [167]. The first set includes the number of peers, the moving speed of peers 
and movement models. The second set contains churn models and the third set consists of the 
query success rate, the query time and the network loads. Gnutella and GIA are considered as 
P2P protocols during the simulation using the OverSim simulator. The RWP model and the 
GM mobility models are used to assess the impact of mobility. 
The mobility of the node is an important aspect that has not been covered in previous worm 
propagation models collectively with other factors. SEIR model, proposed in Chapter Three, 
has the flexibility to accommodate mobility as a factor in the worm propagation process and 
to demonstrate the cumulative results, based on user-behaviour, configuration diversity and 
mobility. In this research, the GM mobility model will be used to compute the mobility factor 
and integrate it with SEIR model. 
6.4.   Factors Affecting the Worm Propagation Process in Wireless 
Networks 
In this section, the parameters related to mobile node communication on wireless channels are 
discussed. These parameters include the mobility of the node, the bandwidth of the wireless-
link and the worm size. The idea of infection-spread probability from a mobile node to its 
connected immediate peers will also be briefly discussed. 
6.4.1.  The Gauss-Markov (GM) Mobility Model 
The mobility of a node is dependent on velocity, acceleration and the rate of change of 
direction. The current velocity of a node may be dependent on its previous velocity. Thus, at 
different time slots, the velocities of a single node are ‘correlated’ and this is called the 
temporal dependency of velocity. The Gauss-Markov (GM) mobility model works with this 
temporal dependence of velocity. 
Cellular/wireless nodes are placed inside the coverage area of the base station /access point, 
and the nodes in the coverage area are independent of each other. Speed S  is the mean speed 
and direction  Θ  is the mean direction. For any time t, the speed and direction of a node is 
computed based on time (t-1)’s speed and direction using equation (6.1) and (6.2): 
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𝑆 𝑡 = 	  𝛼	  𝑆 L,; 	   + 1 − 	  𝛼 S 	   +	  	   (1 − 𝛼)N	  	  𝑆(L,;)O              (6.1) 𝛩 𝑡 = 	  𝛼	  𝛩 L,; 	   + 1 − 	  𝛼 	  Θ 	   +	  	   (1 − 𝛼)N	  	  𝛩(L,;)O           (6.2) 
Where α is the randomness parameter, the degree of randomness decreases as the value of α 
increases and vice-versa. When α = 0, randomness is very high and may lead to sharper turns. 
When α =1, the previous S and Θ are more important, it means the current S and Θ are more 
temporally dependent on the previous values. 
The term 𝑆(L,;)O  and 𝛩(L,;)O  are random variables chosen from the probability density function 
(PDF) generated using Gaussian distribution with mean=0 and standard deviation =1. 
The value of coordinates at time t is: 𝑋L	   = 	  𝑋L,;	   + 	  𝑆L	  𝑥	  𝐶𝑜𝑠	   𝜃L 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (6.3) 𝑌L	   = 	  𝑌L,;	   + 	  𝑆L	  	  𝑥	  𝑆𝑖𝑛	   𝜃L                (6.4) 
The distance, d, from the base station can be calculated as: 𝑑 = 	   𝑋L −	  𝑋[ N +	   𝑌L −	  𝑌[ N	          (6.5) 
Thus the mobility factor can be computed as η = d/r, for all d ≤ r.  
6.4.2.  Bandwidth Factor 
On wireless channels, the data transmission capacity is much less than that on a wired network. 
Bearing in mind this fact, the issues and security challenges faced by mobile nodes are the 
following: 
•   The bandwidth of wired links on the internet is sufficient to transmit large data packets 
or worms within the shortest time. In contrast, the transmission links of wireless nodes 
are shared and have low throughput capability. 
•   A wireless node can transmit data to other wireless nodes using two options [164]. The 
first is direct point-to-point transmission, which requires a large radius of a base-station 
and hence suffers from interference. The second option is multi-hop transmission. In 
either case, the throughput achieved on wireless networks is less than that on wired 
networks. 
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The calculation of the bandwidth factor, using the wireless link capacity and the worm size 
provided, is as follows: 
1-   The mobile nodes are considered to be connected to a fixed base station through a 
wireless connection. The base-station is assumed to be connected to the through wired 
links. The bandwidth of wired links is ‘C’ while the maximum bandwidth of wireless 
links is ‘W’ where W < C. 
2-   Consider ‘S’ as the size of worm. 
3-   Let ‘n’ be the number of wireless nodes connected to a base station. 
4-   Consider only one node can be served at a time for contents at time ‘t’ from the base 
station considering only one transmission channel. 
5-   If the throughput of wireless link is represented by ρ then the condition ρ < W applies.  
6-   The number of nodes that can be infected from one node during time ‘t’ are 
\	  ]^ . 
Similarly, for unit time t, the rate of infection for a network of ‘n’ nodes connected to 
a base station is 
\_^. 
7-   The throughput of a fixed wireless random network is calculated according to [168] is 
as follows: ρ = 	   -abcL(_	  def(_))                  (6.6) 
The rate of infection ‘ψ’ in a fixed wireless network with ‘n’ nodes connected to one base 
station can be computed as follows: ψ = 	   -^	  h	  abcL(_i	  def(_))           (6.7) 
Equation (6.7) is valid if and only if the number of mobile nodes, n > 0 and ψ = 0 if n = 0. 
6.4.3.  Infection Spread Probability by Mobile Node 
Consider a mobile node moving away from the base-station/access-point with uniform speed 
‘S’. If the node has just been infected from any of the other peers, what is the probability that 
it can infect other suspected immediate neighbours? The formulation of the problem is shown 
in Figure 6.2 below. 
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Figure 6.2: Infection Probability by Mobile Node 
 ‘M’ is the mobile node moving with speed ‘S’ away from the base station or access-point. dG 
is the distance that the node has already covered. dL is the remaining distance of the node from 
the effective boundary of the base-station. ‘R’ is the radius of base-station while SM and SF 
are suspected mobile and fixed nodes respectively. If Tleave is the time in which the node can 
leave the effective radius of the base-station if moving with uniform speed ‘S’ in the same 
direction, and Ttransfer is the worm transfer time from an infected to a suspected node, then it 
can be computed as: 
 Tleave = (R-dG) /S    (6.8) 
 Ttransfer = 	  W/	  𝜓 (6.9) 
And infection probability ‘PI ‘can be computed as follows: 
 PI = Tleave / Ttransfer (6.10) 
Where ‘W’ is the worm size and ‘ψ′ is the infection rate for the wireless node computed in 
Section 6.4.2.  
6.5.   Integration of Mobility Factor with SEIR Model 
In Chapter 3, SEIR analytical model for active worm propagation was proposed. In this 
section, the Gauss-Markov (GM) mobility model is integrated with SEIR model so that the 
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impact of the mobility of nodes on the worm propagation process can be observed. A detailed 
description of the computation of the mobility factor (η) is provided in Section 6.4.1. It is 
assumed that the mobile node is connected to P2P network via the hotspot/base-station, which 
has a predefined effective radius ‘r’. P2P network is considered heterogeneous, consisting of 
static and mobile nodes. The ratio of both types of nodes varies at different instants of time. 
At any given time ‘t’, all the nodes could be mobile or all the nodes could be static or it could 
be a mixture of both.  
The GM model operates in a discrete time fashion and with each time tick ‘t’, the mobility 
factor of the mobile nodes is updated. The value of the mobility factor is updated with each 
unit of time for a mobile node and affects the worm propagation process. 
The mobility factor is assumed to be an independent variable and does not have any 
relationship with any other parameter. State transitions are detailed in Section 3.5. The 
notations used in M-SEIR model are provided in Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1: Notations and Description 
Notation Description 
N Total number of nodes in the network 
S(t) Number of suspected nodes at time (t) 
E(t) Number of exposed nodes at time (t) 
I(t) Number of infectious nodes at time (t) 
R(t) Number of recovered nodes at time (t) 
δ Configuration diversity. 0 ≤δ ≤ 1 
β User behaviour. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 
Ki Degree of node i 
ε Infection time lag 
η Node mobility ψ Bandwidth factor 
ρ Rate of transition from exposed to recovered state 
γ Infectious to removal rate 
τ Rate of transition from exposed to infectious state 
b Birth rate of nodes in the network 
d Death rate of nodes in the network 
6.5.1.  Model Assumptions 
While all the assumptions of SEIR analytical model, developed in Section 3.5, remain valid, 
the following are additional assumptions, considering mobility as an additional factor in M-
SEIR model. 
The assumptions that are taken to develop M-SEIR model are the following: 
1-   Mean-speed: A seed value for random computation of mean speed (1-100 km/hour). 
2-   Mean-angle: A seed value for the random computation of the mean angle (0-360 
degrees). 
3-   The Gaussian Factor: A factor used in the Gauss-Markov mobility model to compute 
the coordinates of the nodes. 
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4-   Mobile-node: The number of mobile nodes in the network. Each mobile node is 
surrounded by a circle, which represents the effective radius of the base-station. Mobile 
nodes are initially considered, see Figure 6.3. 
Fixed
 
Figure 6.3: Heterogeneous P2P Network 
6.5.2.  Complete System  
If (η) is the mobility factor computed in Section 6.4, then SEIR model can be extended as 
follows: I	   t + 1 = 	  𝛕	  E	   t − 	  dI	   t − 	  γ	  I	   tR	   t + 1 = ρ	  E t + 	  γ	  I	  (t) 	  + 	  S	  (t)	   I t s	  (δ)(β)(η) − 	  dR	  (t)	  E	   t + 1 = 	  S	   t I t s	   1	  – 	  δ 1 − β 	  1 − 	  η − 	  𝛕E	   t − 	  ρ	  E(t) − 	  dE(t)	  	  	  S	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  −	  S	  (t)	   I t s[ 1	  – 	  δ 1 − β 1 − 	  η + δ β η ] + 	  bN	   − dS	  (t)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
(6.11) 
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Where S(t) + E(t) + I(t) + R(t) = N(t) if and only if birth rate of nodes in the network is equal 
to the death rate in the network i.e. b = d. The factor ‘η′ is independent variable and increasing 
values in the range [0,1] indicate more distant nodes from the base-station and thus reduce the 
worm propagation process. 
6.6.   Evaluation of M-SEIR Model 
As we have already mentioned, the impact of the mobility of nodes on the worm propagation 
process has not been considered extensively. Most of the work achieved in this domain has 
been concerned with wireless technologies such as Bluetooth or GSM.  
In this chapter two benchmark models were selected for the evaluation of the proposed M-
SEIR mobility model. The first model was the SIM (Susceptible Infectious Mobile) [164] 
which addresses the spread of malware in a generalized wireless network infrastructure. The 
SIM model was developed from the conventional epidemic model (SI) and as a result of the 
application of the capacity theory of wireless networks[168]. This model uses uniform 
scanning during the worm propagation. The rationale behind this particular model is that 
wireless networks can communicate in two modes, namely, direct and multi-hop. For both of 
these modes, it is not possible to achieve a throughput equivalent to wired links. This model 
considers a wireless ad-hoc network, where each node can transmit a packet to all its 
neighbours within their one-hop transmission range. The second benchmark model was the 
Probabilistic Queuing Prediction (PQ) model [145], which demonstrates the behaviour of 
worms that spread via proximity-based, point-to-point wireless links. This model considers 
the node-velocity and non-homogeneous connectivity distributions and developed as a 
refinement of the SI epidemiological model. 
In the next section, the evaluation of the proposed M-SEIR model will be carried out using 
both conventional and ABM tools.  
6.6.1.  M-SEIR Model Evaluation using Conventional Tools 
The results from M-SEIR model are provided, using conventional tools (Matlab) and ABM 
tool, (Netlogo) for mobility and bandwidth factors only. These results will be comparatively 
evaluated with those from the benchmark models i.e. SIM and PQ for infection propagation. 
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To assess the mobility of the node, the GM mobility model [169] was used to keep track of 
the previous values of the coordinates of the mobile nodes. The GM model introduces 
parameters to handle the random movement of nodes. The value of zero indicates a completely 
random movement, just as with the RWP model, while value 0 < alpha < 1 defines the degree 
of randomness.  
The parameters considered for computing the mobility factor in M-SEIR model are the 
following: 
1.   Radius = 5, the radius of the base-station or access-point 
2.   Alpha = 0.5, the parameter to handle the randomness of the node 
3.   Speed = 10, the speed of the object in kilometres per hour 
4.   Angle = 30 
5.   Mean speed = 10, in kilometres per hour 
6.   Mean angle = 30, the direction of movement of the mobile node    
7.   Mean = 0, the mean value for Gaussian distribution 
8.   Standard deviation = 1, the standard deviation to create Gaussian distribution 
The random values for speed and angle are chosen from the Gaussian distribution, generated 
with Mean and Standard Deviation values. These values are used in the analytical model. 
6.6.2.  The Impact of Node Mobility Considering Gnutella Protocol 
The selected benchmark papers provided only limited information about the mobility models 
and the details of implementation to achieve the provided results. Mobility as a factor in M-
SEIR model considering Gnutella protocol, is shown in Figures 6.4 (a), 6.4 (b) and 6.4 (c). 
The mobility of a node at any instant of time is computed using the GM mobility model. The 
direction and speed for the GM model and the number of mobile nodes in the network are 
provided for the simulation. M-SEIR model assumes that mobile nodes are moving at the same 
speed and in the same direction. Other factors, such as configuration diversity and user-
behaviour, are considered with different values (details about these factors can be found in 
Chapter 3). It is also important to note that the results were generated without taking the 
bandwidth factor into consideration. The reason for this was the inability of Matlab to handle 
the delay involved due to low throughput on the wireless link. 
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It can be seen that there is a decrease in the number of infectious nodes as soon as the mobile 
node moves away from the base-station and, as a result, the mobility factor increases. The 
reason for the decrease in the node infection rate is the distance of the node from the base-
station. A distant node is affected by different factors, related to wireless transmission, such 
as a loss in signal strength, channel path fading and interference, which all cause a reduction 
in node throughput. 
      
 
Figure 6.4: Infection Propagation with Different Values considering Gnutella 
6.6.3.  The Impact of Node Mobility Considering GIA Protocol 
A decrease in infection propagation is observed with different mobility values, as shown in 
Figures 6.5(a) and 6.5(b) for M-SEIR model. It can also be seen that the value of infection 
propagation is higher, considering GIA protocol, compared to that for Gnutella protocol under 
(a): Infection Propagation (m 0.361) (b): Infection Propagation (m 0.49) 
(c): Infection Propagation (m 0.361, ub 0.2, cd 0.3) 
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the same conditions. The reason for this is the biased random walk feature of GIA that directs 
traffic towards high capacity nodes whereas in Gnutella random flooding is applied. 
        
 
Figure 6.5: Infection Propagation with Different Values considering GIA 
6.6.4.  Discussion 
In this section, the impact of mobility on the worm propagation process is seen to be similar 
to the impact of configuration diversity and user-behaviour. The results concerning the status 
of the nodes in different states with different mobility factors are shown in Figure 6.6 below: 
(a): Infection Propagation (m 0.30) (b): Infection Propagation (m 0.49) 
(c): Infection Propagation (m 0.30, ub 0.2, cd 0.3) 
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Figure 6.6: The impact of Variety Values on GIA and Gnutella 
As shown in the Figures above, the density of infectious nodes decreases with increased values 
of the mobility factor in Figures 6.6 (a), 6.6 (b). A relatively higher value for infection 
propagation is observed in GIA, compared to that in Gnutella due to the topology-adaptation 
feature of GIA. Important observations relating to the mobility factor are: 
1-   The impact of high mobility values on infection propagation in different protocols, 
such as Gnutella and GIA, was observed. For when the mobility factor is 0.8, it can be 
seen in Figure 6.6 that the infection propagation is close to zero. Such a low value of 
infection propagation is due to the different phenomena that are related to the wireless 
  (a)    (b) 
  (c)   (d) 
172	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
environment, such as a weak signal strength, the path fading effect and possible signal 
interference. 
2-   A low mobility factor shows high infection propagation values in GIA, compared with 
Gnutella, but both in the presence and absence of other factors. High infection 
propagation is due to the topology adaptation feature of GIA. 
3-   In the presence of additional factors, such as a heterogeneous network and user 
behaviour, the infection propagation is reduced further with a decrease in mobility 
factor values (See Figures 6.6 (c) and 6.6(d). 
4-   For a mobility factor value of 0.3, the infection propagation under GIA protocol is 
33%, which is 7% more than that under Gnutella protocol (26%) (Figures 6.6(a), 
6.6(b)). 
6.7.   Evaluation of M-SEIR Model using ABM Tools 
Netlogo was used for modelling the impact in a network of the mobility of nodes on the worm 
propagation processes. A detailed description of the set-up, controls and processes related to 
Netlogo is provided in Section 2.7. 
The benchmark models, SIM [164] and PQ [145] provide the infection propagation value 
under given variable values. The evaluation of the results from the SIM model was based on 
wireless ad-hoc networks, where nodes are moving randomly within a closed area. It was the 
posited that infection propagation increases as the mobility of the nodes increases. Very high 
infection propagation was demonstrated by the mobile nodes, using this model (Figure 6.5 
(b)). Similarly, the PQ model showed relatively lower infection propagation (70%) with a 
specific churn rate of nodes from the network. This model provides useful corrections to the 
conventional Kephart-White Model [170], but it still does not take network heterogeneity and 
user-behaviour into account.  
6.7.1.  The Impact of Node Mobility Process Considering Gnutella Protocol 
The graphs generated for M-SEIR model were for 500 node simulations with 20 mobile nodes 
moving in different base-stations with a radius of 20 units. The worm size was assumed to be 
1 Mb and the wireless link bandwidth was assumed to be 1 Mbps. 
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Performance evaluations of M-SEIR model with both the PQ and the SIM models is given 
below: 
1-   The infection propagation observed in the case of M-SEIR model is relatively low 
(20%) (See Figure 6.7, as compared with that in the SIM model (100%) (Figure 6.8) 
and in the PQ model (70%) (Figure 6.9). The major reasons for this are the holistic 
consideration of configuration diversity, user behaviour, the infection time-lag, 
mobility and bandwidth factors in contributing up to a significant extent to the 
reduction of the infection propagation.  
2-   The size of worm plays a major role in infection propagation on wireless links. The 
impact is computed as a bandwidth factor in equation (6.7). During simulation, the 
process slowed down significantly where the worm had to be transferred to the wireless 
nodes. This leads to the conclusion that the worm propagation process in wireless 
networks is many orders of magnitude slower than that for wired networks. 
3-   The SIM model shows 100% infection propagation within a very short period of time, 
whereas M-SEIR model demonstrated the huge delays in infection spreading (12 
minutes for 20 simulations) for a given worm size and link bandwidth for wireless 
nodes. The delay is realistic because the throughput observed by worms on wireless 
links is much less than that on wired links. Hence, the infection process slows down. 
4-   The PQ predication model shows 70% infection propagation for a given churn rate of 
nodes. It indicates that the infection propagation varies according to the varying values 
of affecting factors. Multiple factors introduced in M-SEIR model holistically showed 
relatively less infection propagation, compared with that in the PQ model.  
5-   For the same infection time-lag value, M-SEIR demonstrates that some nodes are 
getting infected while some are recovered as well (Figure 6.7). This represent a true 
heterogeneous network where different devices have different operating systems, 
packages, antivirus and anti-malware installed and it is less likely that 100% of the 
network gets infected. Considering a heterogeneous P2P network, the chances of 
getting infection propagation values of 100% (SIM model) and 70% (PQ model) are 
low. 
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Figure 6.7: Impact of Node Mobility of Infection Propagation (M-SEIR Model) 
 
Figure 6.8: Impact of node mobility of infection propagation (SIM model) [164] 
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Figure 6.9: The Impact of Node Mobility on Infection Propagation (PQ Model) [145] 
6.7.2.  The Impact of Node Mobility on Worm Propagation Considering GIA 
The results shown in Figure 6.7 comply with the results taken for conventional tools 
considering same values for mobility. The infection propagation peak value considering GIA 
protocol observed in (Figure 6.10) is lower than that observed for Gnutella protocol (Figure 
6.7). The reasons are link-level delay by wireless nodes which occupy a slot on super-nodes 
and do not release it until the worm transfer completed. 
Long-delays in infection propagation are observed in the case of simulations considering GIA 
protocol. Main reasons include the capacity of super-peer nodes and wireless link-delay which 
pose hindrance in infection propagation. So the recovered nodes occupy the suspected nodes 
early. Hence the infection propagation slows down. 
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Figure 6.10: Infection Propagation considering GIA Protocol (M-SEIR Model) 
6.8.   Mathematical Analysis of M-SEIR Model 
The mathematical analysis of M-SEIR model evaluates the role of different parameters in the 
model and discusses the impact of the exclusion of a parameter from the model on worm 
propagation process. The parameters that are considered for the discussion are configuration 
diversity, user-behaviour, node mobility and degree distribution of nodes in the network. The 
system of equations, represented in equation 6.11, is considered as the benchmark for the 
analysis. 
6.8.1.  Configuration Diversity 
The configuration diversity of nodes in network is represented by ‘δ’. Excluding parameter δ 
from equation 6.11 produced equation 6.12 as follows: I	   t + 1 = 	  τE	   t − 	  dI	   t − 	  γ	  I	   tR	   t + 1 = 	  ρ	  E t + 	  γ	  I	  (t) 	  + 	  S	  (t)	   I t s(β)(η) − 	  dR	  (t)E	   t + 1 = 	  S	   t I t s 1 − β 	  1 − 	  η − 	  τE	   t − 	  ρ	  E(t) − dE	   t 	  S	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  −	  S	  (t)	   I t s[(1 − β)(1 − 	  η) + β (η)] 	  + 	  bN	   − dS	  (t)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (6.12) 
Since the value of ‘δ’ range from zero to one, any value of the factor ‘1-δ’ decreases the 
number of exposed node and hence the infectious nodes. However, for extreme value of  δ = 
1 completely stops the infection process and all susceptible nodes have to go in recovered 
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state. It means that the configuration diversity of nodes in networks decrease the infection 
propagation. Excluding configuration diversity factor from the equation results in speed up of 
worm propagation process. 
6.8.2.  User Behaviour 
User-behaviour is represented by ‘β′ in the system. Excluding the parameter from equation 
6.11 produced equation 6.13 as follows: 	  	  	  I	   t + 1 = 	  τ	  E	   t − 	  d	  I	   t − 	  γ	  I	   tR	   t + 1 = 	  ρ	  E t + 	  γ	  I	  (t) 	  + 	  S	  (t)	   I t s	  (δ)(η) 	  − 	  d	  R	  (t)	  S	   t + 1 = 	  −	  S	   t I t s	   1	  – 	  δ 1 − 	  η + δη + 	  bN	   − d	  S	   tE	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  S	  (t)	   I t s	  (1	  – 	  δ)(	  1 − 	  η) 	  − 	  τ	  E	  (t) − 	  ρ	  E(t) − dE	   t 	  	  	  	   (6.13) 
The system of the equation is representing the worm propagation process in a scale-free 
heterogeneous network of static and mobile nodes without considering the impact of user-
behaviour. Since user-behaviour is considered as an independent variable with a value ranging 
from zero to one, removing the variable with an average value also reduces the number of 
exposed nodes and hence the number of infectious nodes as well. 
6.8.3.  Node Mobility 
The mobility of nodes plays an important role in the worm propagation process and it is 
represented as ‘η′ in equation 6.11. Excluding the mobility factor produces the following set 
of equations. 	  	  I	   t + 1 = 	  𝛕	  E	   t − 	  d	  I	   t − 	  γ	  I	   tR	   t + 1 = 	  ρ	  E t + 	  γ	  I	   t + 	  S	   t I t s	   δ β − 	  d	  R	   tS	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  −	  S	  (t)	   I t s	  [(1	  – 	  δ)(1 − β) + δβ] 	  + 	  bN	   − d	  S	  (t)E	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  S	  (t)	   I t s(1	  – 	  δ) 1 − β − 	  𝛕	  E	  (t) − 	  ρ	  E(t) 	  − dE	   t            (6.14) 
Equation 6.14 represents a static scale-free and heterogeneous network of nodes without 
mobility. Since the mobility factor is computed using different node-related parameters, it is 
considered as an independent variable. The value of the mobility factor ranges from zero to 
one, thus considering the average value reduces the number of exposed nodes and therefore, 
the infectious nodes. 
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6.8.4.  Network Degree Distribution 
The network degree distribution is represented by ‘φ’ where φ = 1 refers to a network with 
uniform degree distribution while the scale-free networks, considered in the worm propagation 
process, have skew degree distribution with φ > 1.  	  I	   t + 1 = 	  𝛕	  E	   t − 	  dI	   t − 	  γ	  I	   tR	   t + 1 = 	  ρ	  E t + 	  γ	  I t + 	  S	   t I t 	   δ β η − 	  dR	   tS	  (t + 1) 	  = 	  −	  S	  (t)I	  (t)	  [ 1	  – 	  δ 1 − β 1 − 	  η + δβ	  η] 	  + 	  bN	   − dS	  (t)E	   t + 1 = 	  S	   t I(t)	  (1	  – 	  δ) 1 − β (1 − 	  η) − 	  𝛕	  E	  (t) − 	  ρE(t) − dE	   t 	  	    (6.15) 
The system of equations represents a network with nodes having even degree distribution. The 
process of infection is uniform and there are no super-spreading phenomena involve. 
6.9.   Summary 
The role of mobility-related factors in the early phases of the worm propagation process was 
studied in this chapter. The impact of the mobility of nodes, the worm size and of the wireless-
link bandwidth was observed in the results by considering different P2P protocols such as 
Gnutella and GIA protocols. 
A decrease in the infection peak due to the increased value of node mobility was observed for 
both Gnutella and GIA protocols. These results led to the conclusion that node mobility 
reduces the infection rate due to wireless-environment-specific parameters, such as signal 
strength, path fading and interference.  
Compared to wired links, wireless links significantly reduce the throughput, and due to this 
phenomenon; the worm propagation slows down significantly, compared with the results 
shown by the SIM and PQ models. Such a delay could not be shown in the simulations of M-
SEIR model from Matlab and Netlogo due to the limitations of the tools. However, a delay in 
Netlogo simulations was recorded for Gnutella and GIA protocols (Netlogo can record ticks 
only in an observed mode). The delay was many times more than that observed for wired links. 
This suggests that infection propagation in wireless networks is slow, compared with that in 
wired networks. The reason for this is the high value of throughput on wired links, compared 
with wireless links for same value of bandwidth. 
179	  |	  P a g e 	  
	  
The results were tested for 500 nodes, which is admittedly a limited number of nodes, but this 
was due to the processing limitations imposed by the ABM tool (Netlogo). However, this 
model (M-SEIR) can be tested on a larger number of nodes, a possibility that can be realised 
in future work. 
Bandwidth factor did not get significant research attention from the perspective of P2P worm 
propagation and demonstrated to have significant role during the process. It is observed that 
the process slows down many times in wireless networks as compared to wired networks. 
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  : CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE WORK 
7.1.   Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis and discusses potential future work. Firstly, there will be a 
brief but comprehensive summary of the research work carried out. Following this, a review 
of the objectives, which were initially set, will be given, and the methodology adopted to 
achieve these objectives will also be provided. This chapter identifies the limitations in the 
work and the potential directions for future work, indicated by the research carried out in this 
thesis. 
7.2.   Thesis Summary 
This research primarily focused on the impact of worms in P2P networks. Throughout this 
thesis, P2P networks, issues in P2P networks, worms, types of worm and worm propagation 
modelling techniques were discussed. New holistically integrated worm propagation models 
in unstructured P2P networks were also proposed, taking different factors into account. 
Moreover, various issues associated with model implementation were discussed in detail.  
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, P2P networks, its associated issues and challenges, 
worms, types of worm and worm propagation modelling techniques were discussed. Among 
the different threat and challenges in P2P domain, this research primarily focused on the 
impact of worms in P2P networks.  
The research concludes that the worm propagation process is to a great extent affected by 
different factors such as configuration diversity, user-behaviour, the infection time lag and the 
mobility of nodes. Therefore, new holistically integrated worm propagation models in 
unstructured P2P networks were proposed, taking different factors into account. Moreover, 
several issues associated with model implementation were discussed in detail. 
Furthermore, a comparative research study has shown that infection propagation can be 
reduced due to the natural immunity against worms that can be provided by a holistic 
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exploitation of the range of factors proposed in this work. Additionally, the exploitation of a 
promising modelling paradigm, Agent-based Modelling (ABM), in the P2P worm modelling 
context has been built and trialled in this research. 
The thesis began by briefly describing P2P networks, security issues in P2P networks and 
worm propagation as a dominant issue in P2P networks. It further set out the thesis statement, 
and the aims, the objectives and the structure of the thesis; it provided a clear path that was to 
be followed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two, introduced P2P networks, the 
characteristics of P2P networks, types such as unstructured and structured P2P systems and 
security-related issues. Common unstructured P2P protocols, such as GIA and Gnutella, were 
described in detail. The chapter further elaborated on the issues and challenges associated with 
P2P networks, such as scalability, the free-rider problem, quality of service, node mobility, 
social networks, conventional modelling tools and worm threats. Different conventional 
modelling tools were discussed within the context of P2P networks.  
Moreover, Agent-based modelling was introduced in this chapter as a new paradigm to solve 
the dilemma of the whole complex worm propagation process. Following this, multiple ABM 
tools were studied. The merits and demerits of ABM and conventional simulators were 
discussed from the perspective of P2P networks. A performance evaluation of GIA was then 
carried out, using conventional simulators such as Oversim and an ABM tool such as Netlogo. 
Hop-count and delay were considered as metrics of evaluation for both tools. It was found that 
ABM tools could be used to model different processes in P2P networks effectively. The 
chapter helped to lay the foundations for integrating the implementation of P2P protocols with 
the analytical models for worm propagation, using ABM tools. 
A detailed insight into P2P worms, their propagation behaviour and their destruction strength 
by presenting existing analytical models was introduced in the third chapter. Various famous 
P2P worms such as Code Red, Nimda, Slammer, Blaster and Conficker were discussed in 
terms of their origin, the vulnerability they exploit and the impact they have had on the whole 
network. Moreover, a detailed discussion of worm propagation models, their classification and 
different common immunization strategies was provided. A classification of existing worm 
propagation models, based on the propagation behaviour of worms, was provided. Gaps in the 
existing research were identified in the form of parameters that were not discussed in the 
existing mathematical models holistically. These parameters included the infection time-lag, 
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the configuration diversity and the user behaviour, all of which can affect the worm 
propagation process. Consequently, a new stochastic worm propagation model (SEIR) for 
active worms considering all these parameters was developed.  
Chapter four provided the results and a discussion related to SEIR analytical model, which 
was developed in Chapter 3. Two common unstructured P2P protocols, Gnutella and GIA, 
were selected as the protocols of observation for the results. The results were achieved using 
ABM tools and conventional tools. Furthermore, a detailed and comparative analysis of worm 
propagation behaviour was provided using different values for the factors with benchmark 
models. An integrated solution of SEIR model and of P2P protocol (Gnutella and GIA) 
implementation was found. The impact of different tools (ABM and Conventional) was 
evaluated from the perspective of the worm propagation process. It was concluded that the 
worm propagation process can be effectively represented by ABM tools and that this provided 
better controls, compared with the conventional network modelling tools. Certain aspects of 
the process, such as the simulation die-out behaviour and the network lock-down effect, which 
were not observed using conventional tools, were evident with ABM tools. It was also 
accepted that configuration diversity and user-behaviour can slow down the worm propagation 
process and can potentially serve as network immunizers. 
The evaluation of the proposed SEIR model with a real-world data set for one of the most 
recent worms (Conficker) was carried out in chapter five. The data set was obtained from 
CAIDA and analysed using the Wireshark tool. The data showed the various trends of the 
Conficker-affected traffic. The infection density was realised using SEIR model and then 
compared with that realised with the benchmark models, using conventional and ABM tools. 
The infection propagation values provided by all of these models, including SEIR model, were 
compared with the results based on the infection density values provided by the real data-set. 
The evaluation demonstrated that the predictions shown by SEIR model relating to infection 
density in the network were closest to the infection density values produced by the real data-
set. 
Chapter six started with an investigation into the previous work achieved regarding the impact 
of the mobility of nodes during the worm propagation process. The study revealed that only 
limited work had been done in this regard and it did not reflect the true picture of the impact 
of node mobility on the worm propagation process. Following this, different mobility models, 
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such as the Gauss-Markov mobility model and the Random Way Point (RWP) model, were 
studied to understand the movement of mobile nodes. The Gauss-Markov mobility model was 
selected to calculate the mobility factor because it keeps track of node velocity, is flexible for 
adjusting the randomness degree and maintains the spatial-temporal behaviour of the mobile 
node. Similarly, the bandwidth factor was calculated, taking into consideration the various 
parameters of the wireless networks, such as link-bandwidth and worm size.  
The role of mobility on P2P worm propagation was discussed thoroughly. Consequently, the 
mobility factor was integrated with SEIR model, which was thus extended to an M-SEIR 
model. The salient features of M-SEIR model are considering the spatial-temporal behaviour 
of nodes, node-level mobility-factor control, randomness control for individual nodes, 
throughput offered by the network and the worm size. The results were computed using Matlab 
and Netlogo, which again revealed that conventional tools fail to handle node-level control 
and the time-varying properties of the simulation. 
7.3.   Meeting the Objectives: Original Contributions 
The thesis objectives were stated in the first chapter of this thesis. The main objective was to 
understand the worm propagation process and to develop an analytical model to achieve these 
objectives. In striving to realise these aims, several other objectives were met, the details of 
which are given below. 
1.   The first objective was to investigate different P2P networks, conventional network 
modelling tools and ABM tools. To achieve this first objective, a thorough analysis of 
different P2P networks and protocols was carried out and described in Chapter 2. 
Different network modelling tools (ABM and conventional) were studied in detail. A 
comparative analysis of both types of tools was done by selecting OverSim as the 
conventional tool and Netlogo as the ABM tool. The observer’s metrics were hop-
count and delay. It was observed that ABM tools offered better help during the 
simulation by providing node level control, visual-aids and low-level programming 
support. 
2.   In Chapter 3, different worm propagation models, developed for unstructured P2P 
networks, were studied. These models were further classified, based on the 
propagation behaviour of worms. It was observed that most of the work done in the 
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literature is related to active worm propagation modelling while relatively little work 
has been done for other types of worms. Different parameters were found that may 
affect the propagation process and a list of the parameters for each type of model was 
generated. It was also noted that existing worm propagation models consider only a 
sub-set of parameters and ignore the super-set, which itself could lead to more accurate 
results. 
3.   A stochastic worm propagation model (SEIR), considering the infection time-lag, user-
behaviour and configuration diversity, was developed in Chapter 3. This model was 
evaluated for different parameter values, using infection density as the metric of 
measurement. The model was evaluated using Matlab and Netlogo. A major 
contribution was the implementation of two different P2P protocols, Gnutella and GIA, 
together with the analytical model. The results demonstrated that infection density is 
reduced in the case of high parameter values. Using ABM tools, important effects, 
such as simulation die-out behaviour and network lock-down effect, were observed. 
ABM was also shown to address worm propagation modelling better in terms of 
individual node handling, visual aid, the repetition of results for behaviour 
measurement, node coordination and handling varying time delays. 
4.   The evaluation of the proposed model (SEIR) was done, based on a real-world worm 
(Conficker) data-set obtained from CAIDA. The data-set was analysed using a 
Wireshark tool and Conficker-infected-traffic patterns were clearly observed. 
Following this, two different analytical models, selected as benchmarks, were given 
the same data-set. It was then observed that SEIR model matched closely the infection 
density behaviour provided by the real data, using the parameter values identified in 
the literature. 
5.   Addressing the impact of the mobility of nodes in an unstructured P2P network was 
set as a major objective. To find the answer, the mobility factor was computed for 
mobile nodes using the Gauss-Markov mobility model (Chapter 6). The impact of the 
wireless channel bandwidth and the worm size was also computed in the context of 
worm propagation. The mobility factor was integrated into SEIR model, thus 
expanding it into an M-SEIR model. The results from M-SEIR model were generated 
using Matlab and Netlogo and then comparatively evaluated.  
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7.4.   Limitations 
The research conducted in this thesis has provided an invaluable insight into understanding 
worm propagation behaviour. While important discoveries and contributions have been made 
by this research, there remain of course certain limitations.  These are noted below. 
•   Real-World Validation: The overwhelming majority of work done in this research 
area is based on a hypothetical worm. In our work, we report an initial validation of 
our developed analytical model through a Conficker worm dataset. However, more 
extensive comparative analysis of real-world worms with additional real data is still 
required, including comparison with other state-of-the-art models. 
•   Data Set Availability: Limited access to worm data was provided by various 
organizations such as CAIDA and CRAWDED6. However, this data was filtered and 
was missing some important values. It was also hard to analyse a very large data-set 
with the available existing tools. Customized programs and scripts are therefore 
required to enable a better analysis of the data. 
•   High Level of Abstraction: The results provided in this research were generated using 
conventional and ABM tools. It was observed that most commonly used conventional 
tools such as Matlab and Oversim have only limited software development support and 
do not provide a fine-level of control on programs to observe specific P2P worm 
process behaviour. As demonstrated in this work, during simulations, these tools 
impose certain restrictions on modelling behaviour, such as having variable delays in 
the propagation process and having a customizable derivative with allotted time for 
infection propagation. Considering this, tools that provide a low-level of control during 
programming/simulations are urgently required.  
•   Lack of Customized Tools: Due to the lack of support of modelling most common 
P2P protocols in existing tools, it becomes difficult to evaluate the results generated 
by these tools. A basic implementation of the protocol along with a customization 
option is required to get valid results. 
                                                
 
6 http://crawdad.org/ 
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•   Mathematical Analysis: Mathematical analysis of the proposed models has been 
discussed briefly. However, further mathematical evaluation still needs to be carried 
out of the impact of various state transition rates on the proposed models. 
7.5.   Future Work 
This research work opens new avenues for further research. Some possible research directions 
are given below: 
•   Hybrid Worms: A worm that can adopt different propagation strategies at different 
times or under different circumstances in a context-aware manner, is called a hybrid 
worm. An analytical model that predicts the propagation behaviour of such hybrid 
worms is a subject that would warrant further research.  
•   Big Data Analytics: The model was evaluated with a small number of network nodes 
with average query propagation rates. Big data has recently been gaining attention as 
it is generated by a variety of devices, including the Internet of Things (IoT), medical 
imageries, credit cards, mobile device location specific data through GPS, video 
streams and social media applications. The impact of worms within the context of big 
data is another field that clearly needs to be investigated. 
•   Scalability of the Analytical Model: The existing analytical model (M-SEIR) was 
developed while considering all the relevant factors affecting the worm propagation 
process. However, the model is scalable and can be enhanced to accommodate 
propagation behaviour or relatively more complex worms such as hybrid worms. This 
is another interesting area for further research. 
•   Synthetic Model: The availability of a real data-set is a challenge for validating the 
results. Creating a more realistic data-synthesis model that learns and generates the 
propagation data of different real-world worms is another possible research direction. 
•   Extension for Netlogo to Model P2P Worms: Netlogo, an ABM tool, can be 
extended by incorporating different P2P protocols, such as GIA, Gnutella and Kaaza. 
This will allow researchers to effectively utilize ABM tools and more effectively 
simulate the worm propagation process in mainstream P2P networks. 
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•   Develop a New Immunization Strategy: The parameters addressed in this research 
can help in devising immunization strategies for the impact of these parameters on 
immunization. Such strategies require further research and appropriate validation. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: M-SEIR Model and Biological Worms 
In this section, a brief study of biological worms and their propagation behaviour is studied. 
An attempt is made to link the factors addressed in M-SEIR model with the causes of 
biological worm spread. Little tweaks in current M-SEIR model are suggested to model the 
propagation behaviour of biological worms. 
A hookworm is affecting the humans from century from all over the world. The parasite of the 
disease get blood from intestine of infected hosts and spread via soil or other media [171]. It 
is observed that different persons have different immunity and therefore the infection 
probability from the hookworms is directly proportional to the immunity against worms. This 
refers to the configuration diversity factor of M-SEIR analytical model. It is also observed that 
the workers that are working in forests or constructions of rail road are less likely to be infected 
from hook worm as compared with sedentary working populations due to the reasons set [172].  
The studies indicate that repeatedly visiting same infectious place increases the probability of 
infection via hookworms. The mobility factor is already presented in M-SEIR model, however 
requires little tweaks to map to the fact described. The impact of frequency of visits to the 
infectious location in hookworm transmission can be added in the current analytical model to 
address this factor. 
Ebola epidemic began in Guinea during December 2013 and affected at least five countries. It 
spreads through different body fluids and can be stopped through early diagnoses, patient 
isolation, contact tracing and safe burial [173]. The incubation period, is the time between 
infection and the onset symptoms which refers to the infection time lag in M-SEIR model. A 
graph of infection over time for Ebola in West Africa is shown in Figure A.1. 
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Figure 8-1: Infection Propagation Over Time for Ebola 
 
 
Figure 8-2: Infection with Time 
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Thelazia callipaeda (Spirurida, Thelaziidae) is known as the “oriental eyeworm” because of 
its occurrence in the Far Eastern Countries (i.e., Indonesia, Thailand, China, Korea, Myanmar, 
India and Japan). This nematode infection induces from mild to severe ocular manifestations 
in animals, as well as in humans [174]. The spread of this worm is effected by immunity of 
each individual, the time required to get infected and the location of the individual. These 
parameters can easily be mapped to M-SEIR model with little modification. 
The aforementioned discussion shows that the proposed M-SEIR model can not only be used 
for modelling active P2P worms but can also simulate the behaviour of biological worms. 
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Appendix II:  Age-Structure and Stage-Structured Solutions 
The results from existing models for modelling the propagation behaviour of Conficker worm 
modelling are limited. The models do not address different factors such as infection time lag, 
configuration diversity and user-behaviour. An analytical model based on the concept of 
Lefkovitch matrix is created. Lefkovitch matrix is used for modelling state transition 
modelling in biological phenomena and handles the probabilities of transition [175], [176]. 
The Leslie matrix is another way of modelling age-structure of population.  
This matrix is also called ‘population projection matrix’ and dependent on age-dependent 
fecundities and proportional survivorships. The Leslie matrix is the correct approach for 
animals, but not for many plants. For them size or stage is more important than age. Instead, 
plants (and things like corals) are better described using a transition matrix approach.  
Taking the lead from this point, Lefkovitch is a transition matrix that can be used in the 
development of stage-structured analytical model. It contains all stage-specific transitions and 
seed production. There are i columns and j (= i) rows for a population with i stages as shown 
in table AII.1. The i=j, the value indicates that the fraction of organism that remains in the 
same state. 
Table 8-1: Lefkovitch Matrix 
A This year (t) 
t+1 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage i 
Stage 1 a11 a12 a1i 
Stage 2 a21 a22 a2i 
Stage j aj1 aj2 aji 
SEIR analytical model developed in chapter 3 is represented in the form of Lefkovitch matrix 
while keeping the same assumption as defined in chapter 3. Addition of different values of 
parameters and their impact on the worm propagation process will be observed in detail. 
Analytical Model for Conficker Worm 
The analytical model represented in this section is the continuation of SEIR analytical model 
developed in Chapter 4. Following assumptions and constraints are considered for the 
development of the analytical model: 
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1-   The analytical model considers random scanning of IP addresses which is a feature of 
Conficker worm. 
2-   Non-homogenous network with diverse user behaviour is considered.  
3-   Both propagation modes, global and local, are considered in the model by considering 
the degree distribution of connected nodes. 
4-   The variables used in the analytical model are shown in table 8-2: 
Table 8-2: Table of Notation 
Notation Description 
N Total number of nodes in the network 
S(t) Number of suspected nodes at time (t) 
E(t) Number of exposed nodes at time (t) 
I(t) Number of infectious nodes at time (t) 
R(t) Number of recovered nodes at time (t) 
Δ Configuration diversity. 0 ≤δ ≤ 1 
Β User behaviour. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 
Ki Degree of node i 
Ε Infection time lag 
Γ Infectious to removal rate 
Τ Rate of transition from exposed to infectious state 
˄ Birth rate of nodes in the network 
˅ Death rate of nodes in the network Γ Exposed to infection state transition probability 
Considering four states in the model, the state transition diagram is shown in figure 8-3: 
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S E I Ra21 a32 a43
 
Figure 8-3: State Transition Diagram 
The transition probabilities are explained without considering the birth and death rates of a 
state as: 
Table 8-3: Stage transition probabilities 
Transitions Probabilities 
A21 (1	  – 	  δ)	  x 1 − 	  β	    
A41 	   (δ)	  x β	    
A32 𝜋 
A42 1 − 𝜋 
A43 γ 
Given the above transitions and their probabilities, the Lefkovitch representation of four-
state analytical model is given as: 𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑅 =
0 −𝐴21 0 −𝐴41𝐴21 0 −𝐴32 −𝐴420 𝐴32 0 −𝐴34𝐴41 𝐴42 𝐴43 0 𝑥
𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑅 	  ------- (A.1) 
The matrix elements with negative values representing the state leaving probabilities. Solving 
the matrices in equation (A.1) yields following system of equations: 
S (t+1) = -A21 x E (t) – A41 x R (t) -----------------------(A.2) 
E (t+1) = A21 x S (t) – A32 x I (t) – A42 x R(t) ----------- (A.3) 
I (t+1) = A32 x E (t) – A34 x R (t) -------------------------(A.4) 
R (t+1) = A41 × S (t) + A42 ×E (t) + A43 × I(t) ----------- (A.5) 
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This equations (A2-A5) represent exactly SEIR model developed in chapter 3. Lefkovitch 
matrix provides a way to develop analytical models for stage-structured population with 
defined transition probabilities. In the subsequent sections, the results using SEIR analytical 
model will be taken using parameter values obtained from literature and compared with 
benchmark models developed on the same dataset 
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